Is the legal maxim of “justice delayed is justice denied,” frequently leveled against the International Criminal Court for its poor track record, an accurate description of the current situation in Darfur? Or, on the contrary, could the imperative of immediate justice, so often heralded as the sine qua non of a durable reconciliation, be temporarily suspended in the interest of peace? With these questions in mind, will explore what impact a temporary deferral of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir might have, and whether this “surrender of justice” could expedite the peace process. In short, could deferring the ICC arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir lead to peace in Sudan?
In Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced and thousands more killed since June 2011, when the government of Sudan began a campaign to crush an insurgency led by the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of groups aiming to overthrow the government of President Omar al-Bashir. Clashes between the rebels and the government have intensified since late 2013, but the conflict remains stuck in a stalemate. This paper analyzes the trajectory of this conflict, focusing primarily on South Kordofan state, and the relationship between current and past conflicts in Sudan, in particular the Second Civil War (1983-2005) and the Darfur conflict (2003-present). The aim of this paper is to conclude whether this armed struggle is a repeat of past conflicts – the same issues manifesting themselves in a different form – or whether it represents something new and different.
The conflict over Kashmir has been going on for more than 60 years with no real end in sight. The Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965, and 1999 were explicitly motivated by the Kashmiri conflict. Multiple outside efforts at mediation have failed. What makes the conflict all the more dangerous is that both Pakistan and India are nuclear-armed powers. The author argues in his article that what is needed to break this stalemate is a fundamental rethinking of Pakistan’s concept of national identity. Although India can also take substantive steps to resolve the issue, it is Pakistan that holds the key to breaking the Kashmiri stalemate.
The conflict between the Turkish government and the Partiya Karkeren Kuridstan or PKK has persisted to varying degrees of intensity since the latter’s founding in 1978. Over this time, tens of thousands have been killed on both sides. This devastating death toll combined with the litany of failed peace processes along the way have culminated to cement a stalemate with deep mistrust on both sides. Though the most recent peace overtures from the Erdogan government and subsequent withdrawal of PKK fighters from eastern Turkey brought hope of a breakthrough, that progress has now stalled as both sides look set to retrench against the perceived insincerity of the other. While the conflict is complex and dynamic, one aspect is often written off to the margins: the nature of the PKK itself. Many governments and analysts simply write the group off as a mere militant group, terrorist organization, or band of freedom fighters. In this paper, I argue that the stalemate currently being experienced is precisely because policymakers have failed to realize the true nature of what the PKK has become. Indeed, rather than conforming neatly to any one label, the PKK has transformed into a symbol of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Only when the peace process takes this into account will the stalemate truly have a chance to be broken.
A vast and beautiful country rich in natural resources, Colombia suffers from a chronic social, political, and agrarian imbalance. Though many praise it for having eluded the path of military dictatorship taken by practically all of its continental neighbors in the mid-to-late 20th century, this acclaim masks an underlying truth behind Colombia’s democratic façade. While other South American republics fell to military dictatorship, Colombia’s elites were often too divided or jealous of their power to hand the reigns of the State over to a cast of battle-hardened Cold and Korean War veterans – as many of the country’s top generals between the 1950s-1980s were. Or almost just as bad, the elites were too geographically removed from the majority of the population to be concerned. While Colombia is democratic today, it remains mired by guerrilla and drug-related violence, especially in its interior regions, far from the urban haunches of the country’s upper classes.