The K Stands for Kashmir, But It Doesn’t Have To

By
Pilgrims on Amarnath yatra, Kashmir, India
The K Stands for Kashmir, But It Doesn’t Have To - Anand Kandaswamy

Abstract

The conflict over Kashmir has been going on for more than 60 years with no real end in sight. The Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965, and 1999 were explicitly motivated by the Kashmiri conflict. Multiple outside efforts at mediation have failed. What makes the conflict all the more dangerous is that both Pakistan and India are nuclear-armed powers. The author argues in his article that what is needed to break this stalemate is a fundamental rethinking of Pakistan’s concept of national identity. Although India can also take substantive steps to resolve the issue, it is Pakistan that holds the key to breaking the Kashmiri stalemate.

Introduction

In a 1933 document with the somewhat apocalyptic title Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever? a young Cambridge student named Choudhary Rahmat Ali coined the term Pakistan. The name had a double meaning. In Urdu and Persian, it meant, “Land of the Pure.” However, the name also functions as an acronym. As Ali laid out in his declaration, “This alternative is a separate Muslim Federation of at least our five predominantly Muslim units - Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan.”[1]

Ali was an ambitious and controversial figure who is nearly forgotten in the land whose birth he sought. This is due in part to his disagreements with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azamwho is regarded as the true founder of Pakistan, and other Muslim elites who made up the ruling class of the new nation-state. Ali’s obscurity is also due to the fact that he wanted to create a non-contiguous series of Muslim homelands within India, which was a non-starter for both the predominantly Hindu Congress Party and the All-India Muslim League. Although much of what Ali called for in his manifesto was politically unworkable, his idea of Kashmir as a natural part of Pakistan still holds a great deal of sway among many Pakistanis.

India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, a man from a Kashmiri Brahmin family, contested this Pakistani wish and saw Kashmir as an integral part of his country. In some ways, the fight by two large countries over the fate of Kashmir is odd. The land is geographically remote, somewhat inaccessible, and not highly populated. Although scenically beautiful, Kashmir does not possess huge stores of valuable raw materials or any sort of important industrial capacity.

The real reason each country wished and still wishes to possess Kashmir is ideological in nature, not economic or strategic. The All-India Muslim League believed that Indian Muslims would not be fairly treated in independent India.[2] Jinnah and his colleagues called for two nations – one for Hindus and one for Muslims. Jinnah knew that it was not practicable to rule over Muslim-majority territories within India, but he sought control over every Muslim population center in South Asia outside of India proper’s borders – which meant Kashmir and what would one day become Bangladesh. If Pakistan did not possess Kashmir, then the project of Pakistan – the homeland of South Asian Muslims – would be called into question.

For Nehru and his colleagues, including Muslim Congress leaders like Maulana Azad who chose to stay in India, Kashmir also went to the heart of what their new nation meant. For the resolutely secular Nehru, India was a homeland for all – Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and others. Letting Kashmir go to Pakistan would implicitly mean that Jinnah had been correct and that India would not fairly treat its religious minorities. Beyond his personal connection to Kashmir, this was intolerable to Nehru and meant that he was willing to consider all sorts of actions, including military conflict, to keep it.[3]

The result then was to create a stalemate. Although India and Pakistan have fought four wars, three of them explicitly over Kashmir (1947, 1965, 1999), any resolution of the Kashmiri issue sometime soon seems to be remote. In 1999, India and Pakistan fought their latest war over the issue, the Kargil War, which was made doubly dangerous by the fact that both countries were nuclear powers – the only “hot war” in human history to be fought by nuclear powers. More than 65 years after independence, Kashmir is divided between Indian and Pakistani forces, staring each other down over the Line-of-Control.

The Kashmiri issue goes to foundational questions and thus seems very difficult to navigate. Both countries have a stake in Kashmir because the territory goes to their self-images as countries, as noted above. But one must also realize that there is a fundamental asymmetry at work here as well.

After reading any number of works on the Kashmir issue, it becomes clear to any analyst that Pakistan needs Kashmir more than India does. As Stephen Cohen notes in his perceptive book,The Idea of Pakistan, “The staunchest advocates of the idea of Pakistan (in contrast to those who take a more relaxed view as citizens of Pakistan) feel that their identity is wrapped up in the fate of Kashmir…”[4] Even a cursory reading of the relevant literature confirms Cohen’s insight. The issue of Kashmir is existential to Pakistan in a way it is not for India.

Some of this is due to the trauma of the 1971 war with India, the one war that was not explicitly fought over Kashmir. The creation of the independent nation of Bangladesh (with help from India) was a huge trauma for most Pakistanis, but most especially, the elites.[5] A Muslim-majority territory had seceded from Pakistan because it wanted to. To West Pakistan, or what is now Pakistan, this raised a frightening specter.

Pakistan became more homogeneous after the Bengalis left, but it still has a large number of tribal and ethnic divisions. Pakistani elites have appealed to a shared Muslim identity repeatedly throughout their national history, and even more so since the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia, to ease other tensions which threaten the integrity of the Pakistani state.

The resolution of the Kashmiri issue therefore should not be viewed in isolation. To solve the Kashmir conundrum requires policy makers to look outside the borders of that beautiful vale, and to examine more closely the political situations of the two countries who contest it and the superpower that has tried, unsuccessfully, to resolve the issue at different times: the United States. By examining the political structures of each country, we might try to pose some tentative solutions to the Kashmiri issue. It is my thesis that the Kashmir problem can only be resolved by answering the more foundational questions that plague India and Pakistan.

The Pakistani Past

The analysis should start with Pakistan, the country which has more to lose with respect to Kashmir. Although there has not been any major fighting over Kashmir since 1999, the use of force has threatened to flare up several times since.[6] As noted above, Pakistani society is deeply divided by ethnic divisions.

Pakistanis can be relatively easily divided into seven distinct groups, based on the languages they speak – Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Baluchi, Saraiki, and others.[7] Punjabis, who make up a little less than half of Pakistan’s population, are the ruling caste – with a disproportionate share in the upper reaches of the political and military leadership.[8] The Pashtuns, Baluchis, and Sindhis have historically never gotten along with their Punjabi co-religionists, with enmities that go back decades and sometimes, centuries. The Pakistani central government has had to spend a great deal of time and effort suppressing separatist movements among these three linguistic groups in particular.[9] In more recent times, many Pashtuns have been driven into the arms of the Taliban.

This conflict is due in large part to Punjabi intransigence over sharing power. Not only are the Punjabis disproportionately represented in the leadership cadre of Pakistan, but they also control much of the economic life of the country. In India, discrimination against Muslims varies state-to-state and person-to-person, with discrimination being especially prevalent in the conservative Hindu states that make up what is sometimes derisively called the “Cow Belt.” In India, it is possible for religious minorities to attain great power – as attested to by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, and former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam (a Muslim and India’s most famous missile scientist).

In contrast, one cannot really point to Pashtuns or Baluchis who have played a major role in Pakistani politics (the Bhuttos are Sindhis). There have always been efforts to include these minority groups in the rule of the country, but most often, the major decisions of Pakistan have been made by Punjabi and Urdu speakers. Despite being a land that professes to elevate all Muslims, regardless of caste or background, this ideal has not been achieved.

To give another example, Baluchistan was pulled into Pakistan in 1958, against its will according to scholars George Perkovich and Selig Harrison.[10] Since then, the Pakistani army has ruled over the Baluchis in the brutal fashion that they accuse the Indians of (often correctly) ruling Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has apparently sanctioned the assassination of powerful Baluchi leaders.[11] The Pakistani government has also spent a great deal of effort trying to prevent the Baluchis from forming an alliance with another oppressed Muslim Pakistani group – the Sindhis. Perkovich and Harrison also accuse Pakistan’s government of economically exploiting the Baluchis for raw materials.[12]

So far, attempts to encourage greater power-sharing within Pakistan have come to naught. Punjabi and Urdu speakers do not seem to want to give up their privileged position and the central government, even under non-Punjabis like the Bhuttos, has not really done much to force them to behave otherwise. But their continued grip on power has to be realized by them and others to make a mockery of what Pakistan professes to stand for. As is true all over the world, the gap between a professed ideal and its manifestation is large.

This, then, explains one of the main reasons why Pakistani elites feel they cannot compromise on the Kashmir issue. Doing so means that a greater focus would be brought to bear on the issue of minority rights in Pakistan. As long as Pakistani elites continue to fight “the good fight” for their Muslim brothers in Kashmir, they can obfuscate the issue of why power is concentrated in the hands of the few. But as ongoing tensions in the tribal area prove, the Kashmir issue might not be enough to continue distracting the Pakistani populace.

Here, a parallel can be drawn between the United States and Pakistan. During the early Cold War years, the United States was in the odd position of advocating for (anti-communist) democracies (or quasi-democracies) abroad while denying its black citizens in the South fundamental rights, like to vote. This discrepancy was noted and harped upon, not only by the Soviet Union and its allies, but also by American diplomats – even conservatives like John Foster Dulles who lamented the effect segregation was having on America’s ability to find allies in the Third World. Eventually, the tension was too much to sustain and the United States had to take steps to make its African-American citizens full and equal members of the country. Pakistan’s government should not have to wait for the Baluchi or Pashtun Martin Luther King Jr. to start taking action to extend the full benefits of Pakistani citizenship to its minorities. Distracting people with the Kashmir issue is not enough. Indeed, the central government might find that if it starts taking steps to redress minority grievances, then solving the Kashmir issue might become simpler.

The issue of Kashmir, of course, does not hinge only on minority rights in Pakistan. Much more complicated, and more difficult to discern, is the issue of political Islam, which I will refer to here as Islamism (a not uncontroversial nomenclature). To understand the role Islamist tendencies have played in Pakistan, it is necessary to go back to the founding of the country.

Although Jinnah and his supporters wanted a Muslim nation, they were basically secular in orientation and outlook. Jinnah, who ate pork and drank wine, was no religious fanatic and he did not want Pakistan to go down the fundamentalist route. What he wanted was essentially an Islamic market-oriented nation where that identity was important but not all-consuming.

The Slide into Islamism

Although Pakistan had stability problems from the beginning, its early leaders eschewed political Islam because they were conscious that it was a double-edged sword. That changed with the rise to power of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was an outsider in many ways, not only by virtue of his Sindhi (and Kurdish) heritage but because he was the first Pakistani leader who sincerely wanted to take on the political elites – the landowners and factory owners who were the major beneficiaries of the Pakistani state. Bhutto was considered a “leftist” in his country for these reasons and because he had a genuine interest in socialist economics.

However, he faced a major problem. Given Pakistan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, it would be difficult to rally the population around a common cause. There was no common identity, except for one – political Islam. Thus Bhutto can be credited (or blamed, depending on your perspective) for injecting Islamist tendencies into the Pakistani body politic. As Stephen Cohen notes, “Bhutto took on the Establishment (of Pakistan) by cynically merging the two ideologies that had been anathema to it, socialism and Islam, proclaiming a vision of Pakistan as an Islamic and Socialist state.”[13] 

Bhutto was an idealist in many ways, but like some Tammany Hall politico, he also knew how to appeal in a base fashion to his constituents. He knew a divided country needed a common ideal to rally around and he chose Islam, which had been previously eschewed by the political leadership as too risky. What happened next seems predictable to all, save Bhutto. A vicious circle was created whereby rising politician in Pakistani society had to rely on Islam to compete with the more populist parties.[14] Whatever taboo had been in place about invoking Islam was thrown to the wind and there was a movement to codify Sharia law by some powerful, peasant-backed political leaders.[15]

Bhutto’s successor (and the man who ordered his execution), General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was less scrupulous than his predecessor had been about using political Islam. As Navnita Chadha Behera notes in a Brookings Institution study, “While the Bhutto government began the process by according greater importance to the ulemas (Islamic legal scholars), sectarianism took root during the Zia regime.*[16] Zia took steps not previously tolerated in Pakistani political life, like taking Saudi money to help support more fundamentalist elements in Pakistani society.[17] He discriminated against minority Shiites and aided Sipah-e-Sahaba, a fanatical anti-Shia group.[18] In 1979, he introduced an Islamic Penal Code – something that would have greatly displeased Jinnah.

Zia seems to have been more genuinely devout and devoted to Islamic thought than the more cynical Bhutto. Whatever his motivations, however, he did a great deal of damage to Pakistan’s civil fabric. Aiding and abetting him was an American policy championed by the Reagan White House. During the last decade of the Cold War, the Reagan administration’s policy was basically to help anti-Communist forces wherever they might appear in the world – be it in Central America, Africa, or South-Central Asia.

Zia, whatever his many faults, knew how to play American public opinion. He jettisoned the socialist aspect of Bhutto’s platform and focused largely on the Islamist part. Because he made himself into a valuable ally in America’s struggles against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, American policy makers gave him the benefit of the doubt when skepticism was warranted.

This was a mistake. The Iranian Revolution was destined to exacerbate Shia-Sunni tensions in Pakistan, but Zia stoked anti-Shia feelings to cover up for Pakistan’s inadequate provision of social welfare services. The combination of huge amounts of illiteracy and Islamist instruction are not a recipe for social tranquility. But the elites who could have checked Zia were supine in their protestations against the Islamist tide.

Why was this? Because they were playing one of the oldest games in the book. By complying with their ruler, the privileged classes were able to claw back some of the privileges they had lost under a genuine reformer like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This model can be seen in other societies.

Consider Japan after World War II. To preserve their privileges, the Japanese elites, taking the advice of leaders like Shigeru Yoshida, complied with some fundamental changes to their society, acquiescing when they needed to and resisting when they saw the opportunity.[19] In Pakistan, the owners of capital and the army and the intelligence services, some of whom disdained political Islam, decided they could benefit materially and politically from a more Islamic state.

Zia died in a plane crash in 1988, but his legacy has long outlasted him. Although none of his successors have matched him in devoutness, with the possible exception of Nawaz Sharif, they have all, at times, had to adopt the banner of political Islam to navigate the tensions in Pakistani society. Besides ceding power to unelected ulemas and imams, Zia’s policies have had other unintended consequences – particularly in Kashmir.

Islamic thought is rich and varied and there have always been clashes in interpretations among scholars and religious figures. But what Zia and others chose to ignore is that religious clashes are often settled with violence and not always during infrequent (or rigged) elections. Without a viable state mechanism to channel some of the Islamist thought, it fed on itself and grew to encompass and create pockets of fanaticism throughout the country, particularly the disadvantaged sectors.

The effect of all this is obvious. When the Kashmir issue began to be seen in more religious and foundational terms, it made compromise with the Indians much harder. Compromise, the heart of politics, becomes a dirty word when you are fighting Hindu infidels for what is part of God’s own country. The Pakistani elite, by exploiting extreme religious sentiment or keeping quiet when it reared its head, created a monster they could only imperfectly control later on. In the years since, some Pakistani leaders, like General Musharraf, have tried to find a viable compromise with India over the issue of Kashmir, but find themselves checked or thrown out of power by more fundamentalist forces.

Going Forward

It is my contention that to solve the Kashmiri stalemate, the process of Islamization must be reversed. A settlement cannot be reached on Kashmir without solving the fundamental problem of Pakistani society – the use of Islamism to cover up domestic economic and social failures. What can be done to undo the process? In some ways, the repair project is underway. There have been some efforts in the past decade to cut down on religious-based laws. The ISI has become more aware of the dangers of stoking religious sentiment and the new army chief, Raheel Sharif, seems less likely to stoke religious tensions to achieve his goals – unlike his predecessor General Kayani.[20] But the damage done by Islamism is substantial and Raheel Sharif’s decision to minimize (for the time being) the army’s more overt movements will not be enough to undo the damage on its own.

There is a country that does offer a model for Pakistan going forward, but it is a country that the Pakistani elites despise, according to former ambassador Husain Haqqani.[21] That country is Bangladesh. Born out of Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh had a tumultuous birth and a period where the military was excessively involved in civilian affairs. For the last twenty years, Bangladesh has been on a shaky but stable course of democratization with relatively minimal military interference.

Bangladesh is a Muslim country that had found a way to keep its Islamic identity without excluding everything else that is not related to that identity. An analysis of Bengali politics over the past ten years shows that the elites have made a determined effort to keep political Islam out of the political arena. For that reason, Bangladesh is much more stable today than Pakistan is. Bangladesh shows that one can obey secular laws and still be a good Muslim. Bangladesh has many issues with India, but the more secular outlook of the country makes it easier to negotiate on those issues. The Pakistanis might look down on the Bangladeshis but they do so at their own cost.

Besides looking at the Bangladeshi model, the Pakistanis need to go further. If they want to decrease religious influence in politics, then they should attack the root causes of what led Bhutto and Zia to bring up Islam in the first place. Namely, a sustained effort is needed to respect minority rights. The army is very resistant to this notion, but the Pakistani government needs to consider devolving more power to the Baluchis, Pashtuns, and Sindhis. If those groups can have some measure of autonomy without fearing ISI reprisals, then they will feel more in control of their own destinies and thus be less susceptible to religious fanaticism or appeals from groups like the Taliban.

The Role of the United States

It is here that the United States can play a small but positive role. America, quite justifiably, had been concerned with terrorist attacks since 9/11. The Obama administration has made extensive use of drone strikes to kill high value al-Qaeda targets. But these drone strikes are also politically toxic for the Pakistani central government. Furthermore, they embitter those groups – the Pashtuns and Baluchis – whom Pakistan is already most estranged from. If the US wants Pakistan to take small steps towards devolving power to the regions and becoming more secular, then it needs to stop using drones in such an extensive manner. The Republicans might criticize the Obama administration for this move, but it will greatly help the Pakistani government in maintaining better relations with those minorities and eventually devolving power to them once they can be trusted. The US should reserve drone strikes only for the most high-value targets.

The United States should also change its negotiating posture with the Pakistanis. Too often, American policymakers have neglected Pakistan when pressing US interests were not on the line. This neglect has understandably made Pakistani politicians wary of the US, which seems to come to Pakistan only to achieve short-term American interests.

Americans must also realize that their goals are often divergent from Pakistani ones. As former ambassadors Howard B. and Teresita C. Schaffer note in their 2011 study, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, “…[t]here is also a more troublesome asymmetry between the two countries’ objectives. During their periods of most intense collaboration, Pakistan and the United States have decided to disregard significant differences in their strategic goals and priorities.”[22]

Ignoring this asymmetry in goals has been in no one’s interests. One the issue of the future of Afghanistan, there are real and perhaps unbridgeable differences between the United States and Pakistan. However, I do not believe that Kashmir is one of those issues. Although the US does not seem to have the same stake in the issue that Pakistan and India do, the Obama administration knows that having two nuclear-armed powers fighting over land is a dangerous situation. Tensions in South Asia endanger US interests in that vital area of the world.

Instead of the cynical and self-defeating payments to Pakistan that often gets channeled to the worst elements, the United States should be willing to trade future drone strikes to get India and Pakistan to make significant concessions to each other in Kashmiri negotiations. It can also offer greater consultation on the issue of American raids on the Pakistani-Afghan border. The United States should also completely reevaluate its aid program to Pakistan and consider whether it wants to continue giving aid if that aid invariably ends up getting controlled, in large part, by the ISI or other entities that are most resistant to peace with India. It might be more useful to channel that aid to NGOs that are building secular schools and advancing progressive causes that will lessen the grip of the fundamentalist forces in Pakistan and that make a current resolution of the Kashmiri issue so difficult.

India’s Responsibilities

There is a fundamental asymmetry at the heart of the Kashmiri conflict: Pakistan has more to lose than does India. That is in large part because India is more prosperous and more stable. Thus, India should be willing to accommodate Pakistan more than Pakistan should accommodate India, because it is much harder for Pakistan to negotiate. India, unlike Pakistan, can be much surer of its future territorial integrity.

The Pakistanis were deeply traumatized by the loss of Bangladesh and there is an elite consensus among the Pakistanis that no more territory can be relinquished. Indian elites are often blithely indifferent to these concerns. The Indians develop good relations with Hamid Karzai, educated in partly in India, and do not seem to understand why the Pakistanis feel threatened. The Pakistani policy elite have a fearful view of the world and believe that enemy powers are seeking to dismember their country. That might seem like paranoia to an outsider, but the fact is that India must understand and counter that belief if it wants to negotiate with the Pakistanis in good faith. 

One tangible step that India can take would be to reduce the size of its defense budget. India spends more proportionately on defense than China does. Pakistan knows that it cannot compete with India’s military on conventional terms and it gets (rightly) agitated when it sees India building up its defense capabilities in ways that seem anathema to Pakistan’s national interests. During the Kargil War, India was able to mobilize its superior conventional forces to recapture in a short period of time the strategic points that it had lost to Pakistan.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has already hinted that India’s somewhat weak current economy might necessitate budget cuts.[23] India’s defense budget should be the major source of those future cuts. The size and strength of India’s forces are such that it can afford major cuts and still compete with Pakistan militarily. Indian policy elites might complain that the armed forces are actually being developed to check China, but the Chinese have a conventional force superiority that India would not be able to surmount, even with vast increase in the military budget. Indian policy makers have great ambitions for their country in the 21stcentury and budget cuts could be channeled into areas like infrastructure spending and education, which will have the benefit of boosting the Indian economy and relieving some of the tensions in Pakistan caused by India’s conventional force superiority.

India also needs to take another step to resolve the Kashmir crisis. It needs to acknowledge in a forthright manner that it has not always lived up to the secular outlook of Nehru and that sectarian tension has cost many innocent Indian Muslims to lose their lives. Indian policy makers need to let Pakistani leaders know that they understand the reasons for the Pakistani state and that Indian troops have often behaved very badly in Kashmir toward its Muslim inhabitants. India could offer to recognize the existing Line-of-Control that demarcates the portions of Jammu and Kashmir that each nation controls and that future decisions over the vale will be the result of multiparty talks that takes into account the voices of Kashmiri Muslims.

Conclusion

It is my belief that although the United States and India should do a great deal more to resolve the Kashmiri issue, it is Pakistan that faces the greatest challenges (and rewards). For Pakistan to reach a settlement on Kashmir, it needs to cure its own society. It needs to do two specific things – repair its relations with its domestic minorities and try to curb the influence of political Islam. Neither will be easy to do. Decades of Islamism have corroded Pakistani civil society, the press, and even large segments of the population.

However, for a nation often tottering on the brink of failed state status, with restive minorities and a nuclear-armed enemy, the Pakistani elites have no choice. In the 21st century, Pakistan needs to be an Islamic nation with a secular civil sector. Pakistan needs to break out of the stalemate that it finds itself in and forge a new future for its large and growing population – one that incorporates the wishes of all its people and where power sharing among ethnic groups is not a fantasy. In other words, it might want to return to the precepts of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and ignore its ideological founder, Choudhary Rahmat Ali. The “K” may stand for Kashmir, but it does not have to.

Notes & References

  1. Full text of “Now or Never” by Choudhary Rahmat Ali athttp://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html (28 January, 1933).
  2. See The Idea of Pakistan by Stephen Cohen, 2004, 28-29.
  3. See Nehru by Stanley Wolpert for a greater discussion of Nehru’s general attitudes and the origins of his commitment to Kashmir.
  4. The Idea of Pakistan, 52.
  5. Ibid, 54-56.
  6. See Kashmir in Conflict by Victoria Schofield, 2010, 220-224.
  7. See Official Pakistani Census Data at http://www.census.gov.pk/MotherTongue.htm.
  8. See “Will Pakistan Break Up?” by George Perkovich and Selig Harrison (10 June, 2009) athttp://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/10/will-pakistan-break-up/1rqf.
  9. See The Idea of Pakistan, 177.
  10. See “Will Pakistan Break Up?” by George Perkovich and Selig Harrison (10 June, 2009) athttp://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/10/will-pakistan-break-up/1rqf, paragraph 4.
  11. See Admiral Mullen: Pakistani ISI sponsoring Haqqani attacks by Thomas Joscelyn, 22 September 22 2011, inThe Long War Journal athttp://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/09/admiral_mullen_pakis.php#ixzz2yBuMBkde.
  12. Perkovich and Harrison, paragraph 4.
  13. See The Idea of Pakistan, 144.
  14. Ibid,167.
  15. Ibid.
  16. See Demystifying Kashmir by Navnita Chadha Behera, 2006, 197.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Ibid, 198.
  19. See Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II by John W. Dower, 2000, 364.
  20. See Pakistan’s Next Top General by Omar Waraich in The New Yorker athttp://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/12/pakistans-next-top-general.html.
  21. See Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military by Husain Haqqani, 2005, 62.
  22. Ibid, 178.
  23. See Government May Cut Down on Defense Budget by Rajat Pandit athttp://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-11-23/india/44389011_1_defence-budget-south-china-sea-third-party-intervention.
Anand Kandaswamy is an M.A. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He holds a J.D. from Yale Law School and a B.A. from Rutgers College. He is a current and active member of the New Jersey state bar. After practicing law in Washington, D.C. and New Jersey, he decided to pursue a degree in international relations, and hopes to work in a field that combines interests in international public policy and the law.