The International Labor Organization’s Global Labor Regime and Extractive Industry Regulations

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The International Labor Organization’s Global Labor Regime and Extractive Industry Regulations - Kazushige Kobayashi


The ILO revised its strategy in a meaningful way when the soft law-based Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was introduced in 1998. In the same time frame, other spheres of international regulation, such as extractive industries, have accumulated a handful of regulatory successes and failure during the last decade. Extractive industry regulation is a salient example of soft law-based regulation where various private companies, such as firms and NGOs, have developed a form of non-centralized regulation with limited state authority and intervention that increasingly resembles the case of the ILO’s global labor regime. By analyzing these developments through the scope of rational choice theory, this paper examines the lessons the ILO global labor regime may learn from the practices of extractive industry regulation.


The history of international relations is akin to the human trial of “governance without government.”1,2 At the beginning of the twentieth century, creating international organizations was the answer to the shortcomings of global public goods and the increasing interdependence of nations. This frame of mind has changed, however. “Throughout the UN system there is a fundamental and radical shift from a vision of international leadership to one of service to member states.”3 As one of the oldest organs of the United Nations, inherited from the League of Nations, the history of the International Labour Organization (ILO) can be described as a constant oscillation between being an efficient secretary and an effective general.4 But, after making it through a series of zeniths and crises, the ILO began a new chapter of international labor governance in 1998 with the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.5 Today, the shift of production locations from developed to developing countries, the emergence of new business and aid actors in Africa, and the unemployment accelerated by the global financial crisis make global labor standards more relevant and imperative in the realm of global governance.

The structure of global governance has changed drastically since 1998. In today’s increasingly interconnected world, national boundaries can no longer define the core nature of transcending issues, nor can sovereign government alone effectively establish a sphere of control. Moreover, transnational corporations are often as powerful as states, yet held far less accountable.6 For example, already in 2000, 29 out of the world’s 100 largest economies were multinational corporations.7 The world’s largest multinational corporation in 2000 was Exxon Mobile, with a value added of $66 billion per year that exceeds the GDP of Pakistan, Vietnam, Hungary and New Zealand.8 In such a world of less capable states and more powerful corporations, the ILO has increasingly bypassed states and tried to engage directly with global businesses. In this sense, the ILO’s global labor regime has increasingly resembled private or hybrid forms of regulation, while at the same time implications from existing practices of this nature remain unclear. This paper aims to extract lessons from prominent practices in extractive industry regulations, and in doing so will ask what the ILO’s global labor regime can learn from them. In the first section, I argue that the ILO’s global labor regime has been reshaped in recent years, in terms of its drastic shift from convention-based hard law approach to a soft law approach that encompasses states as well as firms. The second section clarifies the theoretical framework as well as definitions of related terms of importance. The third section analyzes the lessons learned from the extractive industry regulations, while section four applies them to analyze the ILO’s new global labor regime through the scope of rational choice theory. The final section concludes.

Theoretical Framework and Definitions

According to Stiglitz, there are two ways of producing global public goods: through enlightened unilateral leadership or by means of an environment that nurtures the space and capacity to generate shared values.9 This notion is applicable not only to states but also to global corporations. Although the emergence of social business - also called double bottom line or social venture by Kaul 2006 - has been highlighted in recent years, this essay primarily focuses on traditional profit maximizing multinational corporations (MNC’s) that constitute the core of global commercial transaction.10 Social ventures are established to improve the state of society through utilizing market mechanisms and business innovation.11 For such socially motivated firms, the type of enlightened unilateral (or unicorporate) leadership discussed above is likely and plausible. On the other hand, the vast majority of MNC’s live in a world purely defined by financial gain. In other words, adherence to regulation and exercise of social responsibility are not the prime objective for these firms, but are rather constraints under which they endeavor to maximize their profit. In analyzing how these MNC’s can best participate in a global labor regime, a rationalist perspective should be applied. A key assumption of the rationalist school is that “institutions do not modify underlying state interests but by changing the informational environment, they change state strategies in such a way that self-interested states find it easier to cooperate with each other.”12 Other important elements of the approach are generally borrowed from microeconomics; rational, self- interested, and egoistic actors interested in maximizing their utility under the given ordering of preferences determine their action based on cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the shadow of the future as well as reputation and reciprocity. Behavioral constraints such as time, technology and regulation also exist.13

Although the rationalist school or rational choice theory is widely applied to analyze inter-state cooperation under anarchy, this theoretical framework is critically relevant in examining the role of the ILO in shaping a new global labor regime. The situation of anarchical international society resembles the global labor regime, since no central authority can establish globally-applicable labor standards or universally binding regulations. Thus, the ILO’s influence lies in changing and shaping an environment in which self- interested nations adjust their behavior to maximize material and reputational utility rather than in trying to alter state interest itself. Rational choice theory was particularly innovative in terms of its application of traditional microeconomic analysis to nation states, whereas both firm and nation are presumed to be unitary actors acting on their economic and national interests, respectively. Coming from a microeconomic perspective, the rationalist approach is particularly significant in investigating the mechanism through which MNC’s are involved in a global labor regime where reputation plays a vital role in ordering preferences.

In analyzing global labor regime’s current state by the Rationalist approach, this essay also draws particular attention to three key terms that deserve further clarification: soft law, hybrid regulation, and global civil society. First, soft law is described as any non-binding source of rights and obligations in which one of three key dimensions of legalization are not strictly constituted.14 These dimensions are described as “the degree to which rules are obligatory (obligation), the precision of those rules (precision), and the delegation of some functions of interpretation, monitoring, and implementation to a third party (delegation).”15 While most of the extractive industry regulations are soft law, thus not strictly binding upon states and firms, the discourse on the nexus between soft and hard laws is particularly relevant to the ILO discussion. The ILO’s 1997 adoption of ‘Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ was recognized as a drastic transition from hard law-based regulation to a soft law- based approach.16 For a long time, the ILO focused on formulating international labor conventions and treaties that explicitly bound the signatories. By contrast, the Declaration seeks to find the source of obligation not in signature and ratification but in membership in the ILO. In other words, the Declaration affirmed that there are fundamental principles that must be respected by all member states, since membership itself generates basic obligations. In this sense, it makes sense to examine the case of extractive industry regulation as an example of how soft law can be an effective non-punitive global regulatory force.

Second, hybrid regulation is a regulatory initiative established through cooperation among international organizations, states, NGOs, and firms. This definition is similar to that of a global public-private partnership (PPP), whose five defining characteristics are that its framework is participatory, based on multiple actors, voluntary, and horizontal, and that it aims to solve globally-spread yet area- specific issues such as climate change and environmental regulation.17 In today’s realm of global governance, “state capacity can no longer be self-supporting; effective capacity requires being connected.”18 Since this claim also holds true for the ILO, the lessons that can be learned from regulating extractive industries through PPP are directly relevant.

Third, the neoliberal notion of global civil society refers to a complementary force for global governance, rather than an opposition movement.19 For example, NGOs collaborating with government counterparts to provide education, international aid, and other global public goods are classic examples of the neoclassical view on global civil society. There is also a more activist view of global civil society defined as “the process through which group movements and individuals can demand a global rule of law, global justice and global empowerment.”20 This view also echoes the definition of transnational civil society (TCS) that refers to “self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest.”21 While the original neoliberal definition is primarily employed, the latter is also relevant in arguing that the reputation risk of global firms is generated by the consumer movements, as demonstrated in cases of Niki in the labor standard case and De Beers in the conflict diamond case.22,23,24

Case Studies of the EITI and the KPCS

The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global PPP launched by the British government in 2003 to promote the responsible use and monitoring of revenues generated by energy and mineral firms by host country governments. The purpose of the EITI is “to ensure that all revenue payments to the governments of such resource-rich countries by oil, gas and mining companies are independently checked and fully disclosed to the public, thus helping citizens to exercise oversight over these revenues and reducing the mismanagement associated with the resource curse.”25 Similarly, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is “an international governmental certification scheme that was set up to prevent the trade in diamonds that fund conflict. Launched in January 2003, the scheme requires governments to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are conflict-free.”26 Although these two schemes share many common traits and objectives, the KPSC is different from the EITI and other global PPP initiatives in that it can be enforced by trade sanctions.27

Aside from wanting to buy into global corporate citizenship, the core rationale for businesses to join such regulatory schemes “is primarily dictated by a concern to address security, reputation, and legal risks.”28 In altering the environment in which these profit- maximizing actors operate, soft law plays a critical role. Even though soft law is not strictly enforceable, it changes the cost-benefit calculations of firms as well as host country governments. For firms, non-compliance with these schemes can result in detrimental social or market penalties but not legal sanctions. In particular, goods such as diamonds and jewels are vulnerable to reputational risk. In case of the KPCS, it is not simply a shining piece of carbon that De Beers is selling, but a symbol of purity and eternity crystalized in the diamond. This creates an opportunity to add or detract value from the product, and means that in the long term the reputation of the firm may be more important than total current sales revenue. Particularly in today’s business context of globally expanded corporate and product brands, the growth of global brands makes firms more vulnerable to reputational threats based on their business practices overseas. Furthermore, the expansion of international communications enables activists to more easily acquire information about global business practices, and then to rapidly disseminate this knowledge.29 In this sense, globalization has increased the vulnerability of MNC’s at the same time as it has fortified their capacity. As for host governments, they “may find it easier to access development finance and the international capital markets when they can show compliance with the EITI validation requirements.”30 This shows how they modify their utility functions based on private sector behavior. Although almost every successful regime involves “a complex dynamic in which several types of mechanisms operate in tandem to produce the behavioral effects,” the EITI and KPCS create soft law that changes the environment in which the utility functions of MNCs and host governments are adjusted to the pursuit of their best interests.31 It is important to note that soft law does not “soften” global regulation. Conversely, it can become a profound tool towards building hard law both globally and domestically. The development and implementation of new norms “are more likely to be successful to the extent that they can be grafted on to previously accepted norms.”32 For example, Liberia passed a comprehensive extractive indurstry governance law after it became the first African country designated as EITI compliant in 2009. It cannot be emphasized more heavily that adherence to the EITI played a critical role in further developing the country’s regulation of extractive industries.

Furthermore, the EITI and the KPCS as global PPP’s create an unprecedented space where new global regulations are discussed and negotiated among diverse participants. Caspary argues that, “Multi-stakeholder groups are seen as a legitimate arena for dialogue, disagreement, and clarification among groups that historically have had little or no interaction.”33 For instance, the EITI involves government, EI companies, and a broad definition of civil society—that is, not only NGOs but also EI-relevant trade unions as stake holders. Fifty of the world’s largest oil, gas, and mining companies support and participate in the EITI through their operations, international commitments, and industry associations. A vast majority of international development and financial institutions have also endorsed the EITI’s goals at the country level.34 Moreover, a representative of the financial sector even sits on the governing board of the EITI. In addition, over eighty investment and institutional funds have issued support statements to the EITI.35 Enjoying worldwide support from various actors, the EITI certification “has become a significant proof of good resource governance to be used not only in negotiations with donors, but also toward private capital markets.”36 The case of the EITI thus demonstrates that global PPP’s can achieve a high degree of legitimacy, supported by both public organizations and private corporations, through creating a global dialogue space with broad multi-sectoral participation. Therefore, global PPP initiatives through certification have the potential to be seen as broader indicators of good domestic governance, which can lead to better market stability.

Both the cases of the EITI and the KPCS indicate that a wider involvement of domestic civil society is the key to successful hybrid regulation. There are two challenges that remain, however: suppression of the regimes by host country governments, and insufficient capacity from domestic civil society to act as an effective watchdog. In research of Brakke, the investigation team found concrete evidence in Azerbaijan that intimidation and suppression from the government have led to media self- censorship.37 The Civicus Survey for Sub- Saharan Africa, conducted by a global alliance of NGOs to promote influence of civil society worldwide, also concludes that “the weakest area of civil society’s impact is at the level of holding the state and the private sector to account, indicating that the liberal concept of civil society as a bulwark against the state is not strongly supported in the surveyed countries.”38 Furthermore, in many fragile states, NGOs are often either co-opted or marginalized by the government, or simply lack the capacity to hold governments and business to account.39 Therefore, harnessing a vocal, transparent and independent civil society is certainly a key priority for accelerating industry regulation. This process can be mutually reinforcing; some research indicates that the introduction of the EITI has improved the state of domestic civil society in terms of its independence, technical expertise and monitoring capacity.40 Hence, strengthening the capacity and autonomy of civil society enhances the effectiveness of global PPP initiatives and counters the absence of hard law sanctions for misbehavior or non-compliance.

Implications for the ILO’s Global Labor Regime

Previous section summarized how the EITI and the KPCS enhanced domestic and global extractive industry regulations through various mechanisms. Here, soft law is the utility modifier, global PPP the source of legitimacy, and civil society the monitoring agency. Although these practices and the ILO labor standards constitute two different regimes, conclusions drawn from the extractive industry regulation can be used to rethink the state of global labor governance.

First of all, the ILO should not underestimate the role of soft law in formulating more comprehensive and effective global labor standards. Vogel, for example, argued that “the effectiveness of civil regulations is roughly comparable to that of many intergovernmental treaties and agreements, many of which are also based on soft law and the ‘naming and shaming’ of noncompliant counties.”41 Another analogy that speaks in favor of the effectiveness of soft low is the functioning of the legal system. As “it is not the existence of a police force that makes a system of national law strong and respected, but the strength of respect for the law that makes it possible for a police force to be effectively organized.”42 Hence, from the rationalist perspective, the soft law approach of the ILO can potentially alter the utility function of firms and the environment in which they operate. This leads them to choose to comply with labor standards, not because of the threat of sanctions, but because it is the rational choice. In this sense, it is too simplistic to denounce the ILO’s 1998 Declaration as regress from hard law to soft law. Aside from various political motives that tried to soften hard law and make compromise, the Declaration now constitutes an integral part of a broader endeavor to regulate global businesses. For example, it is worth noting that “the UNHRC Special Report on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises” incorporated the Declaration into a wider context of businesses and human rights.43 Therefore, the ILO can increase its influence in the global business arena not only by formulating treaties and conventions for states, but also by shaping soft law that directly changes the cost- benefit calculations of MNCs. In today’s world of complex global regulations, it is no longer relevant to discuss whether hard or soft law is more effective. The real question to be asked is rather how to combine these qualitatively different sources of international obligation to serve the broader interests of humankind. Second, the ILO’s departure from its initial state-centric orientation paved the way for more active engagement with global PPPs. Traditionally, the ILO’s regime of labor regulation depended on hard law with sanctions, compliance by governments, and an authority-oriented approach that did not directly involve private actors.44 However, the emerging global labor governance regime is increasingly characterized by its soft law approach that combines incentives and information, compliance by businesses, and a market-based approach that embraces as many actors as possible. These new instruments are rapidly replacing traditional regulatory mechanisms such as prohibitions and sanctions. One significant implication of this evolution is that governments and businesses are no longer the objects of regulation but rather partners in its formation and implementation. While the Declaration and its Core Labor Standards includes universal minimum principles that all member and non-member states should comply with, the ILO can use these core principles and subsequent discussions as a means of further developing the global labor standards architecture. As customary international law is formed through state practices rather than textual codification, the essence of the Core Labor Standards lies not in the ILO’s documents, but rather in the practices, interpretations, and interactions that they produce.

Third, active involvement of civil society as well as MNCs can substantially enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ILO’s global labor regime. In the case of extractive industries, domestic civil society is often claimed to be too fragile to monitor host governments and operating corporations. This is the case examined by the previous section. On the contrary, in case of the ILO, landscape is slightly different. The rationalist perspective assumes that MNCs are self- interested utility maximizers. Firms that adopt high standards can therefore be expected to form alliances with NGOs and states with similarly high standards.45 Since unilateral (or unicorporational) adoption of higher standards could diminish profits, these firms have a strong incentive to persuade or coerce other firms to adopt the same level of standards. Furthermore, if an industry leader agrees to embrace a voluntary code, other firms in the same sector often decide to follow suit.46 Hence, the traditional dichotomy of global civil society opposing MNCs is less relevant in today’s complex world. New rivalries could develop, however, through an alliance of NGOs and high- standard firms that condemn lower- standard companies. As seen in the cases of the EITI and the KPCS, civil society has vast potential not only to constrain the power of the state and businesses, but also to legitimize them. An underlying implication of this conclusion is that innovative integration of the interests of MNCs and global civil society can be achieved, even though their motives are fundamentally different. By building on such common interests, the ILOs global labor regime could potentially pursue further enhancement and fortification of its governance mechanism.


In summary, the ILO can pave a new avenue of global corporate governance by changing the environment in which the powerful MNCs pursue their own interest. Such a task of shaping (or reshaping) the environment is one of the essential responsibilities of international organizations tasked with providing international leadership and global public goods. In today’s world of complex global regulation absent a central regulatory authority, incentives rather than interdictions play important roles in extending global governance. The absence of sanctions is not tantamount to a lack of effectiveness. In particular, soft law, global PPP and global civil society are valuable instruments through which seemingly ungovernable realms are internationally regulated. Learning from the practices of the extractive industry regulation, a soft law approach of the ILO can significantly alter the utility function of MNCs and reshape the environment in which these global corporations operate. The era of prohibition and sanction is quickly disappearing and the new regime of incentive is emerging. New mechanisms of global corporate governance are thus more inclined to encourage firms to comply with labor standards, not because there are sanctions but because it is the rational choice. The emergence of a new global labor governance regime is increasingly characterized by three developments: the provision of incentives and information rather than prohibition; reliance on the compliance of businesses rather than of governments; and a market- based approach rather than a state-centric one. In orchestrating such a regulatory framework, the ILO should be aware of the fact that governments and businesses are partners in its implementation, not mere objects to be regulated. Furthermore, active involvement of civil society as well as MNCs can substantially enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ILO’s global labor regime. Interestingly, in the new global labor regime, there is currently unprecedented convergence in the interests of international business and global civil society. By building on such common interests, the ILOs global labor regime could potentially pursue further development and enhancement of its governance mechanisms.

Notes & References

  1. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge, U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 1992).
  2. Oran R. Young, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
  3. Bruce Jenks, “The United Nations and Global Public Goods: Historical Contributions and Future Challenges”, International Development Policy (Revue internationale de politique de développement) 3 (2012) 35, accessed December 15, 2012, doi: 10.4000/poldev.991.
  4. James Traub, “The Secretary-General’s Political Space.” In Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, edited by Simon Chesterman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
  5. Guy Standing, “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?” Development and Change 39 (2008): 355-384.
  6. Peter Newell, “Environmental NGOs and Globalization.” In Global Social Movements, edited by Robin Cohen and Shrin M. Ray, (New York: The Athlone Press, 2000) 121.
  7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2002 Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, (New York, U.S., and Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations: 2002).
  8. Brian Roach, Corporate Power in a Global Economy, (Medford, U.S., Tufts University Global Development and Environment Institute: 2007), accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.e3network. org/teaching/Roach_Corporate_Power_ in_a_Global_Economy.pdf.
  9. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Theory of International Public Goods and the Architecture of Internaitonal Organisations,” Background Paper No.7, New York: U.S.: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1995.
  10. Inge Kaul, “Exploring the policy space between markets and states. Global Public- Private Partnership.” In The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges, edited by Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceicao, 91-140, (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2006).
  11. Muhammad Yunus, Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism That Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs, (New York, U.S.: PublicAffairs, 2010).
  12. Lisa L. Martin, “The Political Economy of Global Public Goods.” In Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 55.
  13. Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy, (Princeton, NJ, U.S.A., Princeton University Press: 1986).
  14. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421-56.
  15. Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization 54, no.3 (2000): 387
  16. Philip Alston, “Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime,” European Journal of International Law 15 (2004): 457-521.
  17. Inge Kaul, “Exploring the policy space between markets and states. Global Public- Private Partnership.”
  18. Bruce Jenks, “The United Nations and Global Public Goods: Historical Contributions and Future Challenges”, 37.
  19. Mary Kaldor, (2003), Global Civil Society –An Answer to War, (Cambridge, U.K., Polity Press: 2003).
  20. Ibid., 13.
  21. Ann Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. (U.S., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 2000) quoted in Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” World Politics 55, no.4 (2003):579-606.
  22. Anke Hassel, “The Evolution of a Global Labour Regime,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21 no.2, (2008): 231-251.
  23. Niki, a multinational corporation primarily specializes in production of shoes, was widely criticized when it was revealed that the company was taking advantage of illegal labor force such as child labor in developing countries.
  24. World Bank, “Conflict Diamonds,” Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 13, Washington, D.C., U.S.: World Bank, 2001.
  25. Michael Brakke, James Ellis, Malick Fall, Jane Lewis, Tom Niblock, Helena Puig Larrauri, and Nathan Shepherd, “Fighting corruption, strengthening governance: the role of civil society in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.” The Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice Workshop Report. Princeton, (NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, 2009), 4.
  26. Global Witness, “Kimberley Process,” accessed December 15, 2012, http:// conflict/conflict- diamonds/kimberley- process.
  27. David Vogel, “Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct” In The Politics of Global Regulation, edited by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 151-188, (Princeton, U.S.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
  28. Gilles Carbonnier, Fritz Brugger and Jana Krause, “Global and Local Policy Responses to the Resource Trap,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no.2 (2011): 248.
  29. David Vogel, “Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct.”
  30. Carbonnier et al., “Global and Local Policy Responses to the Resource Trap,”252.
  31. Oran R. Young, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, quoted in Carbonnier et al., “Global and Local Policy Responses to the Resource Trap,” 255.
  32. Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” 584.
  33. Georg Caspary, “Practical steps to help countries overcome the resource curse: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” Global Governance 18, no.1 (2012): 178.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Carbonnier et al., “Global and Local Policy Responses to the Resource Trap,” 256.
  36. Georg Caspary, “Practical steps to help countries overcome the resource curse: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” 178.
  37. Brakke et al. “Fighting corruption, strengthening governance: the role of civil society in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.”
  38. Paul Yaw Opoku-Mensah, “The State of Civil Society in Sub Saharan Africa.” In CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society, Volume 2, edited by V.Finn Heinrich and L. Fioramonti, 71-86, (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2007), 74.
  39. Amundsen Inge and Cesaltina Abreu, “Civil Society in Angola: Inroads, Space and Accountability,” Chr. Michelsen Institute Report No. 14. Postterminalen, (Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006).
  40. Brakke et al. “Fighting corruption, strengthening governance: the role of civil society in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.”
  41. David Vogel, “Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct,” 184.
  42. Andrew Clapham ed., Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations. 7th Edition. (U.S., Oxford University Press: 2012), 81.
  43. United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UNHRC Report A/ HRC/17/31, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Human Rights Council, 2011).
  44. Anke Hassel, “The Evolution of a Global Labour Regime.”
  45. Ibid. 46. David Vogel, “Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct.”
  46. David Vogel, “Private Regulation ofGlobal Corporate Conduct.”
Kazushige Kobayashi is master candidate of international affairs and Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar at Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He holds Bachelor of Economics with specialization of Non-Profit Administration from Tohoku University, Japan and previously studied at University of California at Davis/ University of California Washington Center. His current research interests include business-government relation in emerging countries, global governance and forms of governance, as well as foreign and economic policies in Eurasian countries such as Russia