The Case for Cash

Delivering Aid Through Direct Payments to the Poor

Building resilience against hunger and malnutrition in Burkina Faso
The Case for Cash : Delivering Aid Through Direct Payments to the Poor - Fatima B. Kassam


While it is quite common in the West to provide monetary assistance to people in emergency situations, the practice is highly underutilized in developing countries. Under certain conditions, giving cash is one of the most cost-efficient methods of delivering assistance to a high number of people in a short amount of time while engendering future economic growth. This paper counters the arguments of skeptics and calls on key figures in the industry to reflect upon the paternalism and inefficiency that they may continue to foster through their institutions.

While it is quite common in the West as a part of relief action or through insurance companies to provide monetary assistance to people in emergency situations, the practice is highly underutilized in developing countries. When appropriate, a cash-based approach allows beneficiaries of aid to exercise more choice; is usually more cost-efficient for both providers of assistance and recipients; and can have positive short- and long-term effects on the economy of the affected area. However, donor agencies list a myriad of reasons why this approach cannot work in the developing world. Inflationary and security risks, while they have not been thoroughly explored, pose real concerns for both providers of aid and affected populations. Critics also cite the lack of control over where the money is spent and reservations about how the social structure of a community will affect the distribution and control of currency. These challenges affect the plausibility of expanding the scale of cash-based interventions – but they are surmountable. Though not perfect, the cash-based approach is becoming a popular alternative to providing not only food assistance but also other forms of relief, particularly in places where NGOs overlap in the services they offer. Under certain conditions, giving cash is one of the most cost-efficient methods of delivering assistance to a high number of people in places that have experienced either man-made conflicts or natural disasters while engendering future economic growth. This paper will examine the effects of the infusion of cash by taking a closer look at the cases of Afghanistan1 and Mozambique and the conditions necessary for successful cash-based approaches to relief elsewhere in the world.

The Economist's Basis for Cash

With only a simple graph, economists have long helped aid workers to justify the shipment at a moment’s notice of millions of tons of provisions and other materials into post-disaster or post-conflict areas. The argument follows that food aid results in a better-fed population that enjoys a higher level of utility.2 As shown in Figure 1, given that an individual has a limited amount of disposable income to spend, one can construct a line exhibiting this budget constraint. If he spends all of it on food, he arrives at the intercept of the x-axis.

Likewise, if he spends all of it on other goods, he arrives at the intercept of the y-axis. Food relief shifts the budget line to the right, parallel to the original. After the shift, the individual can obtain more food on the same budget and redirect savings to consumption of other goods. With food aid, an individual consumes more of everything and can move to a higher indifference curve, and therefore a higher utility.

If the goal of delivering assistance is a higher nutritional intake of the affected populations, this approach makes sense. However, despite the improvement in the situation, this is not always the most effective use of aid monies. If the goal is to efficiently spend resources available in a way that will maximize the utility of the recipient – that is, in a way that satisfies as many of his needs as possible – then cash is a better alternative.

The fungibility of cash allows the new budget line to extend upwards (see Figure 2). With food aid alone, the highest indifference curve achievable is I2. Clearly, the recipient is better off with aid than without it, consuming higher levels of both food and other goods. However, with cash, utility can be maximized on the curve I3. As exhibited in Figure 2, at the intersection of I3 and the new budget line, the optimal point of consumption for a beneficiary, it is possible that he consumes less food (point F3) than with food aid (point F2), but more of other goods.

With what goods might beneficiaries replace food? This is a point of controversy. Those in the humanitarian aid industry who are unfamiliar with evaluations of cash-based interventions often, in an effort to err on the side of caution, err instead on the side of paternalism. Interviews with aid workers have revealed that many of them worry that adequate dietary intake for a family may be sacrificed by male heads of household for alcohol consumption or dowries for new wives.3 Later sections of the paper will show that such notions have been negated with empirical evidence from both Afghanistan and Mozambique.

The Practitioner's Basis for Cash

Thoughts on food insecurity have evolved throughout the past few decades. In the 1970s, the focus was on global and national supply shortfalls, while in the 1980s it became clear that the fundamental problem was not food scarcity, but food distribution. Availability at the national level did not necessarily translate to access at the household level. Amartya Sen explained this disconnect by introducing the concept of food “entitlement” in a 1981 publication. “Entitlement refers to the set of income and resource bundles available (e.g. assets, commodities) over which households can establish control and secure their livelihoods.”4 This new understanding of food-security allowed for consideration of a number of socio-economic factors not previously given as much attention.

Research throughout the 1990s focused on the relationship between malnutrition and poverty. More specifically, practitioners observed how the poor absorb various risks and found that food is only one of a whole range of factors that determine why people in desperate situations make certain choices. Balancing competing interests in order to prolong subsistence in both the short- and long-term was found to be more complex than previously thought. Many leading organizations have adopted this latest view that food security is a fundamental need but not independent of a broader number of factors. CARE USA calls this “household livelihood security” and defines it as:

… Adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic needs (including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation and social integration) … therefore livelihoods are secure when households have secure ownership of, or access to, resources and income earning activities, including reserves and assets, to offset risks, ease shocks and meet contingencies.5

Both food aid and cash can prevent or delay risk-absorption methods that might be detrimental to livelihoods, like the sale of assets to cope with hunger. However, cash allows recipients more flexibility, and in turn a higher level of household livelihood security.

A Cash Famine in Afghanistan

“On behalf of the people of Afghanistan, we would like to make an appeal … The humanitarian transition must be marked by an emphatic shift from kindness “in-kind” to opportunities “in cash.”

-Minister of rural reconstruction and development in Afghanistan

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, severe drought over a three- to four-year period in some regions has exacerbated the economic effects of the US-led invasion of the country and the subsequent change in government. In spite of the security risks posed by protracted warfare in some regions, cash-based approaches have not only worked well, but are preferred by many of the international agencies currently operating in the country and the beneficiaries of their programs. The findings of a Tufts University report prepared in 2002 for USAID found what the authors described as a “cash famine” in Afghanistan. A number of factors contributed to this phenomenon: loss of crops and livestock after the drought; depression of wages in a labor market flooded with new social groups, such as women, now being allowed to work and refugees returning from neighboring countries; and the stress on credit institutions from non-performing loans and failing currency markets. The report states:

More people need access to markets to achieve food security than ever before yet fewer people have the cash resources necessary to buy goods in the market… Throughout Afghanistan, there are crises of purchasing power, production and credit that continue to directly threaten household food security.6

Though the combination of events leading to the widespread loss of disposable income in Afghanistan may be particular to that country, seizure of land and livestock, forced migration, and stress on traditional financial institutions is not uncommon to conflict zones more generally and can bring about the same negative effect.

Though well-intentioned, agencies delivering food aid can actually hurt local producers and traders. It is true that food aid has saved lives, deterred families from migrating out of desperation, and even protected them from falling further into debt. This is the case for particularly vulnerable households with no surplus labor to contribute to Cash-for-Work programs and other such forms of assistance. However, sales of commodities distributed by relief organizations are widespread.7 This monetization not only indicates a preference for cash or goods other than those distributed, but also depresses prices of goods that can be produced and supplied locally. Wheat prices in Nangahar, for example, fell by 15 to 20 percent as a direct result of the World Food Program’s presence in the area. It was confirmed through focus groups that this price depression served as a disincentive for farmers who would normally try to cultivate surplus wheat for sale.8 The non-distortionary nature of cash would guard against this change in both producer and consumer behavior. Inefficiently targeted food aid, in this case, could potentially set back replenishment of household livelihood security.

Beyond Basic Needs in Mozambique

One year prior to the bombing campaign in Afghanistan, devastating floods hit the southern African country of Mozambique, causing 700 deaths and displacing approximately half a million people in the Limpopo, Save, and Zambezi valleys. Having examined the market conditions and the availability of food supply, USAID Mozambique created the Resettlement Grant Program (RGP), which provided 1,500,000 meticais (about $92) in cash to each of a little more than 106,000 rural families. Due to Congressional inertia, approval and appropriation of funds to USAID Mozambique was delayed until well after the flooding took place.9 By the time monies were made available, other NGOs had already been able to meet most people’s basic needs for everyday survival. In conjunction with millions of dollars allotted to other projects aimed at increasing local production, USAID also launched the Resettlement Grant Program (RGP). The scale of the RGP is negligible compared to that of any other programs in the country. Nevertheless, the thorough evaluation of the endeavor provides practitioners with excellent insight into what recipients consumed in place of food. As program designers envisioned, grants were spent predominantly in local villages on items not available through other programs. Though purchases of food were high, most of the money was spent on household goods, clothes, and livestock. Expenditures on seeds and construction materials were also substantial, indicating an investment in future livelihoods. Interviews revealed that some of the in-kind donations from other programs, such as zinc roofing, was often re-sold in order to purchase different building materials. Again, this monetization suggests that cash would have been more efficient for both providers and recipients of aid.10 One of the most important findings of an impact evaluation performed by Abt Associates is that grant monies almost exactly reflect the normal spending patterns of households, proving the theory that cash-based interventions are non-distortionary.11

The Secret to Success

The economic, social, geographic, and political landscapes of a post-conflict or post-disaster region are all important elements to consider when deciding whether a cash-based approach is appropriate and optimal. Though there has not been much published on what conditions are necessary for a successful venture, this paper pulls from current working papers on the subject and the realities of relief efforts in Afghanistan and Mozambique.

First, a thorough understanding of formal and informal market systems as well as geographical distances are key to determining whether cash will be useful. Local markets must be able to provide essentials at reasonable prices, accommodate additional demand for certain goods, and be competitive and accessible. These facts often relate to how much time has passed since the height of the emergency. Markets are often disrupted in the very short term (four to six weeks) but can be functioning well not long thereafter. An assessment of market indicators is not as complex as it may sound. Price monitoring for key commodities is already a part of most early-warning systems; interviews with traders and shopkeepers are simple and can be conducted quickly. With the increase between 2002 and 2004 of cash-based projects in Afghanistan, some organizations there have developed their own list of indicators. Knowing the following has helped even the government make more informed choices regarding how to deliver assistance: whether bartering is an important form of exchange, the time and cost of accessing the nearest market center clinic or school, the number of months during the winter when market access is restricted, community views on cash versus food programming as a response, and so on. In a recent report published by the Humanitarian Policy Group, Harvey urges that:

… Better analysis of markets is arguably something that aid agencies should be doing anyway, in order to better understand how people are surviving and how best they can be supported. As Lautze argues, village markets are a critical arena [sic] for information, political exchange and socialising; monitoring markets should be one of the fundamentals of a livelihoods strategy.12

Despite recent progress, cash-based approaches have yet to be considered seriously in the range of options available to organizations. It is imperative that the industry change the current focus on resource-driven needs assessments and fold indicators, like those mentioned above, into their routine vulnerability mapping.

Social patterns in a community have bearing on targeting decisions for an organization, who will make spending decisions for a household and how the money will be spent. In Mozambique, program managers targeted families that had not experienced a second harvest, indicating that their assets were more depleted than others. Beyond this, and based solely on intuition, grants were dispersed only to female heads-of-household, under the assumption that they would have more incentive to spend on children and to buy items that would benefit the entire household.13 In evaluating the program, Abt Associates found this hypothesis to be true – for the most part. There were a small number of cases in which a wife simply gave the money to her husband and thus was not able to report on what it was spent. At least one case of domestic abuse was reported, indicating that the cash placed the women at a disadvantage, as opposed to food, which their husbands perceived gave them less power. Perhaps to the dismay of veterans in the industry, almost none of the money was spent on alcohol.14 In Afghanistan, much of the money went towards paying off debts, a grave social burden which many families bore and which had resulted in forced, premature marriage of many young girls in efforts to pay back lenders. By 2002, the practice was widespread.15 Cash in Afghanistan then restored a balance of social power that had been lost in the medium term post-conflict.

The type and place of an emergency will always influence the decision to administer a cash program. Natural disasters in relatively secure places with developed financial institutions will be far easier for implementation than remote war zones punctuated with treacherous mountain ranges, hidden mines, and sniper fire. Despite the risks, the case of Afghanistan can be seen as proof that cash can work well, and is often preferred, in addressing complex emergencies:

… Wars distort economies. Patterns of production, employment, trade, and services shift to war-related activities and patterns… Aid can reinforce market distortions by feeding the war economy and undermining peacetime production and productivity… When aid agencies import goods that can be produced locally and distribute them at no cost, they can undermine peacetime economic incentives.16

Political power structures and relationships are routinely explored by aid agencies for the benefit of staff safety and logistics concerns. However, the implications of delivering aid in traditional ways is not always as rigorously examined. “Aid can also affect trading patterns that link people. If aid organizations import goods that were previously supplied by one group to another and those two groups are in conflict, aid reinforces the new division.”17 Finding the necessary information and information that is reliable, particularly in emergency situations, in order to assess the appropriateness of a cash-based program can be risky and difficult to accomplish in a timely manner. Innovations in the area of needs assessments, however, are the next step that international aid agencies should engage in to better administer their existing programs and better serve their clients in the future.

Security and Corruption

The idea that cash is necessarily more vulnerable to insecurity and corruption than in-kind donations requires further evidence. International aid agencies inevitably find a way to pay staff stationed in remote areas; no one seems to suggest that their salaries be paid to them in-kind. The fact that transport of cash is possible on a smaller scale provides some hope for larger projects. To date, studies of numerous cash-based initiatives have, in fact, shown that the opposite may be true. Although proponents of food aid often argue that the “bulky, and highly visible” nature of shipments or grain stocks make them difficult to steal, many counter this argument with empirical evidence of attacks of these assets in complex emergencies by armed groups. Mobile assets in smaller amounts can provide far more security to staff especially.18

In order to implement a cash program effectively, it is important for agencies to understand the informal financial institutions that exist. Inhabitants of an area always find ways to transfer currency somewhat safely. In Afghanistan, agencies have made use of the local hawala system.19 Staff from Save the Children’s Cash-for-Work programs in the country stated that these programs were easier to manage than in-kind distribution projects, and that they faced less pressures to redirect funds to local commanders because the bundles of currency were in such small amounts.20 Comparatively, distribution of cash in Mozambique was less straightforward and efforts toward increasing security presented enormous logistical challenges. After the floods, program managers contracted different companies to manage security, transport, communications and financial accounting respectively. Oxfam has generated a list of simple techniques to reduce security risks for agencies, including: limiting knowledge of cash movements, limiting access to bank transactions, decentralizing disbursement responsibility, not scheduling cash transfers to keep them unpredictable, using staff who have been with the organization for a while and are trusted.21 From a high-level survey of evaluations (which should not be viewed as comprehensive), the only major sources of corruption seemed to be within the organizations administering the programs. This should not be surprising given the attraction of cash to everyone, not only those in need. Although precautions can be taken in targeting certain beneficiaries of the program, deciding who handles cash internally can be far more challenging.

For Recipients, Cash Preserves Dignity Through Choice

While economists laud cash for its ability to deliver a greater level of utility and practitioners point to a higher level of household livelihood security and cost-efficiency, beneficiaries cite dignity, self-esteem and choice as the most beneficial aspects of cash-based programs. Sen summarizes the significance of this “agency aspect” of the individual:

The success of a society is to be evaluated, in this view, primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy… Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of development.23

Through the optic of a relief-development continuum, “the notion that relief, rehabilitation/ mitigation and development interventions are a continuum of related activities, not separate and discrete initiatives,”24 the idea of preserving self-worth and individual agency has profound implications for how quickly an area will emerge from crisis. Understanding what might inhibit the cultivation of individual agency should be examined. The philosopher Margalit argues for the “decent society” in which institutions exhibit respect, or “non-humiliation” through their actions, not only in their theoretical origins:

Social institutions can be described in two ways: abstractly, by their rules or laws, or concretely by their actual behavior. Analogously, one can think of institutional humiliation by law, as manifested by the Nuremberg laws or those of apartheid, in contrast to concrete actions of institutional humiliation, such as the Los Angeles police officers’ treatment of the black motorist, Rodney King. In the concrete description of institutions the distinction between a noncivilized and a nondecent society is blurred.”25

He further posits that NGOs operating in what he calls a welfare society can be compared to public institutions in a welfare state.26 Paternalistic views that recipients do not know what they need, that they will squander money on alcohol or drugs such as qat and hashish, have been institutionalized through the concrete behavior of an industry that gives little credence to cash-based approaches. Harvey states that “these attitudes of paternalism and superiority remain an important factor in humanitarian response despite the professed commitment to greater participation on the part of affected populations, and that some of the reluctance to use cash is linked to these prejudices.”27 It is imperative that leading agencies engage in introspection and examine the internal structures preventing a necessary paradigm shift in both the aid and development industry.

Short-Term and Long-Term Effects on the Economy

In the short-term, recipients of aid monies tend to spend the most in local areas, on locally produced goods that will be consumed in the near future and will bring benefit to most members of the household. Evaluations of projects in both Afghanistan and Mozambique illuminate the expenditure of a significant portion of funds on debt repayment, livestock, or other investments in future livelihood security. This stimulates local and regional markets and can strengthen the credibility of currency transactions and associated formal and informal institutions. In the long-term, the self-worth gained through an ability to exercise choice after sustained desperation and to make investments in future productivity can only have positive effects.

Critics commonly cite inflation as a significant risk. To date, there has been little evidence collected of major price inflation as a direct result of cash-based programs. Evaluations that cite an abnormal increase in prices also note very few cases of supply shortages or minor price gouging. This type of price fluctuation can be attributed to normal factors affecting market equilibrium or asymmetric information on the part of shopkeepers. To date, only smaller cash-based projects have been implemented, so inflation on a macroeconomic level has not been a truly significant risk to consider. Given the large amount of cash-based programming in Afghanistan, it will be interesting to examine the impact on national exchange rates, inflation rates and wage rates in the coming years. The following graphs are an attempt to model the economic impact of a large-scale cash infusion, for which there is currently no empirical evidence or thorough economic analysis.

Using a Keynesian derived model of aggregate demand, one can model the effects of an increase in the money supply with the IS-LM model. According to the model, if the money supply is increased, people have more money than they want to hold at the prevailing interest rate. As they begin to deposit extra money in banks or to buy bonds,28 the interest rate falls until people are willing to hold all of the money “created” by the injection of cash into the market. This brings the money market to a new equilibrium (shift of curve from LM1 to LM2 as exhibited in Figure 3), lowering the interest rate and raising the level of income. In the short-run, the assumption of this model is that prices are sticky and need more time to adapt. An increase in the money supply then necessarily translates to an increase in real money balances. Thus, there is no price inflation, only an increase in income and a fall in interest rates.

IS-LM curve analysis is most useful when studying industrialized countries with strong central banks and financial sectors. Thus, for developing countries, the more relevant aspect may be in the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy. Cash disbursement on a very large scale might be compared to an increase in government purchases or a decrease in taxes. Both of these policies shift the IS curve upward, generating the opposite effect on interest rates (raising them), while still raising income (see Figure 4). This is a result of an actual shift in aggregate demand at any given price level. So, again, using the Keynesian model, there would be no changes in price level; only output would change. Assuming that the effect on interest rates would apply to both formal and informal money markets, this may pose a significant risk to already indebted recipients. In the collection of baseline data, particularly for organizations that adopt a livelihoods-assessment strategy, level of debt security could be a crucial factor to monitor, and perhaps even more important than price fluctuation.

Both the Keynesian and classical models of short-run and long run equilibria assume that there is a natural rate of income. In the classical theory, however, prices may fluctuate, and adjust to ensure that national income/ output is always at a natural rate. Thus, according to classical theory there may be some increases in prices, but they are a reflection of increased output and income in the economy and not necessarily negative effects.

Finally, with an eye toward later development, one should also examine the IS-LM model for a small open economy (Figure 5). In this case, an increase in the money supply shifts the LM curve to the right, increasing income and lowering the exchange rate. A decrease in the exchange rate makes goods produced domestically cheaper for foreign consumption and can fuel export sectors, in particular. For cash responses aimed at fueling local production, it may be beneficial in the long run to target export sectors, after local needs are met, in order to cultivate surplus for sales abroad.

Contrary to critics who cite inflationary risks as a real concern, the theoretical modeling suggests that any significant increase in price would be temporary or a result of normal factors such as scarcity of supply. Moreover, they will adjust as income- and output-generating activity increase. What practitioners should note is the fluctuation of the interest rate, which could potentially be detrimental to recipients. For development strategists, if the country is open to trade, cash could positively affect export-oriented industries. This subject has been explored at length and there is still debate regarding which methods work best.

WFP And the Powers That Be

Are donors and NGOs responsible for providing the most appropriate resources for meeting needs of affected populations? Judging from the current structure of the industry, it would not seem so. There is virtually no representation of cash responses in the UN’s consolidated appeals process. According to researchers, “Much of this is to do with the dominant operational role of the World Food Program (WFP). WFP’s mandate restricts it to using food as a resource. WFP also plays an important and often leading role in vulnerability assessments, which often lead, with little consideration of alternatives, to food aid.”29 Though not explored in this paper, there is valid reason to believe that the continued tying of food aid to donor country surpluses, particularly the United States, accounts for the dominance of food aid; it is simply what is available. Revision of the Emergency Food Assessment Handbook and recent publications by Edward Clay seem to suggest some willingness to change within the UN. Outside of the UN, NGOs that have adopted livelihoods-assessment methodologies appear to be much less threatened by cash responses.

Perhaps it is too simplistic an approach to characterize agencies as threatened or nonthreatened. While there are certain barriers in the architecture of the humanitarian aid industry that inhibit change, it is important to note that this new approach also requires skill sets that are not readily available among staff in the industry. Logisticians might lack an understanding of financial accounting, social workers do not necessarily know how to evaluate weather risks, development economists do not always have a strong security background, etc. In order to fully realize the benefits of cash-based approaches, the internal make-up of the industry must change significantly through a re-evaluation of staffing needs and innovations in development strategy. Given the benefits of this form of assistance, key figures in the industry might find it worth such an investment to curb the inefficiency and paternalism they may unknowingly continue to foster by not choosing an approach that, for beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, preserves dignity through choice.


1 There is much dispute as to whether Afghanistan is “in conflict” or in a “post-conflict” transitional phase. The political implications associated with both labels can change how aid is administered and which models of assistance delivery that have been implemented there are relevant to this paper. Although this discussion of labels is outside the scope of this piece, it is important to note that for this paper Afghanistan is considered a post-conflict region.

2 This paper will contrast food aid with cash, however, the analogy can be extended to other types of in-kind donations like building materials, clothing, blankets etc. The x-axis in the example would measure the level of the donation being considered and food would be folded into the “All Other Goods” category on the y-axis.

3 Paul Harvey, “Cash and Vouchers in Emergencies,” Humanitarian Policy Group, 10 October 2005 <>.

4 “The Household Livelihood Security Concept,” T.R. Frankenberger and M.K. McCaston (1998), FAO Corporate Document Repository, p. 6, 4 January 2006 <>.

5 Ibid., pp. 1-3.

6 “Qaht-E-Pool: A Cash Famine,” Sue Lautze, et. al., (2002), United States Agency for International Development, Washington, p. 10, 7 January 2006 <http://>.

7 Ibid., p. 39.

8 Ibid., p. 39.

9 Information garnered from personal interviews with RGP staff.

10 “Mozambique 1999-2000 Floods Impact Evaluation: Resettlement Grant Activity,” Maputo: Abt Associates, (2002), United States Agency for International Development, pp. 30-35, 27 October 2005 < d0000811/P907-Mozambique_floods_1999-2000_USAID_072002.pdf>.

11 Though vouchers and cash programming are often studied together, vouchers are by nature distortionary and not advocated in this paper. This important difference is not emphasized enough.

12 Harvey, p.26.

13 Personal communication with RGP staff.

14 Abt Associates, pp. 22-24.

15 Lautze, pp. 45-48.

16 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War ( London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1999) pp. 42-43.

17 Ibid., p.44.

18 Harvey, pp. 39-42.

19 “Cash Transfer Programmes in Afghanistan: A Desk Review of Current Policy and Practice,” Charles-Antoine Hofmann (2004), Overseas Development Institute, p. 6, 5 January 2006 <>.

20 Harvey, p. 38.

21 Ibid., p. 39. 22 Ibid., p. 35.

23 Amartya Kumar Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999) p.18.

24 Frankenberger and McCaston, p.3.

25 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (London: Harvard University Press. 1996) p. 1.

26 Ibid., p. 235.

27 Harvey, p. 46.

28 Of course, at this point, it is difficult to believe that anyone will buy bonds in Afghanistan. However, for the purpose of predicting the effects of holding money, the model is still useful.

29 Harvey, p. 44.

Fatima B. Kassam is an M.A. candidate at the Bologna Center concentrating in international development. Her previous work includes economic development in Mozambique and South Africa, legislative analysis and advocacy on trade and security in the United States, and work with nonprofit organizations around civic engagement and political strategy.