Paradiplomacy

Scope, Opportunities and Challenges

By
Catalonia Nation
Paradiplomacy : Scope, Opportunities and Challenges - STEFAN WOLFF

Abstract

Paradiplomacy refers to the foreign policy capacity of sub-state entities: their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests. It thus challenges a number of theories of the discipline of international relations, which do not normally consider sub-state entities as subjects of international relations, as well as states’ traditional claim to sovereignty. Drawing on three West European examples, this article argues, however, that the paradiplomacy phenomenon is consistent with both international relations theory and state sovereignty when viewed through the lens of conflict resolution and autonomy.

Introduction

Paradiplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon and subject in the study of international relations. It refers to what one could describe as a foreign policy capacity of sub-state entities, their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests. This is a conceptually and practically challenging development. From a conceptual point of view the discipline of international relations does not normally consider sub-state entities as subjects of international relations; and from a practical point of view, states’ claim to sovereignty, their unique right to engage with other players in the international arena, is, in a sense, hollowed out and perhaps fatally undermined if they have to share this essential prerogative of stateness.

Paradiplomacy as an emerging policy capacity of sub-state entities in general can be enjoyed by both the states, provinces, regions or Länder of federations and by the autonomous entities of otherwise unitary states. The latter are often established to overcome another, not uncommon challenge to state sovereignty—the demand for self-determination by particular communities that normally define themselves qua a distinct (ethnic) identity from the rest of a state’s population and, as part of this, claim a portion of that state’s territory as their own. Autonomy thus challenges state sovereignty at two levels—internally and externally—but at the same time offers a unique mechanism to turn these challenges into opportunities for constructive conflict management.

The overall argument of this article is that rather than seeing paradiplomacy as a threat, it should be embraced as a necessity and an opportunity in the process of managing and ultimately resolving what might otherwise be protracted self-determination conflicts—demands for self-determination by identity communities can often be met without the redrawing of existing state boundaries by granting enhanced powers of self-governance, including limited competencies in the area of external relations. Following a brief conceptual introduction to the meaning of autonomy, this paper explores the policy areas in which such entities participate in the international arena. It then makes some general observations about how opportunities and interests of the various actors involved determine the practical scope of paradiplomacy, and illustrates this with three western European examples—Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia in Spain, and Scotland in the United Kingdom. Finally, this paper returns to the question of whether paradiplomacy is indeed a challenge to state sovereignty and what its practical limits and opportunities are for contributing to the constructive management of self-determination conflicts.

Autonomous Entities: A Conceptual Definition

Before discussing the scope, opportunities and challenges that autonomous entities’ participation in the international arena pose, it is necessary to define relatively precisely what we mean by such entities in order to conduct a meaningful comparison.

There is relatively little agreement among academics about the definition of autonomy. The discussion will be limited here to territorial forms of autonomy and will not discuss corporate autonomy, even though the latter theoretically, but rarely practically, could also pursue various forms of participation in the international arena.

The basic idea underlying the territorial concept of autonomy is that the autonomous entity is defined in territorial terms. Thus, a population living in a certain territory is granted autonomy without regard to which ethnic group the individuals belong. Territorial autonomy, in this most general sense, therefore describes self-governance of a demographically distinct territorial unit within an existing unitary state,[1] which comprises the following elements: (1) demographic distinctiveness of autonomous entity: the majority of the population, or at least a significant minority, is ethnically, culturally, linguistically or religiously distinct from the country’s dominant group; (2) devolution of power: autonomous entities exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers independent of other sources of authority in the state in a significant number of substantive policy areas. These powers are exercised by the legislative, executive and judicial institutions of the autonomy, that is, by a regional assembly, a government, courts, and executive agencies under regional control, including the police; (3) legal entrenchment: the status of the autonomous entity is normally constitutionally entrenched, and sometimes internationally guaranteed. At the same time, the country’s constitution and its international obligations impose legitimate limits on the exercise of powers by the autonomous entity; (4) limited powers of external relations: autonomous entities will not normally enjoy traditional foreign affairs powers, but in some cases have limited authority to engage in international contacts that correspond to the substantive competencies that have been granted to them. In some instances, there may also be specific opportunities for the development of special links to cross-border co-operation and/or membership of particular international bodies; (5) integrative mechanisms: the powers of self-governance will typically be balanced with tools that ensure the continued and effective integration of the autonomous unit with the overall state. This includes the availability of dispute settlement mechanisms at the level of the constitutional court, arrangements for the transfer of resources between the center and the autonomous unit, and the guaranteed representation of the autonomous unit in the structures of national government.

Following this definition, we find entities that fulfill the majority of the criteria enumerated above on all continents. They are particularly numerous in Europe and less prominent in Africa. Examples include Nagorno-Karabkah in Armenia; Nakhchivan in Azerbaijan; Brussels, Flanders and Walloon in Belgium; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Faroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark; the Åland Islands in Finland; Corsica in France; Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia in Georgia; Aceh and West Papua in Indonesia; Valle d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino-South Tyrol in Italy; Gagauzia and Trandsniestria in Moldova; the North Atlantic Autonomous Region and the South Atlantic Autonomous Region in Nicaragua; Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Macau in the People’s Republic of China; the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines; the Azores and Madeira in Portugal; Nevis in St. Kitts and Nevis; Príncipe in São Tomé and Príncipe; Vojvodina in the Republic of Serbia; the Basque Country, Catalonia, Ceuta, Galicia, and Melilla in Spain; Darfur and Southern Sudan in Sudan; Gorno-Badakshan in Tajikistan; Zanzibar in Tanzania; Tobago in Trinidad and Tobago; Crimea in Ukraine; Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man in the United Kingdom; and Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan.[2]

Participation in the International Arena: Policy Areas

Among the criteria listed above, (4) is obviously of particular interest for this comparative analysis. On the one hand, it makes clear that autonomous entities do normally participate in the international arena; on the other hand, it also begins to establish more clearly the scope of this participation. First, with very few exceptions, most notably Belgium and to a lesser extent Bosnia and Herzegovina, autonomous entities do not engage in traditional foreign policy. Rather, they have limited capacities to pursue policies in the international arena in areas in which they have substantive competencies to make decisions independently of, but within the existing constitutional framework of their metropolitan state. This situation mirrors a process that has been ongoing at the level of central governments for at least a decade: foreign ministries are no longer the exclusive provenance of foreign policy. Rather, as a result of, among other things, globalization and intensifying regional integration, subject ministries have come to develop their own foreign policies, most notably in the areas of economic and trade policy, the environment, agriculture and even more traditionally domestic policy areas such as justice and home affairs. For example, Nakhchivan in Azerbaijan has agreements with other states to be a transit point for oil and gas from Iran toward the Caucasus. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China and the US state of California have agreements promoting cooperation in the areas of trade, business, culture and education. Similarly, Ningxia of China has built up trade relations with more than 60 countries and regions around the world. Macau, also in China, continues to develop relations and agreements with foreign states and regions, as well as international organizations, primarily in relation to its competencies in economics, trade, finance and monetary policy, shipping, communications, tourism, culture, science and technology and sports. Friuli Venezia Giulia in Italy has joint projects with four new European Union (EU) member states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia—in which the sides exchange experts in various technical aspects of public administration. Gagauzia in Moldova and Tatarstan in Russia signed an Agreement on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation in May 1999. Macau has maintained economic and trade representatives in Lisbon, Portugal and Brussels, Belgium. A trade and cooperation agreement between Macau and the European Community (now the EU) was signed in 1992, when Macau was still a Portuguese colony. Interestingly, the Chinese government facilitated and encouraged the further participation of Macau in the international arena after China regained sovereignty over it, establishing a Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries that convenes triennially in Macau. The Autonomous Regions of Madeira and the Azores in Portugal are able to participate in the negotiation of international agreements that Portugal intends to enter into and have the right to establish cooperative relations with foreign regional entities.

In addition to the above, criterion (4) also points to the fact that there are a number of cases in which autonomous entities enjoy special opportunities to engage in cross-border cooperation. This is particularly the case in instances where there are ethnic kin shared between (neighboring) states or where there are actual kin-states (states in which members of the same ethnic group form the titular nation). This practice is relatively well-developed and institutionalized in Europe. Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, the Åland Islands, Gagauzia, Crimea and Republic Srpska, to name but a few, have all established extensive forms of such cross-border relations. For example, South Tyrol in Italy has maintained very strong relations with Austria throughout the post-1945 period, and Austria has played a constructive role in resolving the conflict between the province and the Italian government over the implementation of South Tyrol’s autonomy. Even before Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995, extensive cross-border cooperation had developed, and in January 2006 a petition signed by 113 of 116 German-speaking mayors in South Tyrol was presented to the Austrian government requesting further protection and guardianship. The 1998 Agreement on Northern Ireland, which is part of a new Anglo-Irish Treaty, puts cross-border relations between the region and the Republic of Ireland on a firm international legal footing, and also provides the framework for broader cooperation among regions and states within the British Isles. Further to the east, the governor of Gagauzia in Moldova visited Turkey in March 2006 and met with senior Turkish officials, including State Minister Besir Atalay and Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Güler, to discuss Turkey’s support for Gagauzia.

Within the framework of the EU, regional cross-border cooperation is also highly developed and institutionalized, including through various EU-sponsored cross-border, transnational and interregional projects (INTERREG). For example, the autonomous region of the Valle d’Aosta in Italy participates in the Western Alps Working Community, or Communauté de Travail des Cantons et des Régions des Alpes Occidentales (COTRAO), which also plays an important role for cultural and educational cooperation between local authorities across borders. Together with its neighbouring French region of Rhône-Alpes, as well as eleven other European regions, Valle d’Aosta participates in INTERREG III B Mediterraneo Occidentale involving regions from six different EU member states and Switzerland. The region is also part of a smaller Italian-French inter-regional group, Alpi Latine—Cooperazione Transfrontaliera (ALCOTRA).

Finally, criterion (4) emphasizes that autonomous entities occasionally enjoy membership rights in specific international bodies. These can be regional organizations, such as the Nordic Council, which includes the Åland Islands of Finland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland of Denmark; subsidiary bodies of international or regional organizations, such as the Committee of the Regions, which is an advisory body within existing EU structures and contains virtually all autonomous entities in EU member states, as well as a wide range of other territorial entities from cities to federal states; and international non-governmental organizations, such as the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, which lobbies on behalf of Europe’s minority languages, or the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). In addition, autonomous entities are frequently given opportunities to send representatives to regional and international organizations, such as the UN and EU whenever these organizations, or their subsidiary organs, treat issues relevant to the autonomous entities. For example, the Nordic Council allows formal membership of autonomous organizations as equals of metropolitan states. This case is not unique. Hong Kong maintains its own delegation in several international organizations alongside China, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation body, the Asian Development Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the Copyright Clearance Center, the International Olympic Committee, the World Meteorological Organization and the World Trade Organization. Hong Kong is a corresponding member of the International Organization for Standardization and an associate member of the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and maintains a branch of Interpol. The autonomous entity also sends its own delegation to international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games.

Thus, for the most part, autonomous entities participate in the international arena in areas in which they have substantive policy competencies. This often includes policy areas that are both symbolically and practically important for the preservation, development and expression of an ethnic group’s identity (that is, their culture, education, language policy and religious practice) and areas in the general purview of territorial governments (that is, the economy, the environment, social policy and rural and urban development). Participation in the international arena is a consequence of increased levels of self-governance. Attempts by states to reassert full control over external relations are counter-productive in the sense that such attempts not only disrupt the peaceful coexistence of state and autonomous entity, but also seriously impede the ability of the autonomous government to govern effectively.

Opportunity and Interest Structures

Having the legal ability to participate in the international arena and actually doing so are, of course, two different things. The degree to which autonomous entities are participating in the international arena depends essentially on how their opportunity and interest structures are shaped. Opportunities in general have increased for non-traditional international actors such as autonomous entities, through globalization and its associated advances in communication, travel and trade; through a related proliferation of regional and international governmental and non-governmental organizations; and through the growing number of issues that can no longer be handled successfully locally or even nationally. However, this general trend says very little about the actual policy capacity that autonomous entities have to pursue policies in the international arena. Advanced regions, like the Åland Islands, the Belgian regions, Catalonia, Hong Kong, Macau, Northern Ireland or South Tyrol, have both the human and material resources to do so, but these are lacking in less developed regions, including Gagauzia in Moldova, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines or the South and North Atlantic Autonomous Regions of Nicaragua.

In addition, interest structures also shape the way in which autonomous entities prioritize their international efforts. For example, an autonomous entity like South Tyrol is particularly active in its relations with neighbouring Austria (of which it was part until 1919) and within various EU-sponsored INTERREG programs, as these address both identity and economic issues important to South Tyrol. Northern Ireland has similarly intensive relations with the Republic of Ireland within the framework of the Council of the Isles (linking all devolved regions of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland), but also across the Atlantic into the United States and Canada to maintain and utilize diasporic relationships. Hong Kong and Macau, on the other hand, have maintained a global network of trade missions and representations that they built up during their time as British and Portuguese colonies, respectively, and that facilitate the existence and expansion of their global economic links.

Flanders, Belgium

Belgium has a total of six governments (the Bilingual Region of Brussels, the federal government, the joint Flemish-speaking Region and Community, the French-speaking Community, the French Region and the German-speaking Community), which are equal to each other, but with strictly defined areas of mostly exclusive and very few concurrent competencies.

As there is significant convergence between the internal and the external competencies of the federated entities (that is, the three territorial regions of Brussels, Flanders and Walloon), these governments have to manage their competencies in day-to-day domestic policy and, as far as applicable, in the international arena. Representing both the Flemish-speaking Region and Community, the government of Flanders has competencies both of a corporate nature (related to Flemish speakers) and a territorial nature (related to the territory of Flanders). This encompasses an extremely wide portfolio of policy areas, including language policy, cultural policy, education and welfare, as well as the economy, the environment, employment and infrastructure. This means that in all these areas the government of Flanders can:

  • conclude treaties with third parties;
  • enjoy diplomatic representation abroad;
  • have direct presence and input in multilateral negotiation delegations; and
  • participate formally in the process of formulating the substance of the foreign policy position of the Belgian federation in policy areas for which they have been assigned competence.

As far as exclusive regional competencies are concerned, the Belgian federal government has only a coordinating role. As far as concurrent competencies are concerned, however, the federal government has both a coordinating role and a stake in the formulation of the substance of foreign policy. Thus, even though the federal government formally retains its lead role in the area of foreign policy, the government of Flanders enjoys maximal foreign policy autonomy unless it undermines the overall coherence of Belgian foreign policy.

As a result of these far-reaching competencies, Flanders has more than 100 different representatives abroad, including diplomats in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Southern Africa (including Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland), the United Kingdom and the United States. There are, in addition, 76 trade and commercial attachés abroad, 11 branches of the Flemish Tourist Office abroad, and seven branches of the Flanders Foreign Investment Office.

Catalonia, Spain

The Spanish system of devolution offers the option of broad powers to its autonomous communities. The constitution specifies competencies specific to the autonomous communities, as well as powers that remain exclusive to the central government. However, it is possible that some of the legislative competencies retained by the central state are delegated to the autonomous communities as well, provided the latter desire this and delegation is feasible. Thus, while the Spanish system in theory is one of symmetric devolution, in practice there is a certain degree of asymmetry that has resulted in some communities holding far more extensive powers than others. Among them, Catalonia enjoys significant autonomy in a very wide range of policy areas.

Even though the Spanish constitution explicitly retains competence in international relations for the central government, the devolution of powers to Catalonia in areas such as economic development, education and tourism has meant that external activities in these areas have become a natural task for the Catalan government in order to discharge its functions effectively.

Within the department of the president, the directorate general for international projection of sport is charged with the promotion of international activities for Catalan sport and the facilitation of international competitions for Catalan sports teams. The ministry of economy and finance, the directorate general for trade and the directorate general for tourism have tasks including the international promotion of Catalan industry and tourism, while the ministry of education and universities has a directorate general for universities, which is responsible for, among other things, the integration of Catalan universities into the European space for higher education.

Catalonia’s participation in the international arena also extends to the conclusion of specific agreements with other entities and organizations, including, for example, California, Kyonggi Province (Korea), Scotland, the National Center for Scientific Research (an administrative branch of France’s Ministry of Research) and the National Assembly of Quebec.

Part of Catalonia’s participation in the international arena specifically involves the promotion of relations with Catalan communities outside Catalonia (within Spain, but also in France and involving the Catalan diaspora around the world). In this sense, Catalonia assumes, almost uniquely, the role of a patron- or kin-state for co-ethnics outside its territory, while the reverse is normally the case: autonomous entities benefit from relations with kin-states (for example, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom; Macau and Portugal; Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; South Tyrol and Austria; and Quebec and France).

Scotland, United Kingdom

The United Kingdom operates an asymmetric system of devolution. Three regions—Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales—have distinct levels of competencies that they can exercise autonomously from the government in Westminster, while England has no devolved powers. With devolution in Northern Ireland currently on hold, and devolution in Wales fairly limited, focusing on Scotland provides the opportunity to explore another example of how an entity with fairly substantive autonomous powers domestically participates in the international arena.

Scotland’s powers are quite extensive. In fact, they are only defined in the UK legislation through an enumeration of so-called reserved matters, that is, policy areas in which the central government retains exclusive competencies. These reserved matters include most importantly, the Union of England and Scotland, foreign affairs and defence. Foreign affairs, in this context, encompasses any relations with territories outside the United Kingdom, with the EU and its institutions, as well as any other international organizations. Scotland is also placed under the obligation to observe and implement international obligations, including those under the Human Rights Convention and Community law. Thus, in contrast to Catalonia and Flanders, while Scotland has comparable domestic policy capacities, its foreign policy autonomy is extremely restricted.

Scotland’s presence and participation in the international arena is consequently more limited. It includes the Scottish Executive’s EU office in Brussels, a US office operating out of the British Embassy in Washington, DC, and a recently established office in China, based in the British Embassy in Beijing. Scottish Development International has operations in 17 countries around the globe. Finally, the Scottish Qualifications Agency has offices in Beijing.

The Scottish Executive’s priorities in the area of external relations are thus equally constrained and include the promotion of Scottish devolved policy interests in and beyond the EU, the building of links with regions and countries in and beyond the EU, the promotion of a positive image of Scotland overseas and, interestingly, the effectiveness of Scotland’s relations with the UK government.

The main achievements of the Scottish Executive are within Europe: cooperation Agreements with Bavaria, Catalonia, North Rhine-Westphalia and Tuscany, and its participation in formal organizations of regional authorities, such as the Committee of the Regions, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, the Groups of Regions with Legislative Powers, and the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions.

Limits and Opportunities for Constructive Conflict Management

To what extent can autonomous entities’ participation in the international arena contribute to constructive conflict management? Autonomy is a mechanism to prevent or settle conflicts between a specific territorially-defined community and its central government, and can only prove successful if both sides are committed to a peaceful and political resolution of their differences and to making such an arrangement work. In this situation, then, the participation of an autonomous entity in the international arena is both a consequence of granting autonomy and, in several policy areas, most likely a condition of the success of the conflict settlement. This involves both symbolic dimensions of recognizing the complete nature of the devolution of powers from the central government to the autonomous entity, and material dimensions of enabling autonomous entities to pursue policies in which they have competencies to the fullest extent of their remit. In such cases, denying autonomous entities in such cases any participation in the international arena is likely to undermine the autonomous regime and may thus endanger the conflict settlement as a whole. Yet, as the three case studies above have shown, the degree to which autonomous entities will pursue their own foreign policy depends both on their interest and opportunity structures, on the way in which they prioritize international engagements and on the degree to which the central government actually represents the interests of autonomous entities abroad (specifically, the degree to which the latter can contribute to shaping the central government’s foreign policy on specific issues relevant and important to them). Participating in the international arena does not mean that autonomous entities can pursue policies without regard to the broader constitutional framework of which they remain a part. This implies that there need to be proper mechanisms of consultation and coordination between autonomous entities and central governments on matters of international affairs. The broader the foreign policy competence of autonomous entities, the more effective these mechanisms need to be.

The foregoing presumes that both sides—autonomous entity and central government—are committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of their existing state, even if only for a specified interim or transitional period. If this is not the case, that is, if independence remains the firmly established goal of the autonomous entity, allowing it to participate in the international arena is unlikely to change this attitude, nor will denying it
international engagement make independence a less feasible option.

The bottom line, therefore, is this: autonomous entities’ participation in the international arena is a function of the competencies that they acquire though a specific autonomy arrangement and need to be treated as a logical extension thereof in order to make the overall conflict settlement viable and attractive.

Conclusion: Paradiplomacy as a Challenge for Existing States?

Foreign policy is normally one of very few areas, along with defence and monetary and fiscal policy, that is excluded from the devolution of competencies to autonomous entities. Consequently, it is not surprising that existing states and their governments often view with a certain degree of suspicion the participation of autonomous areas in the international arena. They often see this as potentially undermining their sovereignty and at times in conflict with the pursuit of the broader national interest. These concerns are not without justification, especially in situations in which the ultimate aim of the autonomous entity is independent statehood. However, where the borders of existing states are not contested, these fears are often exaggerated and groundless.

Autonomous entities’ participation in the international arena in most cases does not contravene national foreign policy objectives; in fact, it often complements them and benefits from them. As international relations are now part and parcel of most individual government portfolios, foreign policy is no longer the exclusive domain of foreign ministries. The three examples of Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland furthermore indicate that, regardless of the degree of foreign policy autonomy enjoyed by an autonomous entity, central governments retain authority over the overall direction of autonomous entities’ participation in the international arena, at a minimum by ensuring coherence in foreign policy. At the same time, autonomous entities will avail themselves of opportunities to participate in the international arena in different ways. The example of Flanders shows the degree to which autonomous entities can make maximum use of opportunities available to them in pursuing their own foreign policy and shaping the foreign policy of their central government. At the other end of the spectrum, the case of Scotland demonstrates how the government of an autonomous entity can limit its participation in the international arena such that it prioritizes certain areas and otherwise relies on its central government to represent its interests abroad.

Above all, the participation of autonomous entities in the international arena indicates that the very notion of sovereignty has fundamentally changed. It can no longer be conceptualized in the exclusive state-only terms of the Westphalian system. For states to enjoy sovereignty to its fullest possible extent and for their populations to benefit from it, states have to share their powers with other players in the international arena. The example of paradiplomacy, however, also clearly indicates that states remain the ultimate bearers of sovereignty: paradiplomacy is, at best, a competence devolved to autonomous entities and hence it is the sovereign state that decides how much of its power it shares.

Notes

  1. My thanks to Marc Weller for sharing his thoughts on the characteristics of autonomy with me.
  2. The status of some entities is contested.

STEFAN WOLFF is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nottingham in England and Senior Non-Resident Research Associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, Germany. He holds an M.Phil. in political theory from Magdalene College, Cambridge, and a Ph.D. in political science from the London School of Economics. He has written extensively on ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. Wolff has authored and edited eleven books, including Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement (Berghahn 2003), Peace at Last? The Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland (Berghahn 2003, with Jörg Neuheiser), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts (Hurst/Palgrave 2004, with Ulrich Schneckener), The Ethnopolitical Encyclopaedia of Europe (Palgrave 2004, with Karl Cordell), Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution (Routledge 2005, with Marc Weller), and Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective (Oxford University Press 2006). He is editor of the journal Ethnopolitics (Routledge), co-chair of the Specialist Group on Ethnopolitics of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, and co-chair of the Standing Group on Security Issues of the European Consortium for Political Research. In 2006, he was elected to the advisory board of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.