It Could Have Been So Much Easier

By
Petrobrás cavalo mecânico
It Could Have Been So Much Easier - Jonathan Kartt

Abstract

After more than a decade of privatization in Latin American countries, the specter of energy nationalization in the name of national sovereignty has risen in the region’s leftist, populist governments, notably Morales’s Bolivia and Chavez’s Venezuela. Brazil undertook an experiment in energy nationalization lasting five decades, from the formation of Petrobrás in 1938 until the enshrinement of its monopoly in the constitution of 1988; the company remains state-owned today, though recent reforms have changed the nature of the relationship. This paper investigates the successes and challenges of Brazil’s experience with energy nationalization and draws important lessons for any country contemplating a similar experiment.

Introduction

Media coverage of Petrobrás, Brazil’s national energy company, during the early years of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s presidency was decidedly negative. Common themes were fear of rollback of recent reforms and lamentation of Brazil’s lack of progress in completely privatizing Petrobrás.[1] Such coverage, however, fails to consider the pace of structural change throughout the history of Brazil’s oil industry. Nationalization itself took decades to accomplish. The first move toward nationalization came with the founding of Petrobrás and subsequent nationalization of undiscovered oil fields in 1938, and was not completely codified until the constitution of 1988 guaranteed monopoly status to Petrobrás.[2] To have reversed the process in little over a decade and taken significant strides toward liberalization, as was the case under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the late 1990s, is relatively impressive considering the circumstances.[3] Rather than seeking to reverse the trend, Lula has shown a much more moderate disposition than many expected from the leader of the Workers’ Party (PT).

In addition, the media coverage fails to credit the important role that nationalization of oil played in Brazil’s development history. Aside from driving growth and development in the mid-twentieth century, the establishment of Brazilian sovereignty over resources, of which energy nationalization was a part, provided a number of political benefits and served as a source of Brazilian national pride.[4] Furthermore, though Brazil has progressed toward privatization of Petrobrás in recent years, the case of Brazilian energy nationalization is relevant today as other Latin American nations consider similar experiments. Recent populist-toned speeches by Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez supporting energy nationalization recall a slogan from the mid-twentieth century push to nationalize Brazilian oil: “O petróleo é nosso” (“the oil is ours”).[5]

This paper investigates the question: “What have been the major challenges facing Brazil’s state energy company, Petrobrás, and what lessons can one draw from the Petrobrás experience about designing effective nationalized energy companies?” This paper argues that, though Petrobrás has been a mostly successful tool of state-driven economic development, a number of difficulties plagued Petrobrás, including widespread politicization and clientelism. The purpose of this paper is not to make an economic argument in favor of nationalization, but rather to draw lessons from the Brazilian case as a means for understanding potential pitfalls of energy nationalization in the name of resource sovereignty. In the first sections, the paper examines the successes and challenges, respectively, of Brazilian energy nationalization. Next, it analyzes the liberalization trend of the late 1990s as an attempt to address some of those challenges. The paper then draws some overall lessons for how to structure a nationalized energy company. Finally, in the last section is a brief discussion of the applicability of these lessons to the Bolivian case, which has seen a recent trend toward nationalization under the newly elected Evo Morales.

The Successes of Petroleum Nationalization

Paul Trebat argues for a number of potential growth-related benefits from nationalization of natural resource industries. These include making up for a weak private sector, the achievement of internal and external economies of scale and the development of competent business managers.[6] Specific to the Brazil experience, there were two main positive effects of nationalization of oil: the assertion of national sovereignty over Brazilian resources and the beginning of a government-led drive to spur economic development.

The first benefit from the establishment of Petrobrás was the assertion of national sovereignty over Brazilian resources. Until nationalization, international oil trusts, notably Standard Oil, dominated the Brazilian energy sector for over two decades.[7] The creation of Petrobrás in 1938 was largely a result of the belief that natural resources belonged to the government as caretaker of national well-being.[8] The slogan “O petróleo é nosso,” which began as the cry of student groups but expanded to the population at large throughout the 1940s, indicates the sovereignty motivation for oil nationalization.[9] Brazilians at mid- century wanted to regain control of natural resources that had been granted away to international trusts through overly generous concession contracts, and nationalization effectively accomplished this goal after nationalist President Getúlio Vargas’s suicide in 1954.[10] After publication of Vargas’s suicide note and the consequent triumph of oil-related nationalism, “Petrobrás became the most durable symbol of Brazilian sovereignty. No other state-owned enterprise (SOE) generated the same kind of mythic importance for the general public and for nationalists.”[11]

A second benefit from oil nationalization was the initiation of a long period of development led by government direction of the oil industry. During the international trust period, there was a general perception, largely true, that oil companies were not investing heavily to explore Brazil’s hydrocarbon potential; with control of large reserves in the Middle East, early incentive for wide-scale Latin American exploration was weak. The rationale for nationalization included the belief that in the absence of private sector interest in developing Brazilian oil fields, the only way to create a functioning Brazilian oil industry was through state-led development.[12] To a great extent, this rationale proved sound in the early years of nationalization; growth reached an average 11.5 percent per year in the period from 1968 to 1973, a time of large-scale nationalization.[13] As of 2004, Petrobrás revenue still composed 6 percent of Brazil’s GDP, and the company was a crucial driving force in the economy as an employer and a consumer.[14] Almeida argues that Brazil’s development miracle can at least partly be attributed to the performance of SOEs, among which Petrobrás has played a dominant role.[15]

The success of Petrobrás in establishing Brazilian resource sovereignty and leading development throughout the twentieth century should not be taken lightly. Indeed, Petrobrás is viewed as having successfully transformed Brazil’s economic position in its early years; success in driving Brazilian growth explains the maintenance of popular support for continued national control of Petrobrás.[16] As Kingstone argues, “the benefits of maintaining state control have been a source of government revenue, national employment, and national pride.”[17] It is necessary to stress, however, that the national sovereignty argument is primarily a political one, and such is the domain of this paper. The economic rationale for nationalization is harder to defend than the clearly positive political benefits of Petrobrás’s role in Brazilian development, particularly in the long run.

The purpose of this paper is neither to argue in favor of nationalization nor to give a balanced view of its benefits and drawbacks. Given appropriate circumstances, one can make reasonable arguments for at least partial nationalization of natural resources. Of greater interest is understanding how nationalized hydrocarbon companies can operate more effectively, given the desire to nationalize in the first place.

Main Challenges for Brazil’s Nationalized Structure

As the nationalized energy industry has evolved, a number of structural challenges to Petrobrás’s functioning have surfaced. While a full economic analysis of Petrobrás’s successes and failures over time would be insightful, the purpose of this article is to investigate the institutional difficulties that Petrobrás has faced from a primarily political perspective. Among these challenges, four stand out as having been especially troublesome: politicization of the national oil industry; the persistence of clientelism; failure to define clear roles and relationships, both for Petrobrás and for the managerial authorities that serve as a link to the state; and the inability of the system to accommodate reform.

Politicization

A particularly difficult challenge for Petrobrás has been rampant politicization of the oil industry. To a certain extent, politicization of Brazilian oil is to be expected given the fervently nationalistic origins of the company itself. Anxiety over Petrobrás and the conflict with anti-nationalist forces are even acknowledged as contributing factors to Vargas’s suicide in 1954. His suicide note made reference to the nationalization struggle and condemned opponents of nationalization, and the popular movement for further assertion of state control gained substantial momentum after the note was publicized.[18]

One major symptom of Petrobrás’s politicization has been high management turnover. Turnover was very high during the early 1960s, corresponding to a similarly turbulent period in the political arena. Four different company presidents were appointed between 1961 and 1964, compared to four in the seven preceding years—already a relatively high turnover rate.[19] Barbosa argues that the primary reason for poor performance of Petrobrás in the 1960s and 1970s is that “the turnover rate of presidents and directors…[was] very high due to the political nature of these positions, and there [was] no mechanism in place to stimulate efficiency and profitability.”[20] High executive turnover contributed to instability of management and served to increase politicization; if management could be dismissed at will by the government, it was more likely to respond to political concerns and think about keeping political patrons content, and less likely to concentrate on running an effective company.[21]

The problem of politicization extends beyond simple management turnover. A major factor in Petrobrás’s formation and subsequent politicization was its dependence on government, rather than internally generated, revenue sources.[22] On top of receiving significant government revenues for decades, the profits it did generate internally were due largely to high tariff levels on competing imports that increased the prices it could charge; this monopoly power accounted for two-fifths of Petrobrás’s earnings from 1954 to 1960.[23] In this respect, the Brazilian case can also be seen as an example of protectionism in support of Brazil’s overall import-substitution industrialization strategy, rather than solely as a means to control resources.[24] State dependency meant Petrobrás was politically vulnerable; politicians maintained a heavy influence over the company, particularly in its early years. As Smith argues, “[f]rom 1960, the fortunes of Petrobrás began noticeably to decline, as radical nationalism became increasingly influential in government, and successive presidents sought to control it and the political process.”25 Congress also was able to politicize the company, as Petrobrás’s investment plans were approved by Congress as part of the overall federal budget.[26]

Though politicization is a problem in and of itself, strident economic nationalism had a number of economically distorting effects; there were two such effects on Petrobrás’s financial operation. First, politicization led to the channeling of fiscal investment directly to the state oil company and discouraged outward-looking investment; one consequence was failure to invest in Bolivian gas fields in the 1950s. Second, high unpredictability and the lack of transparency created uncertainty, which posed additional challenges to Petrobrás’s efficient operation.[27] Greater than problems for Petrobrás itself, however, were the implications for society as a whole. As SOEs, including Petrobrás, incurred public-sector debt and relied on continued injection of state funds, the government allocated fewer and fewer of its resources to social spending.[28] Thus, by continuing to prioritize development of the oil sector, the state simultaneously contributed to inequality by reducing spending on those who were less well off.

Clientelism

A second, related challenge Petrobrás has faced is the persistence of clientelism. After the end of the military dictatorship, presidents often employed political appointments as a means of building coalitions; many of these appointments have been to state-owned firms such as Petrobrás.[29] Some argue that Petrobrás’s very survival has depended upon the patronage benefits it controlled as Brazil’s largest and most successful SOE, including handing out jobs, making investments and initiating purchasing contracts. Petrobrás’s managers were the primary beneficiaries of this patronage system, and their influence over other members of the main business lobbies meant longstanding entrenchment of resistance to reform. In addition, individual members of Congress controlled access to some of these benefits, which gave them incentive to avoid proposing reform in the first place.[30]

Petrobrás’s promotion of clientelism was not limited to the state-owned sector of the Brazilian economy. Because decisions about many of the patronage benefits, particularly investment and purchasing contracts, were made by the state, private companies dealing with Petrobrás became dependent on state patronage for their survival.[31] Many business decisions were thus made for clientelistic rather than profit-motivated reasons, and the likely results of such a system are the presence of economic waste and the introduction of a certain measure of corruption to an already politicized body.

Poorly Defined Roles and Relationships

A third challenge has been a poorly defined relationship between the state-owned business, Petrobrás, and the state itself. Though Petrobrás is a state-owned business, it is in fact a business, with responsibilities to make exploratory investments, produce petroleum and earn profit. The problem is that the control structure has been vaguely defined throughout Petrobrás’s history. A major weakness was the use of the ministerial model, wherein Petrobrás reported to a ministry serving as an intermediary between the government and the enterprise.[32] A major feature of this model was instability in the relationship between Petrobrás and the ministry; it swung between giving the company too much autonomy at some points, and subjecting it to overbearing micromanagement at others.[33] For example, after the oil shocks, the government decided that part of the means to restore macroeconomic control was through reassertion of authority over SOEs, including Petrobrás; at other times, as noted above, oversight was notably looser.[34] Araújo and Oliveira concur that subordination of state-run businesses through performance contracts to ministries within the executive branch is an ineffective way to run a state-owned business.[35]

Furthermore, the company was subject to simultaneous control by multiple state agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. In the 1960s and 1970s, SOEs reported to several controlling bodies, including the Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN), Special Secretariat for State Control of Enterprises (SEST), Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank. This led to mixed signals and fragmentation of decision making.[36] Though the regulatory structure changed in the late 1990s under Cardoso, there are still similar, if less severe, difficulties; authority and oversight are still divided between the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP). This ambiguity arose because Cardoso needed to compromise on some of the details of the constitutional reforms and leave others for later implementation through regular legislation and medida provisória.[37] Intent to reform was determined at the constitutional level, but actual structure was left ambiguous, leading to difficulties in oversight and confusion, as Petrobrás sought to serve multiple constituencies. In recent years, there have been turf battles and periodic competition between executives of ANP and Petrobrás—the very company over which ANP is supposed to have authority.[38]

Structural Inflexibility and Difficulty of Reform

The three challenges explored above were important in and of themselves; however, Petrobrás’s largest underlying structural problem was the virtual nonexistence of a reform process to correct these other deficiencies. Prior to the 1988 constitution, the state had had a monopoly on oil prospecting and production since the 1967 constitution, which itself reinforced a federal law of 1950.[39] The 1988 constitution’s ban on foreign investment extended the state monopoly on oil by prohibiting foreign and private sector investment in the whole industry.[40] Petrobrás’s insulated position was progressively entrenched, culminating in the placement of the national oil company on the same legal footing as the separation of powers and the guarantee of basic rights.[41] If the state had created the oil monopoly through standard legislation, reform would have been as simple as changing a law. But because its national status was written directly into the constitution, major changes in the oversight, structure or general operations of Petrobrás required modification of the document that underpins the nation’s political structure. On paper, this is difficult to do in Brazil; constitutional amendment requires a legislative three-fifths super-majority, voted twice in each chamber of Congress.[42]

In practice, the process is even more difficult and requires sophisticated legal maneuvering and a bit of luck. In addition to entrenching the oil monopoly, the 1988 constitution greatly diminished the president’s power to legislate by decree, and thus his ability to control directly the structure of SOEs.[43] Also, due to the politically sensitive and clientelistic nature of SOEs, presidents faced difficulty in working through the nominal amendment channel, and thus struggled to build legislative coalitions in favor of reform. Brazil’s high degree of legislative and party fragmentation posed a further challenge to building coalitions to change Petrobrás’s control structure.[44] The ability of nationalist elements of the military to exert anti-reform pressure through rightist parties, with claims that oil represented a “strategic sector,” was an additional impediment to reform.[45]

Thus, Presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco, with weak legislative coalitions, were not up to the task of reforming Petrobrás, and true reform had to wait until Cardoso took power in 1995.[46] Cardoso was more of a coalition-builder and saw legislative success in many areas where his predecessors had not. In 1995, Cardoso was able to amend the constitution in such a way as to allow some private sector competition in the energy sector; the Petroleum Law of 1997 established the ANP to oversee Petrobrás and new private sector competition. It is important to note, however, that these steps were only possible because Cardoso politicized unpopular oil worker strikes to demonize leftist and nationalist opposition to reform.[47] Thus reforms depended on the appearance of a politically capable, reform-minded leader, and on a confluence of events favorable to reform; without these circumstances, steps to clean up the energy sector might not have occurred.

Recent Liberalizations: A New Way Forward?

Between 1995 and 1999, Cardoso took the first major steps of destatização in the petroleum sector, with an aim toward repairing Petrobrás’s major problems. Though Cardoso himself preferred total privatization of Petrobrás, he was forced to compromise, and the first significant step was the passing of a constitutional amendment to open the sector to competition.[48] Following this opening was the establishment of the energy oversight and regulatory agency, ANP, in 1998, with responsibility for overseeing Petrobrás and promoting competition in the industry.[49] A third major change, as of June 1999, was the introduction of competitive bidding in the upstream hydrocarbons sector, in which Petrobrás itself is now only a (strongly advantaged) participant.[50] Though it is early to tell what will come of the concessions won by private companies, this action has effectively broken up Petrobrás’s monopoly and introduced competition, with ten companies in addition to Petrobrás winning concessions in the 1999 round.[51]

In addition to giving Petrobrás incentive to act less like a state-run agency and more like a proper business, the reforms of the mid-1990s also gave the firm a new means by which to do so. The reforms granted Petrobrás the flexibility to form joint ventures in the energy sector. As such, Petrobrás continued to benefit from preferential access to the state as the national oil company, while being allowed to realize some of the benefits of private-sector funding.[52] Though Petrobrás was for a long time 100 percent government-owned, ownership is now a mixture of public and private investment, and the late 1990s saw the state’s share of the company reduced from near totality to simple majority.[53]

Despite best efforts at reform and some notable progress, a number of the decades-old challenges remain under the new structure. Even under the new regulatory bodies, executive branch appointments to head both ANP and Petrobrás are highly politicized, with the Ministry of Mines and Energy exhibiting tendencies to nominate appointees for reasons of partisanship and patronage.[54] The lack of an energy ombudsperson and the fact that ANP directors can be removed from power by the executive branch have led to continued, though diminished, politicization and capture by interest groups.[55] Interaction with legislators also remains far from ideal, largely because of a desire to maintain access to patronage resources and an ingrained socialistic tendency to manipulate the agency for aims of social welfare, as was done pre-ANP[56] (Kingstone argues that “ANP…while staffed with qualified personnel and backed with appropriate legal empowerment, [continues] to run the risk of political interference through political appointments or politically motivated barriers to the funding of their operations”).[57]

Thus recent liberalizations constitute a mixed bag. They have kept control of Petrobrás in state hands and permitted it to continue serving state development aims, and recent signs of new competition are promising. Recent literature is relatively weak in diagnosing the extent to which the reforms of the mid-1990s have provided durable cures for the old ills of politicization, clientelism and regulatory ambiguity. But initial signs point to some legacy of the difficulties of the old order, and to a certain extent these may be accepted as a natural price to pay for maintaining the presence of government in business. A major step to improve the petroleum sector, short of outright privatization, would be the introduction of stronger checks and balances between the branches of government. By requiring approval of management dismissal by the legislature, and by streamlining judicial oversight of the energy sector, which is sluggish and often causes delays in changes requested by ANP, the state could systematically improve Petrobrás’s functioning.[58]

Conclusion

From this survey of Brazil’s experience with Petrobrás, we can derive a number of institutional best practices for improving the functioning of a nationalized hydrocarbons sector. First, governance structures should insulate state oil companies from politicization and cronyism to the greatest extent possible. Pires recommends four measures for a successfully depoliticized regulatory structure. These include selection of independent directors, at both the regulatory agency and company level, without clientilistic ties to the government; prohibition of arbitrary removal of directors; establishment of financial and administrative independence from the state, to the extent possible; and provision of transparent and unpoliticizied mediation and appeal procedures.[59] To ensure these measures are working, the structure should be such as to promote transparency; ways to do this might include holding regular public hearings and publication of support documentation to explain controversial decisions. Such transparency would have the additional benefits of promoting social legitimacy and maintaining public support for continued existence of the state oil firm.[60]

Second, the state should seek to allow private competition to exist alongside the state-owned oil company, and to permit the national company to engage in some quasi-private sector practices, such as establishing joint ventures with private firms. In particular, the government should seek to make the state company self-sufficient, and wean the firm off undue subsidy fiscal sponsorship, in an effort to further combat politicization and clientelism. This measure was obviously not possible in the early years of the Petrobrás experience, as the very existence of the company was in part a reaction to private underinvestment. The energy sector in particular, with large upfront capital expenditures and long lead times to actual production, is a difficult space in which to divorce nationalized companies from the state, but once the state energy company becomes self-sustaining, as Petrobrás, the largest Brazilian concern, appears to be, opening up the sector to competition is an advisable step.[61]

Finally, states should give forethought to the ease of structural reform when deciding how to implement nationalization. This recommendation will mean different things in different systems. For example, in highly fragmented political systems, like that of Brazil, with an ineffective legislative process, weak party discipline and multiple veto points, states should avoid constitutionally-mandated energy nationalization. In other systems, including those dominated by a strong president who can count on weak legislative resistance, stronger measures would be important to insulate the firm from usurpation and unnecessary change.

Given the limited prospects for growth of the energy sector in the first half of the twentieth century, it seems that nationalization was a sensible policy. Aside from the unquantifiable benefits of developing national sovereignty and national pride, there is clear evidence that assertion of government control over the energy sector directly led to its rapid development. Given lack of interest among international firms in funding oil exploration and production, the benefits of nationalization in the early years were many, and the challenges explored above seem a small price to pay for Brazilian development. Compare the Brazilian energy sector’s lack of development before Petrobrás with the achievement in 2006 of energy independence. As a result of the state-sponsored push for adoption of ethanol fuel for transportation, Brazil arguably has more sovereignty over its energy resources than most other nations.[62] Other countries, notably Venezuela and Bolivia, have sought to realize similar benefits through nationalization in recent years. In the event that they continue with further energy nationalization, it will be important to keep in mind the lessons of the Petrobrás experience.

Lessons for Bolivia

Bolivia’s gas-dependent energy sector, though relatively nascent, is more developed than was Brazil’s at the time of nationalization in the first half of the twentieth century. Whereas international companies were ambivalent about developing Brazilian oil, a number of countries have actively invested in Bolivia, including Brazil and Argentina.[63] Bolivia has the second-largest gas reserves in South America, after Venezuela, but lacks funds for development and depends on outside investment.[64] Furthermore, the dependence on gas rather than oil means that Bolivia’s energy industry relies on pipelines to neighboring countries. This means that demand for its products comes from Brazil and Argentina, the very investors it risks alienating through nationalization.[65] These two points taken together mean that Bolivia must tread more lightly than Brazil in appropriating resources from private investors.

Recent contract renegotiations with the major international oil companies with investment in Bolivia, including Petrobrás, were harsh, but all of the companies renegotiated rather than pulling out of the country, as happened in Venezuela.[66] The future direction of nationalization is unclear, but with the country’s state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), now effectively in control of a majority of the country’s energy earnings, Morales would do well to consider the Petrobrás case as he considers whether to further entrench nationalization in the name of national sovereignty.[67]

Notes & References

  1. “Gruel Before Jam,” Economist, 15 February 2003; “Focus: Brazil: Ready for Lula,” Petroleum Economist, 17 December 2002.
  2. K. S. Rosenn, “Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society,” American Journal of Comparative Law 38, no. 4 (1990): 800; P.S. Smith, “Petrobrás: The Politicizing of a State Company, 1953–1964,” Business History Review 46, no. 2 (1972): 4.
  3. F. K. Comparato, “The Economic Order in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988,” American Journal of Comparative Law 38, no. 4 (1990): 760.
  4. P. Kingstone, Critical Issues in Brazil’s Energy Sector: The Long (and Uncertain) March to Energy Privatization in Brazil (Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2004).
  5. Ibid., 22.
  6. T. J. Trebat, Brazil’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Case Study of the State as Entrepreneur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 70.
  7. Smith, 1972, 3–4.
  8. A. Lieders, “A New Chapter in Brazil’s Oil Industry: Opening the Market While Protecting the Environment,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 13, no. 3 (2001): 1.
  9. Kingstone, 22; Smith, 1972, 16; João Lizardo Rodrigues Hermes de Araújo and A. de Oliveira, “Brazilian Energy Policy: Changing Course?,” Coloquio Internacional “Energia, Reformas Institucionales y Desarrollo en América Latina,” Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—Université PMF de Grenoble (2003): 2.
  10. Kingstone, 23.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Araújo, 660.
  13. Marco Antonio de Souza Aguiar, M. Arruda, P. Flores and T. Groth, “Economic Dictatorship versus Democracy in Brazil,” Latin American Perspectives 11, no. 1 (1984): 4.
  14. Kingstone, 5.
  15. Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, “Reform Through Negotiation: The Privatization of State-Owned Firms In Brazil,” LASA—21st Internacional Congress (1998): 27.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Kingstone, 3.
  18. Ibid., 23.
  19. Smith, 1972, 10.
  20. Fernando de Holanda Barbosa, “Economic Development: The Brazilian Experience,” Development Strategies in East Asia and Latin America (1999): 11.
  21. Smith, 1972, 19.
  22. Ibid., 12.
  23. Ibid., 13.
  24. E. Berman, “Government, Politics and Economic Competitiveness in the Global Economy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 3 (1990): 254.
  25. Smith, 1972, 10.
  26. Barbosa, 8.
  27. P. S. Smith, “Bolivian Oil and Brazilian Economic Nationalism,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13, no. 2 (1971): 181.
  28. Economist, 25 April 1987.
  29. B. R. Schneider, “Partly for Sale: Privatization and State Strength in Brazil and Mexico,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 4 (1988): 14.
  30. Kingstone, 27.
  31. “Brazil: Survey,” Economist, 25 April 1987.
  32. Trebat, 70.
  33. Ibid., 71.
  34. Almeida, 15.
  35. Araújo, 683.
  36. Ibid., 72.
  37. G. D. Landau, “The Regulatory-Normative Framework in Brazil,” Policy Papers on the Americas, Center for Strategic and International Studies 13, no. 2 (2002): 8.
  38. Ibid.
  39. Comparato, 760.
  40. Rosenn, 800.
  41. Kingstone, 21.
  42. L. E. Armijo and P. Faucher, “We Have a Consensus: Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and Society 44, no. 2 (2002): 775.
  43. Almeida, 19.
  44. Kingstone, 3.
  45. Ibid., 27.
  46. Ibid., 28.
  47. Ibid.
  48. Coopers and Lybrand, Working Paper C1: Preliminary Note on the New Institutional Framework, SEN/Eletrobrás (1996): 25.
  49. Landau, 7; Almeida, 18.
  50. A. Patusco, “Energy Sector Highlights in 1999 and Business Opportunities,” Brazil Ministry of Mines and Energy homepage (2000), available at http://ecen.com/eee19/enersect percent20.htm, accessed 17 April 2007.
  51. Lieders, 3.
  52. Kingstone, 25.
  53. A. C. Gurmendi, “The Mineral Industry of Brazil,” US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook (2003); Smith, 1972, 3.
  54. Landau, 8.
  55. José Claudio Linhares Pires, “Capacity, Efficiency and Contemporary Regulatory Approaches in the Brazilian Energy Sector: The Experiences of ANEEL and ANP,” Challenges and Opportunities Facing the Brazilian Energy Sector BNDES, Center for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford (1999): 9.
  56. Kingstone, 43–44.
  57. Ibid.
  58. Pires, 10.
  59. Ibid., 5.
  60. Ibid., 6.
  61. Almeida, 24; Aguiar et al., 3.
  62. M. Reel, “Brazil’s Road to Energy Independence,” Washington Post, 20 August 2006.
  63. “Farewell to the Apertura Petrolera,” Economist, 5 April 2006.
  64. “Now It’s the People’s Gas,” Economist, 4 May 2006.
  65. “After Morales’ Move,” Economist, 3 May 2006.
  66. “Morales the Bountiful,” Economist, 13 December 2006; “A Hard Bargain,” Economist, 2 November 2006.
  67. Economist, 2 Nov. 2006.
JONATHAN KARTT is currently pursuing a master’s degree in international affairs, with a concentration in Latin American studies, from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Before attending SAIS, Mr. Kartt was a management consultant in New York with Strategic Decisions Group, a business strategy consultancy focusing on the life sciences and energy industries. He holds an A.B. in government from Dartmouth College.