Democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq

Paper Tiger, Clay Pigeon, and Military Surveillance

By
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Democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq : Paper Tiger, Clay Pigeon, and Military Surveillance - Imtiaz Hussain

Abstract

Even with foreign military surveillance, Afghanistan's democratization may become no more than a paper tiger and Iraq's a solid clay pigeon for ethnic groups to shoot at. So suggests a post-war comparative study of (a) the democratization mandates, (b) structures and procedures envisioned, and (c) the implementation record. Depending on how welcome foreign troops are in other ethnically divided societies today, they too may find their fate between the paper and pigeon roles.

Puzzle

Democratizing defeated countries remains a puzzle. Nazi Ger­many and imperialist Japan could be irreversibly transformed after World War II, but that is cold comfort for the US in today's thrice­threatened Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike Germany and Japan, Afghani­stan and Iraq are not just ethnically divided societies, but these divisions also antedate Islam-indicating democratization means more than cutting the Islamic Gordian Knot. Just as these ethnic groups seek their own Westphalian moment of self-assertion and identity, the Muslim Middle East is also gripped in a second tussle: religious versus secular forces, much akin to West Europe's Thirty Years War. The third source of Afghan and Iraqi pressure is democratization itself, not the stereotypical domestically-determined version, but one externally catalyzed and with a conspicuous exogenous component.

Democratization was mandated under external supervision, for Afghanistan through the December 2001 Bonn Agreement (BA), and for Iraq through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established by the Coalition of the Willing (COW), but operating through the Iraqi Governance Council (IGC). A comparative study of both mandates, the structures and processes they stipulate, and their implementation thus far informs us of both Afghani and Iraqi prospects, and possible Middle East spillovers.

Apples, Oranges, and Fruitful Comparisons

No two countries are alike. Even though both Afghanistan and Iraq had monarchical backgrounds, faced, and still face, internal divisions and foreign interventions, flirted, even if briefly, with one kind of socialism or another, and eventually became failed states, differences between them predominate: Afghanistan's lack of resources and remote location con­trast with Iraq's enormous oil reserves, its pivotal world economic posi­tion and its location at the crossroads of civilization. Iraq's Sunni-Shi'ite religious divide belies a broader and deeper Arab-Persian ethnic chasm, just as recent realpolitik invoking Afghanistan, dubbed the "great game", conceals a more historical ethnic Pashtun-Tadjik rivalry. Adjusting historical gravitations to today's priorities necessitates meaningful comparative dimensions.

HISTORICAL THORNS

As artificial constructions, the Afghani and Iraqi states were doomed to fail. The indicators of their fall may be gleaned from the nature of cleavages, the relative power between groups, and pinning stability on foreign military presence.

Ethnicity, religion, and ideology sharply divided both countries. Afghanistan's Baluchis, Hazaras, Tadjiks, Turkmenis, and Uzbekis, among others, were historically subjugated by Pashtunis, just as Iraq's Kurds and Shi'ias were by Arab Sunnis. Imported socialism not only deepened these schisms, evident in Saddam Hussein's Baathist totalitari­anism and Afghanistan's Soviet invasion, but also divided the dominant groups. Afghani Pashtunis, for example, are divided along a pro-democ­racy faction under Hamid Karzai, a pro-Taliban fundamentalist counter­part under Mullah Omar, and a less severe pro-Islamic alternative under Burhanuddin Rabbani. In Iraq, Shiites account for 60% of Iraq's 25m people, and therefore theoretically may command absolute majority, but diverge along fundamentalist, moderate, and secular loyalties-catalyzed in part by anti-Saddam war alliances.

Democratization ultimately rests upon the relative strength of Afghani and Iraqi groups. Prior to the conflict, Pashtunis wielded power in Kabul, whether under the monarchy, the communists, or the Taliban, and in Iraq, Sunnis held a vice-like grip. Both countries faced excesses, Afghanistan from religious fundamentalism, Iraq from military totalitari­anism. Changing the regime in both, therefore, could easily invite tyr­anny. In Afghanistan, minorities could face the brunt, in particular Tadjiks exploiting intra-Pashtuni differences between a pro-democracy faction under Karzai, pro-Taliban under Mullah Omar, and a less severe Islamic group under Burhanuddin Rabbani. In Iraq, a tyranny of the majority in Shi'ite-controlled Iraq, 1 or a divided Shi'ite camp, are distinct possibilities. Whereas Tadjiks are too small to continue directing Afghani affairs without substantial external military support, Shi'ite governance carries even more damaging spillover potential. Among the likely sources of Tadjik support are India, Russia, and the United States, however India lacks contiguity, Russia would reopen old wounds elsewhere in Afghani­stan, and the US never fully accepted the Tadjik preponderance from the very outset. Similarly for Iraq. Shi'ite excesses may be applauded by, and encouraged in Iran, but generate resentment among Iraq's southern neighbors and the United States. Sensing the opportunity, Kurds may push their autonomy desires into a full-fledged independence movement, thus breaking Iraq, rattling Iran and Turkey, and complicating democratization.

Democratization therefore necessitates military order, and as a corollary, US engagement. However, direct US military engagement in Iraq against its more off-shore Afghani role also unofficially expresses the lower degree of US confidence in democratizing Iraq than Afghani­stan. Afghanistan's democratization is in the hands of Karzai, augmented by a token international force, of which the US provides 12,000 troops and off-shore military presence, Great Britain 2,000 troops, while Canada and others provide 5,000 troops. On the other hand, Iraq's democratization is directly supervised by a former US ambassador, L. Paul Bremer, serving as Bush's envoy from May 2003, with roughly 130,000 US troops supplemented by Great Britain's 11,000, Poland's, 2,400, Italy's 2,300, Ukraine's 1,650, Spain's 1,300, the Netherlands's 1,100, and Japan's 600, with 3,000 non-combat South Korean soldiers also offering support.

Centralizing presidential authority in both countries faces all kinds of obstacles. Without the US-based military presence, ethnic rivalries would explode; with it, democratization assumes different colors.

Comparative Democratization

All three barometers-mandate, structures and procedures envi­sioned, and performances-illustrate the perils of adjusting historical tensions to modern society.

MANDATE

Assumed as the strategic goal in both countries, democratization nevertheless developed differently in each. Afghanistan's various ethnic groups were locked up in Petersberg Hotel, Koenigswinter, until they forged what came to be called the BA; Iraq's ethnic groups stemmed from instruments of surrender as well as surreptitious arrangements with exiled groups, crystallizing into the IGC through the CPA.

Leadership was curiously provided by exiled or cosmopolitanized persons or groups in both cases. Karzai led a long Afghani list, which also includes the US ambassador in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad. Owing to his popularity and US backing, Karzai, the monarch's Popolzai relative, became Interim Authority/Administration (IA) leader from December 22, 2001. Yet, relative power positioning rather than proportional repre­sentation propelled the Tadjik-Uzbeki Northern Alliance (NA) to the top under the Panjshiri troika, named after the Tadjik valley that has been uncaptured by the Taliban: General Mohammad Qasim Fahem, Yunus Qanuni, and Dr. Abdallah Abdallah-future defense, interior, and foreign ministers. They did not want the monarchy restored, nor any interna­tional security force at first. Having been kicked out of Kabul in 1996, they routed the Taliban in Mazar-i-Sharif in November 2001.

In the Koenigswinter background were the Peshawar, Cyprus, and Rome groups, representing the Pashtunis, Shi'ite Hazaras, and exiled monarchists, respectively. The Pashtuni representative, Haji Abdul Qadir, later a short-lived, assassinated vice president, even left the negotiations to protest Tadjik high-handedness. As the group from which the Taliban emerged, the Pashtunis were reduced to either supporting the return of ex-king Zahir Shah, himself a Pashtun, or becoming tadjikized, that is befriending the Tadjiks. Whereas the Rome Group was more interested in the monarch's home-journey from exile rather than in his restoration, the Cyprus Group essentially sought to preserve minority Shi'ite rights in Kabul. They were held together by UN Special Represen­tative Lakhdar Brahimi and a no-nonsense United States.

On the Iraqi front, both Kurds and selected Shi'ites were in touch with the US even before Saddam Hussein abandoned Kabul. Among the Kurds were Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Among the Shi'ites were Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who worked with the US until his August 2003 assassination, but reflected neither Najaf Shi'ite temperaments, nor Shi'ia's emerging youth aspirations; and businessman Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraq National Congress (INC), who is a US neoconservative favorite but not trusted by either the CIA or the Depart­ment of State. There was no Koenigswinter equivalent of independent parleying between them: the US alone kept them connected.

After crossing many hurdles, Afghanistan stands on the threshold of its first general elections in September 2004, while Iraq is scheduled to begin its interim governance from July 2004 until elections are held in late 2005. Whereas Afghanistan needed new centralized institutions, such as the constitution, presidency, and regularized elections, as well as emerging administrative, legislative, judicial, and banking agencies to replace old counterparts like the monarchy and loyajirga, Iraq's replace­ment of centralized Baathist institutions creates a more formidable Achilles Heel. Dubbed the paper tiger and clay pigeon models, both illustrate options other failed states may one day face: Afghanistan's progress is satisfactory, but only on paper, while Iraq's is being shot down even before it is erected. Clearly democratization needs long-term military safeguards in both countries.

Three playing field differences between the two models are notewor­thy: Whereas IGC's 25-members handpicked by Bremer were not part and parcel of any endogenously unfolding dynamics after Saddam's exit, many Afghanis in Koenigswinter directly reflected battlefield interests; Afghani centralization was a necessity given the absence of any ethnic group commanding absolute majority, whereas Iraq's centralization, given the absolute Shi'ite majority, merely invites future civil war; and finally, whereas the BA picked up on independent UN-based efforts from the 1988 Geneva Accord to facilitate Soviet withdrawal, post-war UN efforts in Iraq were subordinated by US political preferences and military imperatives, and ultimately shattered when the August 2003 killing of Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other UN officials prompted a UN Iraqi departure.

STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES

Even though democratization is the common strategic goal, Afghanistan and Iraq are on two different tracks, in part reflecting dissimi­lar US interests. Whereas both were prioritized in the US war on terror­ism, Iraq also had a leader the US wanted out. The result: greater US hands-on engagement in Iraqi than in Afghani democratization.

Two successive governing structures were spelled out to prepare the 2004 elections in Afghanistan: the Interim Authority or Administration (IA) from December 22, 2001 until the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) convened in June 2002; then the Transnational Authority/ Administra­tion (TA), chosen by the ELJ, framed a constitution by December 2003. After specifying a UN-approved chairman, five vice chairmen, and twenty-four department heads, the IA worked with a UN-approved 21-member Special Independent Commission (SIC) to convene the ELJ. Local elections for 1051 ELJ delegates were held in March 2002, but were left at the mercy of the 32 provincial governors and the many more warlords. To account for displaced persons, professionals in exile, deep ethnic cleavages, nomadic groups, and particularly women, 501 addi­tional delegates representing 381 districts (including foreign enclaves as far away as the US east coast), were nominated. They met three extra days amidst applause and brawls, accomplishments and intimidations, to elect a TA president and approve his cabinet. Within its first two months, the TA established a Constitutional Commission; and the January 4, 2004 constitution ratification leaves only the elections to be staged, not in June 2004, as initially earmarked, but possibly in September. Less than one-tenth of eligible voters have been registered as of March, with women lacking sufficient representation, while security conditions remain ever-precarious in the region.

In addition to challenging their traditional counterparts, emerging institutions also promote secular, western practices, such as voting by ballots, creating a supreme court, and extending adult franchise, among people largely untutored in such practices. Building a national army or police force is slippery as the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO refuse to be deployed outside Kabul. How these play out in traditional Afghani societies remains to be seen.

As previously alluded to, once the US-dominated COW had defeated Saddam's regime decisively, President Bush's call for the cessation of war from May 1, 2003 resulted in the CPA establishing a 25-member IGC in July, consisting mostly of exiled political and secular Kurd, Sunni, and Shi'ite leaders. It accurately represented (a) Iraq's ethnic composition, with 13 of the 25 members being Shi'ites, and (b) regional composition, with 9 of its 18 provinces under Shi'ite control, 7 under Kurds/Sunni, and 2 mixed. However, this governing body is too exogenous, as it grossly ignores sentiments within Iraq: religious Shi'ite views were underrepresented, in addition to Sunni and Kurd apprehension of a tyranny of the majority.

Bremer's Transitional Plan of November 14, 2003, which the IGC fully approved, called for caucus elections in Iraq's 18 provinces to eventually produce an Interim National Assembly and an Interim National Government by July 1, 2004. These, in turn, would produce a constitution and hold free and fair elections based on universal adult suffrage within 18 months. A Transitional Administrative Law, or interim constitution, was adopted on March 7, 2004 to facilitate their tasks.

How the cards are originally stacked eventually skews outcomes. Afghanistan is fulfilling all of its pre-election obligations while Iraq is struggling to get to first-base. In the final analysis, Afghanistan may still fulfill all paper obligations without fully democratizing, while Iraq's efforts may be furiously contested.

As expected, the IA was heavily weighted in favor of the NA, even more so against the Pashtunis. Of the 30 appointed officials, 18 belonged to the NA factions, 11 to the Rome Group, 1 to the Peshawar Group, and none from the Cyprus group. Karzai remained the only significant Pashtuni in the IA. The Tadjik stranglehold troubled even the Uzbekis within the NA, led by General Rashid Dostum's Junbish-i-Milli (National Islamic Movement). Although subsequently made a Deputy Defense Minister, Dostum, together with Ismail Khan, a Persian-speaking, born­again Herati mujahedeen, were essentially ignored at the ELJ. They claim the centralization process, and especially any state armed force, as the cause of the murder of Ismail Khan's son revealed in Herat this March.

There is no doubt to observers that this monumental exercise at centralizing Afghani authorities through a constitution, democratic elections, and a strong president would not have proceeded so smoothly without the military presence of the United States. Whether it is the ISAF, off-shore retaliatory capabilities, selective deployment of special forces to hunt Taliban die-hards, or even providing Karzai's personal bodyguards, the United States military presence has forced expectations into realities. This does not necessarily guarantee Afghanistan's first democratically elected government, based on universal adult suffrage. The assumption ignores how ISAF does not operate outside of Kabul and

Afghanistan's porous borders, particularly with Pakistan, prevent a Taliban-proof countryside. Until the decisive day of reckoning between the democratic and disruptive forces, Afghani restoration may remain surreal. Nevertheless, in contrast to Iraq, Afghanistan has come a long way: Specified goals, no matter who set them and under what supervisory circumstances, have by and large been met, whereas in Iraq they con­tinue to be defied.

The roles of Bremer himself and the CPA complicate Iraqi democra­tization. Bremer is re-enacting Douglas A. McArthur's inappropriate over-lord Japanese role after 1945 with the veto-power he wields over IGC, for example, in preventing the enactment of Shari'a, and the unwrit­ten Muslim code, undercutting the constitutional and democratic ends being sought in Iraq. In addition, the CPA encouragement to develop private militias across Iraq as a step towards forging a multi-militia security for Iraq is also capturing attention. As Jennifer Bremer of the University of North Carolina's Kenan Institute of Private Enterprises's Washington Center surmises, "this process could slide into Northern Ireland-style chaos, with each faction forming its own militia for defence against all the other militias."2

Adopting Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was hin­dered when Ayatollah Sistani opposed two Kurd demands: First, subject­ing the permanent constitution to a two-thirds majority vote, and second, installing a rotating presidency among five members, three of them Shi'ites, one Kurd, and one Sunni. A long political road lies ahead in chronologically diminishing time to resolve these differences. As it currently stands, the TAL, also called the Fundamental Law, includes a bill of rights, federalism, and Islam as one source oflegislation, which the actual constitution cannot alter. The first two seek to reconcile the differ­ent ethnic groups by recognizing a wide variety of rights, while the third does not make Islam the only source oflaw. Misgivings abound; for example, demands from the 3 women IGC members for formalizing 25% of legislative seats for women, Kurds insisting their militia, pesh merga, be retained at the federative level, and the ambiguity in the role of Islam. The US seeks a power transfer in time for the November elections, but whether the IGC continues after June 30 is a more urgent issue. Walid Khadduri of the London-based Middle East Economic Survey proposes confessional approaches:3 bringing in neglected Sunni or Shi'ite mem­bers after that date to work out a future collectively. Others, such as the US, call for its dissolution; yet others, like Sistani, only see the IGC as an illegitimate collection of US-stooges.

Weaving a way out of this quagmire is undoubtedly important to a viable Iraq, but the critical contemporary issue deals with the nature of those caucuses. As previously observed, selective US preference contrasts with Sistani's direct elections demand, and this fissure was compounded by comments from a UN electoral team which returned from Iraq, under Carina ,Perell, during February, claiming Iraq will not be prepared for elections as early as June 30.

Accordnig to the BBC's Barbara Plett, four issues dividing the US and Iraqi officials not only predict Shi'ite reactions, but also increasing UN involvement:4 completing voter registration by June 30, the June 30 deadline itself, building a pluralistic political culture and security. The first two reflect administrative problems, but are affected by the underly­ing constraint combined in the second two issues: Iraq's identity prob­lem. US Secretary of State Colin Powell insists the June 30 US deadline for transferring power will not be compromised,5 itself an acknowledg­ment of the limits of US military power in pursuing political goals. Barry Schwerd of the Associated Press, among others, sees this as a philosophi­cal US shift towards embracing UN engagement. To recall, prior to the March 2003 outbreak of war, the US reduced the UN, to a helpless body and ridiculed Security Council opponents of Resolution 1441, namely France and Germany. "We are waiting to see whether or not the U.N. has better ideas than the caucus system," Powell conceded.6 While this may not be tantamount to the UN finally finding its place in the sun after almost sixty years on the run, it is the one agency Iraqis of all constituen­cies place faith upon, Iraq's neighbors are clamoring for, and the US is increasingly turning to. If the UN is not engaged, the alternative of civil war may otherwise be just around the corner.

Democratization by defiance necessitates the US and UN, the former to provide military cover, the latter as a diplomatic symbol. Neither the US nor the UN can remain permanently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both countries have no choice but to utilize this briefly safeguarded opportunity to eliminate historical windows of vulnerability. Under today's demanding circumstances, this may be a tall task.

Conclusions

Democratization faces at least five trip-wires: the impact of military victory, the nature of rogue/failed states, the middle class, the superpower's engagement, and the UN.

A military victory today promises a slippery slope: Germany and Japan landed on their own feet under similar circumstances by the 1950s, however Afghanistan and Iraq face damoclean propositions from greater population diversity, porosity of state boundaries reducing the state's gatekeeping capacities, and the disruptive and costly localization of more globalizing trends and developments.

Drifting from mainstream attitudes, behaviors, and policies imposes greater costs for rogue/failed states today than before. Even though the Cold War was not democracy-friendly, Germany and Japan had no choice but to embrace it. Under today's contrasting atmosphere of greater transparency and accountability, overblowing domestic concern enhances rather than eliminates procedural obstacles.

Supposedly the motor behind modernization, the middle class is split between those who adapt well to changing circumstances and those who don't. Shana Cohen argues that without bonding with the state, the individual fails to identify with such desirous overarching developments as market liberalization or a Kantian perpetual peace.7 Instead, he/she falls prey to another overarching development, terrorism. With more educated persons in absolute and proportional terms, Iraq carries more seeds of long-term breakdown, irrespective of its ethnic conflicts, than Afghanistan. Within these conflicts, it becomes but a time-bomb.

Superpowers need to draw the line between retribution and remold­ing society to avoid what John Lewis Gaddis calls the Agincourt syn­drome, that is, inflicting a military victory so imposing as to psychologi­cally change the defeated, as Henry V did at Agincourt and the US in Germany and Japan. He identifies three ways to prevent it:8 (a) multitasking, (b) winning and sustaining local welcome, and (c) main­taining the moral high ground. Whereas Afghanistan has a mixed record with all three, Iraq is failing with each: the BA's progress contrasts with Bremer's restoration plan facing stumbling blocks; Afghani locals find US and allied troops more fascinating than fearsome, however in Iraq Sunnis, Shi'ites, or formerly exiled supporters either never welcomed the US, and if they did, are taking back that welcome; and finally, whereas 9/11 gave the Afghani invasion the much-needed high moral ground, in Iraq not involving the UN and not substantiating the WMD argument are undermining both the morality behind invasion and the morale of ground occupying forces.

Multitasking has been pursued differently by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq: With an occupying army in Iraq, the US must face all eventuali­ties and pursue every opportunity, in contrast to its off-shore Afghani posturings, which allow local dynamics to be ignored. One consequence: The US Embassy in Baghdad is not only bigger than the one in Kabul, but the biggest of all embassies worldwide.9 Yet, suicide bombings and threats inflict greater US losses in Iraq than in Afghanistan.

Sweden's former prime minister, Carl Bildt, extracts six state­building lessons from Iraq relevant to the comparison.10 First, a secure environment must be established. This seems to be more advanced in Afghanistan than in Iraq. Second, prioritizing state building over recon­struction. While generally true for Afghanistan precisely because of a more secure environment, in Iraq state-building is not taking roots, owing to the lack of a secure environment. Third, the stipulation of a final goal. This is true in Afghanistan, and the necessary bricks to put them into place are also largely there; but Iraq has yet to conceptualize where it wants to go, and therefore the needed pieces cannot even be precisely defined. Fourth, the necessary conditions for long-term economic growth should be present. Here both countries face deficits, Afghanistan from its lack of resources, inadequate infrastructure, and abject poverty, and Iraq from its collapsing infrastructure, diversion of resources to pay repara­tion and inherited Baathist debt, and increasing impoverishment. Fifth, a benevolent regional atmosphere should prevail. With Pakistan playing a spoiler role in Afghanistan and Iran doing the same in Iraq, this will be the Achilles Heel in both cases. Neither Afghani nor Iraqi reconstruction and rehabilitation can be quarantined from their influences. A final state­building lesson is the availability of international support. Yet, this is harder to garner for Iraq than for Afghanistan, given the divided world opinion behind the Iraqi invasion and the large-scale UN exit, or subordi­nation, in Iraq. In the final analysis, even by fulfilling many of the stipu­lated checkpoints, Afghani democratization remains reversible, but Iraq is barely in the democratization playing field.

Finally, without the United Nations working as a player, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States would be in a deeper hole. The durabil­ity and dignity the world body demonstrated in Afghanistan during the 1980s and in Iraq through the 1990s, prove its capability to aid in making the world a safer place for democratization.

Implications

Democratization impacts development, identity-searches, and regional relations.

Afghani and Iraqi experiences challenge the development approach of Gabriel Almond and others in the Social Science Research Council project. They predicted identification, among other sources of crisis, as but means towards the ends of political modernization. As this study suggests, political development may have to be the means for resolving the embedded identity crisis in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Development procedures that worked during the Cold War, how­ever, may be damaging for democratization. In grappling with ethnic, racial, religious, or nationality identification problems, a state revolving around a dominant nationality has proven more stable, than an artificial state composed of embattled nationalities. The identity crisis inside Afghanistan and Iraq is not dissimilar to predicaments faced by India and Pakistan in South Asia, the post-Soviet successor states of Central Asia, elsewhere in the Middle East, and across Africa.

Given the artificiality of many Middle East, African, South Asian, and Central Asian boundaries, two scenarios follow: The worst case scenario remains an Afghani or Iraqi explosion rippling across neighbor­ing countries, prioritizing military considerations over both democratiza­tion and development. The best-case scenario of democratization spilling over would challenge Middle East political structures. Both are inher­ently destabilizing.

Notes

1. Michael O'Hanlon and Stephen J. Solarz, "Iraq's timely vote," The Washington Times, February 16, 2004, from www.washingtontimes.com/ commentary/ 20040216-083055-345or.htm

2. No relation of the chief US administrator, L. Paul Bremer. See "Electing chaos," Washington Post, January 18, 2004, from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A23714-2004Jam6.html

3. "Senior politicians fear Iraq on verge of social explosion due to unemployment, instability,'' The Daily Star, January 28, 2004, from www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/ 28_01_04_b-asp

4. "Obstacles on road to Iraq elections," BBC News, January 21, 2004, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/350475i.stm

5. "U.S.: Iraq deadline fixed,'' Indianapolis Star, February 18, 2004, from www.indystar.com/a rticles/ 4/1 21714-5974-010 .html

6. Barry Schwerd, "U.S. reliance on U.N. signals philosophical shift,'' Baltimore Sun, February 19, 2004, from www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal us-iraqo219,o,4583146.story?co

7. "Alienation and globalization in Morocco:addressing the social and political impact of market integration," Comparative Studies in Society and History 45 (January 2003) 168-89.

8. "A grand strategy of transformation," Foreign Policy (Nov/ Dec 2002) 50-57.

9. F. Zakaria, "In Iraq, it's time for some smarts," Newsweek, March 1, 2004, 9.

10. "Analysis:state-building lessons," BBC News, January 18, 2004, from: http://news.bbc.co.uk./1/hi/world/middle_east/3407613.stm

Imtiaz Hussain is a professor in the Department of International Studies at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico.