Leadership and Democratization

The Successful Model of Southern Europe

By
Juan Carlos I of Spain
Leadership and Democratization : The Successful Model of Southern Europe - Christina Politi

Abstract

In the 1970s, three southern European countries—Greece, Spain, and Portugal— democratized successfully. In light of the transitions underway in the Middle East, understanding the reasons behind their success has taken on new urgency. The paths of all three were fragile and uncertain. Yet, when examining their similarities, we find that their success was due in great part to their charismatic and visionary leaders, including Constantine Karamanlis in Greece, king Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez in Spain, and Melo Antunes and Antonio Eanes in Portugal, who not only built consensus towards democracy but also skillfully and courageously stood up against threats to the new regimes.

Introduction

It would have been difficult for a European living in 1970 to envision a different state of affairs for the continent. Democratic Europe was bordered by three dictatorships to the south. In Spain, Francisco Franco had been in power since 1939, having emerged victorious from the horrendous civil war that tore the country apart for three years. In Portugal, Antonio Salazar came to power in 1932 and established the Estado Novo authoritarian regime after more than a decade of political instability. In Greece, the dictatorship of the Colonels had ruled since the coup of 1967, after a period of “restricted democracy” since 1950.1 to the east lay the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, bastions of Communism. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1970s, the three southern European dictatorships had successfully transitioned to democracy. As they consolidated their new regimes within the next decade, the USSR would eventually also collapse. The democratic movement, coined the “third wave” by Samuel Huntington,2 began in these three countries and spread to countries the world over, prompting many scholars to analyze its causes and reasons for success. Due to the broader political and intellectual context of democratization, studying the paths of the three southern European states is not only intriguing but has taken on urgency in the context of the recent democratic fervor that has spread across the Middle east and north Africa. Is it possible for southern Europe’s success to offer a model for other countries? Unfortunately, the answer is more ambiguous than one would hope. Yet the role of leadership in successful democratization is undeniable: the charismatic, visionary leaders that emerged during the transition played a vital role in engineering a democratic outcome.

Despite the evident temporal and geographic proximity of the three countries (both to each other and to democratic Europe), the causes of the demise of each dictatorship and the specific path taken toward democracy differ significantly in many ways. Nonetheless, Greece, Portugal, and Spain were similar and successful in five critical respects. First, they emerged from a socio-political setting that was conducive to democratization, while the demise of the dictatorships was relatively swift and smooth. Second, they were gifted with exceptional leadership—Constantine Karamanlis in Greece; king Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez in Spain; and Melo Antunes, Mário Soares, and António Eanes in Portugal—that guided them decisively towards democracy, promoted moderation, and were critical in avoiding potential pitfalls during the process. These leaders helped build consensus among the important factions of political parties, the military, the monarchy, and the state bureaucracy. Third, when necessary, these leaders moved to neutralize threats to democracy. Fourth, all three states institutionalized democracy through electoral and constitutional means, paving the way for consolidation. Finally, each country benefited from facilitating conditions, including the moderating role played by the population and external actors.

The Demise of Dictatorship

The first step to building a successful democracy is eliminating the ruling dictatorship. The underlying long-term factor that led to the fall of these three dictatorships was their inability to adapt to new social, economic, and political realities.3 Robert Fishman specifically distinguishes between two different causal factors leading to the collapse of authoritarian regimes. The first is via a crisis of failure, whereby the dictatorship “manifestly fails” to respond to a crisis, and the second is via a crisis of historical obsolescence, according to which the regime has simply been “historically superseded.” 4 Spain falls under the second rather than the first category, because its transformation followed the death of Franco. Greece and Portugal, on the other hand, have elements of both, since the regimes were both historically obsolete and failed entirely to respond to external crises that were the immediate causes of their demise.

In all three cases, the economy played an important role—but in a manner different than the commonly accepted argument, which suggests that the democratizations were the result of two decades of economic growth.5 Geoffrey Pridham cautions that although “it would be commonsensical to agree that democracy benefits from affluence...this is not the same as a certain threshold of affluence being the cause of democratic institutions.”6 It is not an economic boom but rather an economic crisis that undermines the legitimacy of the dictatorship.7 Specifically, Greece, Spain, and Portugal had been plagued by economic stagnation in the postwar period but undertook policies of economic liberalization in the 1950s and 1960s, enabling average GDP growth rates above six percent per year.8 However, all three continued to have a low standard of living and relied on tourism, remittances,9 and imported energy10 and were thus vulnerable to the oil shock of 1973. This shock proved that the dictatorships, whose very legitimacy was tied to economic growth, were too inflexible to deal with the crisis.11

In Greece, although the regime had already been largely weakened by student protests demanding greater freedom at the law School and Polytechnic of Athens, it was the debacle in Cyprus, in which the Colonels backed a coup against Cypriot president Makarios III,12 followed by an invasion of the island by turkey on July 20, 1974, that provided the coup de grace. In the ensuing 72 hours, several key decisions taken by the leadership “effectively signaled the end of authoritarian rule in Greece.” Indeed, the military’s weakness in responding to the attack was uncovered, and Brigadier-general Dimitrios Ioannides lost his support, paving the way for a handover to civilian rule.13 the fact that a threat to national security contributed to the fall of the Colonels had significant consequences for the evolution of the democratic process. Both the subsequent “wave of national solidarity” in response to the external threat and the “climate of self restraint” allowed for a “precious interregnum” during which democratization could occur effectively.14

As in Greece, the cause of regime change in Portugal was rooted in the country’s international engagements, although the process was decidedly different. Even after the death of Salazar, the regime under Marcello Caetano had failed to reform in any meaningful way,15 but, “[i]n the absence of domestic opposition, the only resistance ... came from the military, the country’s sole independent institution.”16 the military, which had grown impatient with the costly yet futile wars in the African colonies, engineered an April 1974 coup against the Estado Novo that was both popular and successful.17 the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), with general António de Spínola, a “popular” veteran of long-running anti-guerrilla campaigns in Africa, at its head,18 would play a key, yet often conflicting, role in Portugal’s democratization.

In contrast to both Greece and Portugal, international considerations did not have an important impact on the fall of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. In reality, the preceding years had seen the rise of a working class that was increasingly mobilized, mounting opposition from student and regional movements, and the “withdrawal” of support for the regime by the Church. However, it was Franco’s own death in 1975 that opened up prospects for reform.19 As the assassination of Carrero Blanco by the terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 1973 caused a lack of strong leadership in the Francoist camp, Juan Carlos emerged as king and successor to Franco, having “gained an unexpected freedom of manoeuvre that he was to use in unanticipated ways.”20

Building Consensus Towards Democracy

Thus, by the mid-1970s, the three southern European states had overthrown their repressive dictatorships but still had not succeeded in establishing democracy. In the following months and years, charismatic leadership would move the three countries decidedly into the democratic camp. In this enterprise, they would benefit from favorable domestic factors. First of all, the prosperity of the previous decade had brought about “an unprecedented degree of social, economic, and cultural modernization,” which in turn favored moderation in the political sphere and helped smooth the transition.21 Secondly, previous experiences with democracy in all three cases—both successes and failures—created conditions conducive to a democratic transition. Although Greece had the shortest-lived dictatorship, only in place since 1967, it had also witnessed the failures of a “restricted democracy” after 1950. Following failed experiments in establishing truly democratic republics, both Greece and Spain had witnessed terrible civil wars. In Spain, both the failure of the Second republic (1931–36) and the civil war “served as a... cautionary tale counseling moderation and restraint.” finally, of the three, Portugal had the least democratic experience, which made the transition more perilous and crisis-ridden. In fact, Portugal’s rocky path served as a warning during Spain’s transition.22 thus, economic and social progress, as well as prior experiments in democracy, would prove valuable during the transitions in Greece and Spain, while the relative lack of progress would make the Portuguese path more difficult.

The key turning point for all three countries was the move to break decisively with the past toward a democratic future. According to Huntington’s analysis of democratic transitions, this could occur either through transformation—whereby democratic elements from within the regime lead the transition, as was the case for Spain—or through replacement, in which democratic elements outside the government instigate a process for the complete removal of the existing regime, as occurred in Greece and Portugal.23 Both cases demanded significant consensus building, so that the existing power balance could be readjusted without causing instability. The key would be for supporters of democracy to cooperate, while at the same time avoiding the mobilization of a dangerous opposition that could lead to either a reactionary backlash by conservative “standpatters” or revolutionary chaos brought about by “radical extremists.” 24

In Spain, success was achieved largely because of the leadership of king Juan Carlos and Suárez. In 1975, Juan Carlos could have steered the country down one of three diverging routes: first, an approach of continuity supported by staunch francoists;25 second, limited reform; or third, a “democratic rupture.”26 In 1976, he opted firmly for the third route and replaced Arias Navarro with Suárez as prime minister. Suárez, a technocrat from within the regime, was not only able to “manipulate successfully the bureaucratic machinery” but also used it to gain valuable information, thereby “exploit[ing] the opposition’s internal divisions.”27 Impressively, Suárez managed to convince the Cortes legislative body to essentially disband itself by voting for a system of universal suffrage and a new Parliament, 28 which, along with the legalization of unions, strikes, and the Spanish Socialist (PSOE) and Communist (PCE) parties, paved the way for elections.29

According to Kenneth Medhurst, “consensus” politics ensued.”30 Here it is important to highlight the judgment of opposition parties to pursue a path of moderation and collaboration, an outcome that was not necessarily obvious at the time.31 In the 1977 elections, Suárez was able to win due to the backing of Juan Carlos as well as his careful crafting of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) party consisting of an amalgam of Christian and Social Democratic elements.32 Subsequently, Suárez, the apt negotiator, achieved agreement on the 1977 Moncloa Pact, which officially recorded the joint goals of renouncing Franco’s regime and building the new one in a “non confrontational” spirit.33 Additionally, the constitution-writing process successfully addressed divisive issues—such as the relationship of the state with the Catholic Church, education, and the explosive issue of the rights of the regions—with ambiguous wording, often brokered in back-door meetings.34 “gradualism and consensus” would also pervade negotiations on economic reforms, especially efforts to control inflation, in which unions were heavily involved.35

In many respects, Greece had a consensus-driven approach similar to that of Spain. In Greece, as in Spain, the fall of the dictatorship did not automatically lead to an institution of liberal democracy. In fact, the initial proposal by the military leadership, made in a back-door meeting with eight centrist and rightist leaders, advocated a largely unaltered role for the army with only a semblance of democratic politics, and in particular the exclusion of the far left.36 the critical refusal of the National Radical Union (ERE) and the Center Union (EK) to accept this proposal led to the alternative solution of bringing Karamanlis back from his exile in Paris. Karamanlis had left Greece in 1963 and was thus not politically tainted by the junta. At the same time, he appealed to the right because of his staunch anti-Communist stance as evidenced in his prior tenure as prime minister.37 Seen as a deus ex machina,38 Karamanlis eased the democratic transition by using his “skill in breaking with his own past, while at the same time conveying an image of seasoned competence and continuity.”39

Developments in Greece took on a similar character to those in Spain, although stability came mainly from Karamanlis and the office of prime minister, rather than from the monarch. Karamanlis immediately made all political parties legal, including the Communists; reversed both junta-era and predating civil-war legislation; and released political prisoners.40 Karamanlis turned to highly divisive issues only after an electoral victory in November 1974 had further legitimized his tenure.41 Soon thereafter, he conducted a referendum on abolishing the monarchy, which had played an interventionist and destabilizing role in the past; the measure passed by an overwhelming majority.42 foreseeing the rise of the Center-left, Karamanlis also attempted to reform the right43 and drafted a strong presidential position into the constitution to act as a counterweight to government.44

The trajectory of Portugal was different from that of Spain and Greece, most significantly because the MFA came to power after the coup. The following year and a half was critical for the establishment of democracy: from April 25, 1974 until November 25, 1975, “power shifted from the reformers to radicals, then to populists and finally to moderates who were able to impose their preference for a West European pluralist democracy.”45 the victory of the moderates was in great part due to the leadership of Soares, Antunes, and Eanes. After the coup, the MFA chose gen. Spínola as president and leader of the Board of national Salvation, comprised of military officers. Spínola “brought centrists and socialists into his provisional cabinet,”46 but was unsuccessful in using this to “consolidate his power.”47 After being forced by the MFA to accept Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, a radical Communist,48 as prime minister, Spínola tried to reassert himself by calling for a popular rally to mandate his program. The roads and the rally, however, were blocked by Communist barricades, which the military refused to break up. As a result, Spínola resigned in September 1974.49

What followed was a radical turn in the Portuguese transition. Francisco da Costa Gomes, who was pro-West but also for the MFA program, replaced Spínola as president. The radicals within the MFA were growing stronger, and Gonçalves adopted the policy of the PCP.50 Soares, who had been gathering external support for his Socialist Democratic agenda, nevertheless “assured” US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that December that the “PCP would be gradually marginalized.”51 However, on March 11, 1975, Spínola engineered an anti-Communist coup (known as the “right-wing” coup) that failed and actually strengthened the MFA radicals, who then purged moderates from government; set up the Council of revolution; and carried out large-scale nationalizations.52 Simultaneously, the PCP promoted agrarian collectivization projects, which were resisted by farmers in the northern, heavily Catholic areas.53 Surprisingly, the scheduled April 1975 elections were a success for Soares and the Partido Socialista (PS), “showing how democracy had rapidly taken hold in Portugal”54 as the population demonstrated its opposition to the radicalization of Portuguese politics. However, after the elections, PCP general Secretary Alvaro Cunhal warned that “there [was] no possibility of a democracy” in Portugal, while there were rumors of an imminent “Lisbon Commune” and even civil war between north and South.55 In July 1975, Soares and other Socialist members of government resigned, while Communists prepared for “the final takeover.”56 the alarming radicalization of the left during the “hot summer” of 1975 convinced moderates to cooperate and consolidate their forces in favor of democracy.57 It was critical that at this point, Maj. Antunes and other fellow moderates published the “Manifesto of the nine” asking for the resignation of Gonçalves and the democratization of Portugal. 58 this manifesto was supported by 85 percent of the armed forces.59 the MFA, which had become more moderate, and President Costa Gomes forced Gonçalves to resign and appointed in his place a moderate prime minister.60

Following the publication of this manifesto, the moderates grew stronger, but they would still face a grave threat from a left-wing military coup in April 1976. Due to the successful suppression of this coup, Portugal soon thereafter celebrated the country’s “first freely elected government in nearly 50 years” with the election of Soares as prime minister.61 general Eanes, who had played a key role in suppressing the coup, was elected president.62 Eanes “provided an important stabilizing force in lisbon,”63 especially because governments had difficulty forming majorities.64 thus, provisions in the 1976 Constitution that provided stability were important. The president of state also served as president of the revolutionary Council and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.65 In fact, through this position of strength, the president actually drew “power away from the Assembly as he sought to ensure some stability and effectiveness” but did not attempt to institutionalize such power.66 the revolutionary Council acted as a further “balance or flywheel in providing a certain orientation to the unstable system”67 until it was abolished in 1981.

Neutralization of Potential Threats

Despite positive tendencies toward moderation and stability, “threats to the survival of a new institution will be very high in its infant stages.”68 Greece, Spain, and Portugal were no exceptions to this theory, but the leaders of these respective countries played pivotal roles in effectively responding to and neutralizing potential and actual threats. In Greece, Karamanlis took several steps to cleanse the army of extreme rightist elements and in so doing, prevent a backlash in response. After the 1974 elections, he pursued a policy of “contained and circumscribed retribution.”69 In fact, in 1975, a “foiled military coup” gave Karamanlis the political capital to try the leaders of the 1967 coup along with those of the 1975 attempted coup. Those implicated with torture or the brutal repression of the 1973 student uprising were also tried. Lesser sentences prevailed, with the exception of the junta leaders (who nonetheless received clemency from the death penalty) in an effort by the government to avoid polarization.70 Moreover, Karamanlis attempted to neutralize the military by appointing trusted officers, such as Evangelos Averoff, and by repeatedly stressing “the principle of civilian supremacy.”71 nonetheless, he “resisted calls to purge the army,” offering them early retirement instead,72 and thus opted to “offer reassurance in return for strict observance of the new rules of the game.”73

The threat faced by Greece was mild compared to that of Spain. After economic discontent prompted Suárez to resign, there was an attempted coup by Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, supported by general Jaime Milans del Bosch, in February 1981. It is clear that it was king Juan Carlos’s explicit support for democracy and condemnation of the coup that served to delegitimize it. This one pivotal action of a single individual leader “determined ... the shape of subsequent Spanish history.”74 After the attempted coup, the government passed legislation to reduce the autonomous regions’ powers so as to placate the military.75 In fact, “the fear of a military intervention against democracy helped to restrain the more radical instincts of some political actors.”76

Portugal had not one, but two coup attempts that challenged the success of democratization. The failed “right wing” coup by Spínola in March 1975 caused a dangerous radicalization toward the left while the leftist coup of November 25, 1975 also challenged the democratization agenda. Prior to this coup, despite the strengthened position of the moderates, “anarchy continued unabated” and “the military... became paralysed as the chain of command broke down completely.” general Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a radical populist,77 refused to resign and organized paratroopers to take over, but he was successfully stopped by a “strike force” under the command of Eanes. This victory by the moderates was a “major turning point of the process of transition”78 and ensured that Portugal remained on a democratic path. Eanes, appointed chief of the general staff, undertook the depoliticization of the army, reducing the forces by more than two-thirds to 40,000 men and integrating them into nAto.79 finally, in 1982, the Council of revolution, which kept certain political power in the hands of the military, was abolished by Parliament, symbolizing “the final return to the barracks of the armed forces.”80 Due to the strong support of democracy by several politicians and key MFA officers, the liberal democratic system prevailed.81

Factors Aiding the Institutionalization of Democracy

As is evident from the above analysis, although all three countries successfully emerged from dictatorships in the mid-1970s, the move towards democratization was a perilous one requiring charismatic and innovative leaders. Pridham’s warning against “the fallacy of retrospective determinism”82 serves as a reminder that it is impossible to judge a priori whether, even if many necessary conditions are in place, they will be sufficient to sustain a democratic outcome. Concerning Spain, Omar G. Encarnación notes that “we can be misled into believing that a successful democracy was a predestined outcome,” when, in fact it was “a delicate operation fraught with uncertainty and peril.”83 this concept applies to Portugal and Greece as well and emphasizes the critical significance of the leadership in cultivating a consensus movement toward democracy and neutralizing potential and active threats.

Significantly, throughout this process, one group played a consistently moderate role: the citizenry. In Spain, “the emergence of a larger and more variegated middle class discouraged the kind of sharply polarised and ideological conflicts that characterised the 1930s.”84 When called to vote, the people supported Suárez’s referendum for constitutional changes in 1976, voted for the UCD and Suárez in 1977, and again overwhelmingly supported the 1978 referendum on the new constitution. Finally, in 1982, the public voted left-of-center for Felipe González and the PSOE.85 In Greece, Karamanlis was widely popular with a population that desired above all “an uneventful ‘normalisation’ of political life,”86 and it duly elected him in November 1974. In fact, Karamanlis’s occupation of the presidency facilitated the election in 1981 of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party and Andreas Papandreou, because he played the role of a conservative “counterweight.”87 finally, in Portugal, the people decidedly voiced their opinion against the radicalization toward the left in 1975, when they voted for the center-left Socialist Party and Soares, indicating an overwhelming support for the “prodemocracy” parties,88 and again in 1976 and 1980, when they supported Eanes as president.89

In addition to the multiple rounds of elections in the three southern European countries, the approval of new constitutions (as well as laws that liberalized society) helped consolidate the democratic process. In Greece, the 1975 Constitution was inspired by Gaullist France: it provided for a relatively strong presidential office, which was seen as a way to prevent the chaotic politics of the past.90 In Spain, the 1978 Constitution provided for a parliamentary monarchy, in which the king was seen as a stabilizing factor, as well as autonomy for the regions. No official religion was specified.91 these provisions attempted to solve two of the most divisive issues in Spanish politics by establishing a strong, centralized state with simultaneous decentralization and by delicately addressing the relations between state and Church. The constitution was seen as legitimate precisely because it took an ambiguous stand and was thus evidently the result of compromise. In addition, it denounced repressive practices under the dictatorship in an attempt to break with the past.92 It also included “mechanisms...to impede the fall of the government” in response to the democratic failures of the 1930s.93 finally, in the case of Portugal, an initial constitution was adopted in 1976, which guaranteed universal suffrage, fundamental rights and liberties, the rule of law, and the transition to Socialism.94 However, it was revised in 1982 to replace the revolutionary Council with the Council of State and to diminish the power of the presidency.95

Finally, in all three cases, the external environment had an impact on the process of democratization. The most important aspect of this environment was western Europe’s ability to serve as a model for southern European countries.96 In fact, Spain, Greece, and Portugal were strongly influenced by their northern neighbors, both in the formation of institutional structures and in the character of their political parties. Greece and Portugal were directly inspired by the Gaullist constitution of France in initially establishing a strong presidential office. Similarly, in Spain, the constitution allows for “a constructive vote of no-confidence,” which was “a direct borrowing from the West German Basic law.”97 In addition, the political parties of Greece, Portugal, and Spain were “identifiable in relation to the different ideological movements in western europe.”98 In Portugal, while the Communist Party was receiving assistance from the Soviet union, this was matched by assistance to the moderate parties from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, including West Germany, and from Socialist parties and unions in western Europe. In fact, the Common Market pledged $180 million in loans with the political condition of the establishment of a multiparty democracy.99 In addition, Spain’s PSOE received “advice, money, and organizational expertise” from Socialist parties in France and West germany.100 even the Communist Party in Spain, which could have been a destabilizing force, adopted eurocommunism and worked within the democratic system.101 However, although European and international actors provided significant “moral, political, and material support” to the democratic cause in southern Europe, their “role ... can only be described as complementary and secondary to that of domestic forces.”102

Conclusion

It is evident that the causes underlying the fall of the dictatorships and the processes of democratization in Spain, Greece, and Portugal were notably different. However, it is from their similarities that one can distill those factors that were truly crucial in determining a successful outcome: the formation of a liberal democracy. First, it was evident that the dictatorships were obsolete and near collapse. Here, socio-economic modernization and previous democratic experiences were facilitating factors, while external factors in the case of Greece and Portugal, and Franco’s death in the case of Spain, provided the immediate impetus for change. In addition, throughout the transition, the people took a truly moderate stance when they voted in multiple elections, belying fears that Communism would dominate, especially in Portugal.103 More importantly, while the people’s desire for change was in place, it was primarily due to effective leadership that the dangers of the transition were successfully avoided. Democratization was indeed ensured by the existence in each country of a “swing man”104 (or two) who built consensus and cooperated with the opposition, as exemplified by Karamanlis, Juan Carlos, Suárez, Antunes, Soares and Eanes. These leaders also played a key role in mitigating threats from established powerful groups, especially the armed forces. Finally, the political influence and financial assistance from Europe helped moderate the Socialist and Communist parties, inspire the constitutions of the three new democracies, and build a multiparty democratic model. If there is one primary lesson to be drawn from the evolution of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, it is that the path to democracy was wrought with peril and the outcome was in no way predetermined.

Determining the reasons for the democratic successes in these three countries should not be seen as just an academic exercise. In fact, if common threads are identified, they can provide an important model for democratization elsewhere. Recently, the world has witnessed what appears to be another wave of democratization sweeping across several countries in North Africa and the Middle East. It will therefore be important to observe in those countries the evolution of the key factors identified in this piece: the role of the people; the character of the transition of the authoritarian regime; the stances of key power players, including the religious establishment, the army, and international actors; and, most importantly, the role of leaders in guiding change and engineering compromises that will allow moderate forces to prevail. Thus, one is pressed to ask, where will this much-needed leadership come from? And, in the face of a leadership deficit, can these movements be successful?

Notes & References

  1. Nikoforos P. Diamandouros, “Southern Europe: A third Wave Success Story,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins university Press, the International forum for Democratic Studies, and the Institute for national Policy research, 2007), 9.
  2. Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 582-590, JSTOR, accessed January 23, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151795.
  3. Geoffrey Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives on the new Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?,” in The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (UK: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1984), 21.
  4. Robert M. Fishman, “Review: Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy,” World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 422-440. 
  5. Jose Maria Maravall, Regimes, Politics, and Markets: Democratization and Economic Change in Southern and Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, 1997), 4. 
  6. Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives,” 19. 
  7. Maravall, Regimes, Politics, and Markets, 11. 
  8. Ibid., 44-46. 
  9. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Random House, 2007), 504. 
  10. Maravall, Regimes, Politics, and Markets, 47. 
  11. Ibid., 56.
  12. Judt, Postwar, 509. 
  13. Nikiforos P. Diamandourous, “Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 19741983: A Tentative Assessment,” in The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (UK: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1984), 53-54.
  14. Ibid., 54.  
  15. Fishman, “review,” 430. 
  16. Judt, Postwar, 511. 
  17. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Ten Years After the Revolution of 25 April 1974” in The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (UK: Frank Cass and Company limited, 1984), 72-83. 
  18. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Discovering Democracy,” The Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 1 (January 1, 1985), 67-81, accessed January 23, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40257659
  19. Kenneth Medhurst, “Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy.” in The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (UK: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1984), 30-49. 
  20. Ibid., 32. 
  21. Nikoforos P. Diamandouros “Southern Europe: A third Wave Success Story,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, the International Forum for Democratic Studies, and the Institute for National Policy research), 7-8. 
  22. Ibid., 9.
  23. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” 582-590. 
  24. Ibid., 589. 
  25. Medhurst, “Spain’s evolutionary Pathway,” 33. 
  26. Ibid., 33. 
  27. Medhurst, “Spain’s evolutionary Pathway,” 36. 
  28. Judt, Postwar, 519. 
  29. Ibid., 519-520. 
  30. Medhurst, “Spain’s evolutionary Pathway,” 37. 
  31. Ibid., 37. 
  32. Ibid., 38-39. 
  33. Omar G. Encarnación, “Spain After Franco: Lessons in Democratization,” World Policy Journal (Winter 2001/02): 39. 
  34. Medhurst, “Spain’s evolutionary Pathway,” 39-40. 
  35. Encarnación, “Spain After Franco,” 40-41. 
  36. Diamandouros, “transition and Consolidation,” 54. 
  37. Ibid., 55. 
  38. Ibid., 55.
  39. Judt, Postwar, 510. 
  40. Diamandouros, “Transition and Consolidation,” 57-60. 
  41. Ibid., 57.
  42. Ibid., 61.
  43. Ibid., 59.
  44. Ibid., 63-64.
  45. Walter C. Opello, Jr., “Portugal: A Case Study of International Determinants of Regime Transition,” in Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Great Britain: Leicester University Press, 1991): 91. 
  46. Judt, Postwar, 51. 
  47. Opello, “Portugal: A case study,” 92. 
  48. Ibid., 86.
  49. Ibid., 92.
  50. Ibid., 93.
  51. Ibid., 94.
  52. Opello, “Portugal: A Case Study,” 94. 
  53. Judt, Postwar, 514. 
  54. Mario Del Pero, “A European Solution for a European Crisis. the International Implications of Portugal’s revolution,” Journal of European Integration History, ed. by the European union liaison Committee of Historians, 15, no.1 (2009): 29. 
  55. Judt, Postwar, 514-515. 
  56. Ibid., 96.
  57. Del Pero, “A European Solution,” 31. 
  58. Opello, “Portugal: A Case Study,” 97. 
  59. “Portugal: the Anti-Communists Strike Back,” TIME Magazine, August 25, 1975, http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,913421,00.html
  60. Opello, “Portugal: A Case Study,” 97.
  61. Ibid., 99-100. 
  62. Bruneau, “Discovering Democracy,” 75. 
  63. Ibid., 75. 
  64. Bruneau, “Continuity and Change,” 75. 
  65. Ibid., 77.
  66. Ibid., 78.
  67. Ibid., 78.
  68. Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives,” 12. 
  69. Diamandouros, “Transition and Consolidation,” 58. 
  70. Ibid., 59. 
  71. Ibid., 60.
  72. Judt, Postwar, 510. 
  73. Diamandouros, “Transition to Democratic Politics,” 60. 
  74. Judt, Postwar, 521. 
  75. Medhurst, “Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway,” 46. 
  76. Fishman, “Review,” 430. 
  77. Opello, “Portugal: A Case Study,” 96. 
  78. Ibid., 98.
  79. Ibid., 100.
  80. Opello, “Portugal: A Case Study,” 87. 
  81. Bruneau, “Continuity and Change,” 73. 
  82. Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives,” 16. 
  83. Encarnación, “Spain After Franco,” 38. 
  84. Medhurst, “Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway,” 40. 
  85. Kenneth Maxwell, “Spain’s Transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38, no. 1, The New Europe: Revolution in East-West Relations (1991): 37. 
  86. Diamandouros, “Transition and Consolidation,” 55. 
  87. Ibid., 64. 
  88. Bruneau, “Discovering Democracy,” 73. 
  89. Ibid., 75.
  90. Diamandouros, “Transition and Consolidation,” 64. 
  91. Judt, Postwar, 520. 
  92. Medhurst, “Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway,” 40. 
  93. Maxwell, “Spain’s Transition,” 38. 
  94. Bruneau, “Continuity and Change,” 74. 
  95. Ibid., 80. 
  96. Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives,” 15. 
  97. Ibid., 9.
  98. Ibid., 9.
  99. Bruneau, “Discovering Democracy,” 75.
  100. Maxwell, “Spain’s Transition,” 39. 
  101. Ibid., 38.
  102. Diamandouros, “Southern Europe,” 6-7. 
  103. “The Battle for Southern Europe.The Economist, August 10, 1974, 14-15, The Economist Historical Archive 1843-2006, http://www.tlemea.com/economist/home.asp
  104. Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives,” 18.
Christina Politi is an M.A. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, with a concentration in Energy Policy and a specific interest in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. She graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 2010 with a degree in International Affairs and a certificate in International Business.