"Peace is Costly, but it is Worth the Expense": Stalemate in Sudan

An Alternative Approach to Peace and Justice in Darfur

UN Peacekeepers on Patrol in Abyei
"Peace is Costly, but it is Worth the Expense": Stalemate in Sudan : An Alternative Approach to Peace and Justice in Darfur - Nora Sturm


Is the legal maxim of “justice delayed is justice denied,” frequently leveled against the International Criminal Court for its poor track record, an accurate description of the current situation in Darfur? Or, on the contrary, could the imperative of immediate justice, so often heralded as the sine qua non of a durable reconciliation, be temporarily suspended in the interest of peace? With these questions in mind, will explore what impact a temporary deferral of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir might have, and whether this “surrender of justice” could expedite the peace process. In short, could deferring the ICC arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir lead to peace in Sudan?

No Peace Without Justice

The ICC, created in 2002 through the ratification of the Rome Statute, is the only extra-territorial criminal court with both the authority and the responsibility to try alleged persecutors of genocide, crimes against community and war crimes. As its founding document clearly states, the ICC is first and foremost mandated to act in the interest of justice: “…the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured.” The Court’s founding documents also declare its goal “…to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”[1]

One can also argue that the goal of punishing crimes and prosecuting war criminals contributes to a larger objective: achieving lasting, sustainable peace. Peace is not a negative condition that exists only in the interstices of violence or in the absence of conflict; on the contrary, for peace to truly take root, it requires that a strong sense of security be restored among the warring populations. Without it, there is no guarantee that their individual, inalienable rights – to life, liberty and security of person – will be protected. This security, in turn, depends wholly on the existence of an effective and impartial justice system that establishes an equilibrium between victims and perpetrators and channels any desire for vengeance through legitimate judicial institutions.[2] Indeed, by facilitating retribution for past crimes and delegitimizing violence as a tool of dispute resolution, international justice serves a crucial role in ending the suffering of the war’s victims and preventing mass violence from reigniting.

In short, a crucial assumption underlying the ICC arrest warrant is that peace and justice sustain each other and are mutually reinforcing: if the truth is not told and accountability is not guaranteed, Bashir will not be deterred from committing further mass violence against his people; deep grievances on the part of the victims will remain unaddressed; and the embers of the long-standing crisis will continue to slowly burn, reigniting at the slightest spark. With the inherent complementarity between peace and justice in mind, let us now examine what the ICC arrest warrant could achieve in terms of promoting peace in Darfur.

The ICC Arrest Warrant: A Potential Boon for Peace

This broad argument – that justice is integral to peace – played a key role in informing the decision to refer the mounting violence in Darfur to the ICC in March 2005. Indeed, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1593, the Prosecutor was tasked with “promot[ing] the rule of law, protect[ing] human rights, and combat[ing] impunity in Darfur…in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace.”[3] Many in the international community, and particularly in the West, also hoped that the increased pressure placed on Bashir’s National Congress Party as a result of the referral would lead it to take steps to cease all violence and implement genuine and credible measures to resolve the crisis. This sense of optimism was strengthened when Bashir was finally charged with war crimes (for directing attacks on the area’s Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa peoples) and crimes against humanity (for overseeing murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape) in March 2009,[4]and with genocide in July 2010, when a second warrant was issued.[5]

At the time, many Western lobby groups and conflict analysis organizations conjectured that “…the prosecution may provide others with leverage to resolve the Darfur conflict, make Bashir a sufficient liability to his party to cause his resignation and possible exile, and possibly prevent further violence in Sudan by showing there is a price to be paid for heinous crimes.”[6] As Human Rights Watch argued, “…an indictment is a deeply de-legitimizing thing. Being indicted for mass murder makes you someone that no one wants to be around… When someone is indicted for crimes against humanity or war crimes, that tends to marginalize them; it diminishes their power and it creates more political space for moderate forces to come to the fore and those are the ones who are more likely to actually make peace. That’s been the experience in Bosnia, in Yugoslavia, in Liberia, even to some degree in northern Uganda. And we expect it to be the case in Sudan as well”.[7]

Indeed, by virtue of Article 86 of the Rome Statute, which stipulates that “States parties shall… cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”,[8] member states are under a legal obligation to cease all relations with the Government of Sudan, as well as to arrest Bashir and turn him over to the ICC if he sets foot on their soil. Since the indictment, his freedom of movement has become constrained to a few friendly Arab states and African neighbors. In July 2013, for instance, news of his presence in Abuja at an African Union summit spread quickly and led to calls for his arrest by human rights activists both inside the country and abroad, forcing him to return to Sudan to avoid being arrested by the Nigerian justice system. His indictment has also cost him a number of former allies. While Bashir used to enjoy the protection of Malawi’s former head of state Bingu wu Mutharika, the current President Joyce Banda has not allowed him to set foot on Malawian territory.

This growing marginalization could have an important impact on Bashir’s ability to wage war. First, Khartoum’s sources of loans to finance its budget deficit and pay for the costs of fighting a war on multiple fronts are slowly drying up. Major international lending institutions have blacklisted the government, and many smaller national banks prefer to close their accounts with Sudan than risk incurring the wrath of the U.S. for making loans to the government. Having historically relied heavily on foreign direct investment as a source of wealth, the Khartoum government is now facing a steep decline in this important stream of external financing. Once the arrest warrant was issued, both public and private investors faced mounting pressure from advocacy groups and became increasingly reluctant to invest in projects in Sudan out of concern that their reputations would be tarnished by doing business with a government accused of war crimes. [9] The result is that only the Arab investment funds, the Islamic Development Bank, and a small number of Chinese entities are prepared to support Sudan financially. In short, the impact of the arrest warrant in terms of damaging the country’s business climate, coupled with a devastating loss of oil revenue following the South’s secession in 2011, could quickly deplete the Sudan’s coffers and significantly hamper its ability to crush the rebellions as powerfully as before.[10]

Second, a lack of progress on the indictment front, caused by the Sudanese government refusal’s to comply with the ICC and hand over Bashir, could lead to the establishment of even more oppressive sanctions than those currently in place. This retaliation by the international community could further weaken the state and limit its ability to wage war by focusing selective pressure on Khartoum. 

Although a number of individual countries have established unilateral sanctions on Bashir’s regime (such as the U.S. government’s Sudan Sanctions Program or the UK’s Embargoes and Sanctions on Sudan Program), the most comprehensive regime system is the UN’s Sudan Sanctions Committee, which attributes to all member states the responsibility to staunch the flow of arms and other war materiel to key actors operating in Darfur, to prevent them from travelling and seeking exile outside of the country, and to freeze the financial assets and economic resources owned by individuals designated by the Committee.[11] Both the international and unilateral sanctions schemes are remarkable for the conspicuous absence of Bashir’s name on the list of  people targeted by the asset freeze and travel ban, last updated in September 2013,[12] and for the number of loopholes that weaken the sanctions’ potential impact on his movements. 

It is conceivable that the longer Bashir evades justice and the arrest warrant remains unfulfilled, members of the international community will be compelled to increase the severity and reach of their sanctions until he has no more room to maneuver. As the International Crisis Group recently noted, “…lack of decisive sanctioning action by the Security Council arguably fostered conditions where the regime had more to gain by continuing down a path that involved war crimes and crimes against humanity than it did by dialing back and committing to a genuine peace process.”[13] If these conditions were to change - that is, if governments were to increase the pressure on Khartoum out of commitment to the ICC’s pursuit of justice (by adding Bashir to the travel blacklist, for example) - the arrest warrant may indirectly contribute to reduced violence and to increased prospects for sustainable peace.

In theory, therefore, the ICC arrest warrant could have the corollary effect of advancing peace in the region through the mechanisms described above. Given the experience in Uganda, where ICC arrest warrants for leaders of the Lord Resistance’s Army played a key role in isolating them from their support base in Khartoum and thereby increased their interest in participating in the Juba peace talks, it is reasonable to hope that a similar outcome could be replicated in Sudan.[14] As the International Crisis Group anticipated in 2008, “…it may be the case that, in initiating this process [applying for an arrest warrant] the Prosecutor will be advancing the interests of peace…It may be that the increased pressure now placed on the NCP governing regime will lead it to take long overdue steps to cease all violence and implement genuine and credible measures to resolve the Darfur crisis.”[15]

The ICC Arrest Warrant: An Actual Bane for Peace

Bashir’s indictment added fuel to the already fiery debate about the ICC’s exclusive and, according to critics, disproportionate, focus on Africa – to date, all of the Court’s investigations have involved abuses on African soil.[16] While most of these cases were referred by the national governments themselves, these accusations nevertheless tarnish the institution’s reputation as a truly international and neutral tribunal. Given that the ICC has no police force of its own, cooperation by member states is crucial in enabling it to carry out its mandate. However, if African states, and in particular Sudan’s neighbors, perceive the institution as unfair, selective or arbitrary – epithets that the African Union (AU) and Kenya, in particular, recently leveled against the court – they will be increasingly reluctant to collaborate and turn Bashir over should he enter their territory.

Indeed, with the exception of the few heads of state mentioned above, the arrest warrant has succeeded in coalescing support for Bashir among many African and Arab leaders, who took umbrage at the indictment of a sitting head of state and worried that such far-reaching jurisdiction could be used against them. The Arab League issued a statement in March 2009 expressing its solidarity with Sudan and rejecting the ICC decision against Bashir on the grounds that it undermined the country’s sovereignty and set a dangerous precedent by targeting a current head of state. The Arab League also argued that the ICC’s actions breached the 1961 Geneva Convention on Diplomatic Relations as well as customary international law.[17]Similarly, the African Union issued a resolution in 2009, which it reiterated in 2010, prohibiting its member states from cooperating with the ICC,[18] and in 2012 called on the court to drop its charges against Bashir.

In short, instead of marginalizing the leader in the region, the arrest warrant succeeded in achieving the very opposite, with a number of key regional organizations and individual countries aligning with Bashir and refusing to cooperate with the ICC on the pretense of protecting Sudan’s national sovereignty against “a non-democratic entity based on selectivity and double-standards that targets the weak and turns a blind eye to criminals”.[19] If isolation on the international and African scenes was ever a factor in Bashir’s decision-making, the mobilization of regional support behind him engendered by the arrest warrant removed that threat and allowed him to continue operating with impunity. 

While it is impossible to definitively attribute particular actions to the ICC decision, it is nevertheless worth considering whether the arrest warrant actually prolonged the fighting in Sudan. It is arguable, in other words, that the principal Darfuri rebel groups were emboldened by the prospects of Bashir’s arrest and became increasingly loathe to cooperate and commit to a cessation of hostilities.

Both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) have exploited the space created by the warrant to harden their positions and retreat from their initial willingness to engage with Khartoum. As the International Crisis Group notes, these groups saw the decision as further isolating and delegitimizing the National Congress Party and a sign of international support for the military option and regime change, and therefore continued to rearm and fight in the hopes of defeating the weakened state.”[20] Given that their military escalation did not yield the desired results, they have shifted their approach and are now angling to obtain more from the negotiations than what they had initially hoped for. Indeed, perceiving Bashir and the NCP as being in no position to bargain, the principal rebel factions are currently demanding significant amendments to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), which was signed into effect in July 2011 and constitutes the framework for the peace process in the region. The JEM has rejected the Doha Agreement and is insisting on a more comprehensive agreement that would include the SPLM rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and bring about democratic change.[21] The other leading rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement–Minni Minawi (SLM-MM), is similarly exploiting the pressure on Bashir by refusing to take part in peace talks under joint AU-UN auspices and by asserting that regime change is the only viable option.

Neither the alternative proposed by the JEM, which would entail significant concessions to the rebels, nor the demand for regime change made by the SLM-MM is conceivable to Bashir and his government, a fact that the rebel groups are undoubtedly aware of. This political maneuvering allows them to continue attacking army positions in the west of the country and to bring their armed struggle closer to Khartoum, all under the pretext of a “true peace” for the people of Darfur. In reality, however, their obstruction of the process has resulted in high numbers of displaced people and casualties as the deadly fighting continues throughout the region and has put at risk the chances for a definitive and stable peace.

Third, the indictment has also changed Bashir’s calculus, resulting in retaliatory action and a hardening of his grip on power. The day after the arrest warrant was issued, Bashir expelled thirteen international aid organizations and three local agencies, which had been providing vital humanitarian relief throughout Darfur, on the grounds that they were spies working beyond their mandate and disrespecting the government’s authority.[22] According to the UN, this step gravely affected the lives of more than 1.5 million people living in the region, whose access to food, water, and healthcare was severely compromised.

Today, the resurgence in hostilities between armed groups and government troops and among tribal forces has meant that the demand for humanitarian assistance has increased beyond anticipated needs. Indeed, aid workers reported that following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the Government of Sudan became even more opposed to the presence of international aid workers on Sudanese territory, and particular in rebel-held Darfur. In Bashir’s mind, the presence of aid agencies contributed to the secession of South Sudan, to his indictment, and to the strengthening of rebel movements and therefore needed to be curtailed.[23] The result is that nearly all aid agencies have stopped providing assistance, and the few that stay have little support or security from the UN’s mission on the ground. In addition to the immediate shortages in aid and protection, the expulsion also caused the remaining agencies to prioritize emergency assistance at the expense of long-term development initiatives, which has dire consequences for the region’s long-suffering inhabitants. 

Furthermore, rather than scale back his military operations, Bashir continued instead to sponsor aerial attacks against rebel positions in reaction to the ICC’s decision. In May 2009, for instance, a few months after the warrant was issued and days after negotiations resumed between the two parties, UNAMID peacekeepers described seeing Sudanese government aircraft bombing suspected rebel outputs in the west of Darfur.[24] Similar provocations by the government were reported over the following months, leading to hundreds of reported casualties and thousands of displaced people. Just last month, the government announced a new offensive against the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, which combines the main Darfuri factions with rebel groups in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states.[25]

According to Sudan expert Eric Reeves, “…what we are seeing in Darfur is rapidly increasing insecurity, greater danger for displaced persons and their camps, more attacks on relief supplies and humanitarians, increasing fighting among various armed parties (including Arab inter-tribal fighting), and unconstrained aerial bombardment by Khartoum wherever it thinks it gains military advantage against rebel groups, even if the only effect of the attacks is to kill civilians perceived by the regime as supporting these groups.”[26]

In short, an overview of developments in the region reveals that the indictment did not result in an abatement of the hostilities on either side. The rebels, buoyed by the decision, have adopted increasingly hardline positions and refused to engage with Khartoum on terms other than their own. Bashir, in turn, has reacted to the warrant by entrenching himself, restricting UN and humanitarian operations, and continuing to defiantly launch deadly attacks in the region. The result has been incessant warfare, hundreds of thousands killed, millions displaced, and billions spent on aid. Given this miserable reality, one must ask whether focusing so intently on delivering justice and arresting Bashir is not in fact counterproductive; and, as a corollary, whether the most pressing need – to end the horrific suffering of the Sudanese and ensure that there is no new explosion of mass violence – might not be better met by temporarily suspending this pursuit of justice. In the words of Andew Natsios, former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, “…however much one may despise Sudan’s regime for committing atrocities, moral outrage is no substitute for practical policies aimed at saving lives and promoting stability.”[27] What other options are there?

An Actionable Alternative

As Alex de Waal contends in his authoritative analysis of political dynamics in Sudan, “…the long-standing rule of thumb for Khartoum elite politics should not be forgotten: the greatest threat to the president comes from those closest to him…”, and not from external actors or disorder in the peripheries.[28] Based on this theory, Sudan’s ruling class is constantly faced with challenges – bankruptcy, debt, war, international isolation, and an indictment by the International Criminal Court, to name a few – and has, by dent of its “hyper-dominance” over the rest of the country, become adept at weathering them. As a result, the only real threat to the regime’s grip on power comes from within its inner ranks or from the capital’s middle-income population, which has long benefited from the center’s economic exploitation of the hinterland. Writing in 2007, de Waal predicted that it is only when Khartoum becomes unable to sustain its prosperity and relative social peace that “the chickens will come home to roost.” Until then, having passed through the worst and facing a much more favorable economic and political environment, the regime would continue to manage for a while longer.[29]

Recent developments in Khartoum portend an imminent and important shift in this paradigm and thereby constitute a window of opportunity for the international community to finally influence the peace process in a positive way and break the cycle of violence in Darfur. In late September and early October, Bashir’s government was confronted with a new threat in the form of large-scale urban demonstrations protesting the regime’s decision to slash subsidies on fuel and other essential commodities, which it responded to with brutal repression, resulting in an estimated 200 casualties and 800 arrests.[30] As John Prendergast notes, although rebellions have raged nonstop in Sudan since Bashir’s coup in 1989, what has been missing is a corresponding urban uprising that complemented the rural wars. Without any pressure in Sudan’s northern cities, the Islamist regime has remained somewhat comfortably in power. That is why, he notes, “…[that] week’s violence [was] potentially so significant.”[31]

Indeed, Khartoum’s middle-class population, which had long reaped the benefits of the regime’s marginalization and exploitation of the periphery, has become increasingly disillusioned with and affected by the government’s corruption, mismanagement of the economy and consequent austerity measures, causing it to join forces with the poor in protest. Although the demonstrations quickly subsided, they nevertheless revealed widening cracks in the regime’s Khartoum-based stronghold, which grew even wider as a result of the government’s extreme reaction. For the first time in recent history, the center found itself on the receiving end of the regime’s brutality, marking an important turning point in the dynamics that have kept it afloat for so long. 

The demonstrations also brought to the surface growing divisions within the National Congress Party. Shortly after the unrest, more than thirty of the party’s top figures collectively presented a memo to Bashir, criticizing his decision to remove the subsidies and condemning his forces’ excessive use of violence against the protesters. They also urged Bashir to open up political space and create a mechanism for national reconciliation composed of various political forces, including members of the opposition, and outlined a series of steps that the government should take to find a political solution. They reportedly concluded by saying that “the legitimacy of [his] rule has never been at stake like it is today.”[32] A number of these leaders, including the former adviser to the president and member of the party’s Leadership Bureau Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, have subsequently expressed their commitment to leave the party and form a new one to “bring new hope to Sudan.”[33] This most recent challenge to Bashir’s authority comes on the back of a coup attempt last year by elements within the army, the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces, the National Security and Intelligence Services and the ruling party itself. Though abortive, the plot revealed growing dissatisfaction with Bashir’s leadership and paved the way for further dissent this past fall.

How this nascent internal opposition and widespread popular anger will play out and impact Sudan’s political landscape remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the international community can and should capitalize on this increased pressure if prospects for peace in Darfur are to stand a chance. Given that the current strategy has failed in this regard, it is time to devise and implement an alternative approach. Invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute’s Article 16, a step which has never been used in the Court’s history, could lead to the collapse of Bashir’s power and, as a result, to a marked decrease in the violence plaguing Darfur.

By applying Article 16, the Court would grant Bashir a one-year deferral of the investigations and temporarily suspend the arrest warrant against him in exchange for specific and irreversible reforms.[34] Offering Bashir a strong incentive – a carrot rather than a stick – would increase the probability of a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire by his troops and militias, which would ensure a respite of the violence that has plagued Darfur for so long. Until now, Bashir has had nothing to lose; with his back against the wall, his options have becoming increasingly limited, which explains the desperate measures he has taken to maintain his grip on power. If he receives assurances that he will not be arrested and extradited the minute he sets foot on foreign soil, and if he sees in the implementation of Article 16 the possibility of regaining legitimacy on the international scene, Bashir may be willing to commit to a cessation of hostilities in Darfur. This, in turn, would open up space for the international community to provide much-needed assistance to the region’s inhabitants and focus its attention on resolving the inter-tribal clashes.

Furthermore, in deferring the investigation, the international community would invalidate the principal argument that Bashir has so consistently used to justify his actions and divert blame for his failures, namely external intervention in the sovereign affairs of his country. In a recent press conference, where he addressed his government’s response to the street protests, he attributed Sudan's economic problems to outside factors and not to the mismanagement of Sudan's oil revenues in the lead-up to the secession of South Sudan, or on the high cost of the wars in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Nuba mountains.[35] No longer able to blame “the West” for the litany of woes that Sudan has experienced under his rule, Bashir would be revealed for who is truly is: a war criminal who has brutalized his people and squandered his country’s resources. The ideological wall of protection that he has effectively built around himself would crumble, the rhetorical arguments he has so often advanced to justify his behavior would be revealed as baseless, and Emperor Bashir would be left, in effect, with no clothes.

This vulnerability would further undermine his position, weaken his support base, and in the absence of the indictment, blame for crushing economic hardship and prolonged fighting in Darfur (and in the New South) would be placed squarely on his shoulders. The costs that his cadre would have to endure, including popular anger and a discredited reputation, would quickly become unbearable and outweigh any benefits of remaining in an alliance with Bashir. 

This theoretical scenario, whereby the indictment would be temporarily rescinded, could predictably yield one of two outcomes. Bashir would either be sidelined by reformist elements within the NCP and, no longer able to ignore the deafening calls for his resignation, would be under great pressure to step down at the next elections. Alternatively, in order to stay in power he would have no choice but to significantly reform his government’s judiciary and security services and provide transitional justice to the people of Darfur. Such reforms, which would be a precondition for Article 16 to be invoked, would ultimately lead to the emergence of greater accountability, promote reconciliation efforts, and ensure crucial improvements in the governance of the country – all of which are essential to the success and sustainability of the fragile peace process.


As the African proverb in the title suggests, “peace is costly – but it is worth the expense.” Although it is impossible to predict with certainty what effect a deferral of Bashir’s indictment would have on developments in Darfur, the costs associated with maintaining the status quo, and thereby fueling his growing desperation and perpetuating the violence on the ground, are increasing by the day. The pursuit of justice for his heinous crimes is undeniably important, but not if it comes at the expense of peace, which has been eluding Darfur for over a decade. By deferring justice, the international community can ensure that the most critical of all needs – to end the horrific suffering of the Sudanese people and prevent a new explosion of mass violence – is met today and that the groundwork is laid for accountability tomorrow.

Notes & References

  1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
  2. Grono, N. The Role of International Justice Mechanisms in Fragile States, Speech to the Overseas Development Institute, “Peace versus Justice? Understanding Transitional Justice in Fragile States”, 9 October 2009.
  3. United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005 (S/RES/1593). Official record, New York, 2005.
  4. International Criminal Court, “Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, published by the Pre-Trial Chamber I on 4 March 2009. (ICC-02/05-01/09). Official record, The Hague, 2009.
  5. International Criminal Court, “Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, published by the Pre-Trial Chamber I on 12 July 2010. (ICC-02/05-01/09). Official record, The Hague, 2010.
  6. International Crisis Group, Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, 17 July 2009, p.26.
  7. Human Rights Watch, Why Indictment Matters, Interview with Ken Roth, 3 March 2009 (accessed at http://www.hrw.org/video/2009/03/03/why-indictment-matters on 3 December 2013).
  8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
  9. Reuters, “Interview – Sudan investors wary of war crimes case – minister”, 22 February 2009.
  10. According to a number of sources, including the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank, Sudan lost 75% of the oil production, 36% of budget revenue, more than 65% of foreign exchange revenue and 80% of total exports as a result of South Sudan’s secession and the subsequent loss of major oil fields located below the border.
  11. United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan”. (Accessed at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1591/ on 8 December 2013).
  12. United Nations Security Council, “List of Individuals Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1591 (2005). (Accessed at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1591/pdf/Sudan_list.pdf on 8 December 2013).
  13. Grono, N. The deterrent effect of the ICC on the commission of international crimes by government leaders, presentation for the conference ‘The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges”, 26 September 2012.
  14. Darehshori, S. and Evenson, E. “Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court”, Oxford Transitional Justice Research – Research Article 1, 19 March 2010.
  15. International Crisis Group, New ICC Prosecution: Opportunities and Risks for Peace in Sudan, 14 July 2008.
  16. The Office of the Prosecutor is currently conducting investigations in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Sudan and Uganda.
  17. Arab League, “Doha Summit Statement Regarding Solidarity with the Republic of Sudan in rejecting the decision of the First Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir”, (accessed at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ Arab_League_Summit_2009_-_SummaryFV.pdf on 14 December 2013).
  18. African Union, “Decisions and Declarations, Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009”, (accessed at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2009 /july/summit/decisions/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%20243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_e.pdf on 14 December 2013).
  19. Arab League, “Doha Summit Statement Regarding Solidarity with the Republic of Sudan in rejecting the decision of the First Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir”, (accessed at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ Arab_League_Summit_2009_-_SummaryFV.pdf on 14 December 2013).
  20. International Crisis Group, Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, 17 July 2009.
  21. “Sudan says no talks on Darfur without Doha framework”, The Sudan Tribune, 17 December 2013.
  22. Rice, X. “Sudan’s president orders all foreign aid groups to leave the country within a year: Bashir steps up defiance of international community and says he wants to ‘clear out spies’”, The Guardian, 16 March 2009.
  23. Loeb, J. “The disappearance of cross-line aid in Darfur, Sudan”, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 58, July 2013, Humanitarian Practice Network.
  24. Heavens, A. “Sudan govt forces bomb near North Darfur-UN”, Reuters, 13 May 2009.
  25. International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch, April 2009 – December 2013.
  26. Reeves. E. “’They Bombed Everything that Moved’. Aerial military attacks on civilians and humanitarians in Sudan and South Sudan, 1999 – 2013”. Sudan Tribune, September 2013 (Accessed at http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/sept_13_bombing_update.pdf on 4 December 2013).
  27. Natsios, A. Beyond Darfur. Sudan’s Slide Toward Civil War. Foreign Affairs. 3 May 2008.
  28. de Waal, A. “Sudan and the International Criminal Court: a guide to the controversy”, openSecurity, 14 July 2008 (accessed at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/sudan-and-the-international-criminal-court-a-guide-to-the-controversy on 17 December 2013).
  29. de Waal, A. “Sudan: What kind of state? What kind of crisis?”, London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Centre, Occasional Paper 2, April 2007.
  30. “Sudan’s Bashir: Protests sought regime fall”, Al Jazeera, 9 October 2013.
  31. Prendergast. J. “Is Sudan’s Uprising the Beginning of the End of Omar al Bashir?”, The Daily Beast, 28 September 2013.
  32. “Sudan cabinet reshuffle expected this week: sources”, The Sudan Tribune, 3 December 2013.
  33. Ibid.
  34. The Article, titled “Deferral of investigation or prosecution”, reads “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”. ((http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm)
  35. Shaib, A. “Is Sudan on the brink of another civil war?”, Al Jazeera, 27 October 2013.
Nora Sturm is a second year M.A. student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), working toward a degree in International Relations with concentrations in Conflict Management and International Law. Prior to attending SAIS, she worked for the International Crisis Group in Brussels. After two years in this role, she launched an NGO whose mission is to integrate policymaking in the areas of democracy, development, rule of law, and security in periods of political transition in fragile and conflict-affected states. She holds a B.A. in Sociology and Hispanic Studies from Columbia University.